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Developments in Australia 
and greater China
Andrew Podger, Hon S Chan and John Wanna
Introduction
This book – a symposium of papers originating from a workshop1 at 
City University, Hong Kong, in June 2017 – examines how governance 
structures may be designed to promote performance and to ensure 
accountability. It describes developments in Australia, the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan.
1  The workshop was organised by the Greater China Australia Dialogue on Public Administration, 
a collaboration amongst scholars across the People’s Republic of China (including Hong Kong and 
Macao), the Republic of China (Taiwan) and Australia. Workshops have been held each year since 
2011 involving both scholars and practitioners who are keen to learn more about developments and 
practices in each other’s jurisdictions on issues of common interest.
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The book explores in particular the executive arm of government’s 
institutional arrangements for advising on and implementing government 
policies and programs. It does not aim to explore the basic institutional 
arrangements of government, though these inevitably shape the structures 
within the executive. Rather, chapters explore theories of organisational 
forms and functions in public administration, the ‘core’ agency structures 
used in the different jurisdictions, the structures used to deliver public 
services (including non-government organisational arrangements) and 
other ‘non-core’ agency structures such as government business enterprises, 
regulatory organisations and ‘integrity’ organisations.
This overview highlights some of the key issues canvassed in the following 
chapters and the recent developments they describe and analyse. It also 
fills in the inevitable gaps that exist in the volume’s coverage of practice in 
the three jurisdictions.
The concepts of performance and accountability used in the chapters vary 
from a narrow focus on administrative delivery with oversight by superior 
authorities to a much broader appreciation of the impact of both policy 
and administration against desired outcomes with public reporting and 
accountability. The concepts are shaped by institutional arrangements, 
and are also evolving in each jurisdiction over time.
Theories of forms, functions, 
accountability and performance
As John Wanna argues in Chapter 2, principles for the design of 
organisational structures are more often honoured in the breach than in 
the observance, and many contextual factors may influence them. At the 
same time, structures do help to shape the way that functions are managed 
and there may be some truth in the adage ‘form should follow function’.
Wanna also notes the previous century’s increasing emphasis on ensuring 
bureaucratic structures, such as those described by Max Weber, are 
democratically accountable upwards, to governing supervisors, and 
outward to the wider community. More recently a particular emphasis 
has also been placed on accountability for performance.
3
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The way in which such accountability is achieved is determined in large 
part by each jurisdiction’s political institutional framework. There are 
considerable differences across the PRC, Taiwan and Australia, perhaps 
the most significant concerning the relationship between politics and 
administration. Both Australia and Taiwan have a formal separation of 
roles while the PRC’s party-state system features an integration of politics 
and administration. Nonetheless, Wanna’s discussion of balancing the 
desire for conformity and the benefits of flexibility, and of balancing 
political control and ‘relative autonomy’, has relevance in the PRC as well 
as Australia and Taiwan, as all three look to improve both accountability 
and performance, however defined.
These universal issues are addressed in other chapters, including those 
that explore the increasing use of non-government organisations to 
deliver public services and the various contractual devices used to ensure 
a measure of accountability to the public, not just to the executive. 
The appropriate, or desired, balances vary with the functions involved.
Wanna and Andrew Podger try to map functions to structures with 
different balances of control and autonomy, not only to describe 
the differences and relationships but also to suggest some normative 
framework (notwithstanding the many factors that affect the structures 
used). Both authors also refer to the influence of informal conventions 
and practices on the way structures operate, including professional values, 
norms and cultures, which is a theme also reflected in other chapters.
Podger further draws on developments in institutional and organisational 
theory and their continuing relevance to public administration structures 
and processes, particularly with the current interest in behavioural 
economics and innovation.
High-level structural trends
A common development in the three jurisdictions has been to reduce 
the number of ‘core’ departments or agencies over time. In part this was 
intended to help the political leadership exercise greater control over the 
whole of government.
Podger refers to Australia’s introduction of ‘mega-departments’ in 1987, 
which allowed a reduction in the size of the cabinet, with each ‘portfolio 
department’ represented in cabinet by its ‘portfolio minister’. Non-cabinet 
DeSiGninG GovernAnCe STruCTureS For PerForMAnCe AnD ACCounTABiLiTY
4
ministers and parliamentary secretaries were appointed to support 
portfolio ministers in defined areas of responsibility. The arrangement 
continues to operate, supporting a generally effective cabinet coordination 
process, though it has not proven to be as successful as originally intended 
in providing ongoing stability in (portfolio) departmental responsibilities 
(the 2020 arrangements have also blurred lines of accountability between 
administrative structures and the ministry). Australian governments 
frequently (too frequently, perhaps) engage in machinery of government 
changes, often for expedient reasons. Looking back, two recent trends 
can be detected: a proliferation of agencies occurred around the early 
2000s, followed by a rationalisation of agencies from 2013–14 and 
a  reconsolidation of functional agencies under umbrella organisations 
(e.g. the combination of national security agencies under the Home 
Affairs ministry).
Yi-Huah Jiang reports in Chapter 4 that Taiwan has had more difficulty 
in streamlining its overall structure because the Legislative Yuan and not 
the Executive Yuan establishes the key agencies and determines their 
functions (in Australia, it is only the prime minister who has the power 
to determine the Administrative Arrangements Orders that allocate 
functions and responsibilities to ministerial departments). While modest 
rationalisation has been achieved, with indicators of some improvements 
in performance, Jiang identifies a list of lessons to be learned from the 
attempts at comprehensive structural reform within Taiwan’s overall 
institutional framework, highlighting the various forces constraining 
reform. He concludes that successful reform may only be possible if 
Taiwan moves from its unique five arms of government to a more standard 
three-arms framework (executive, legislature and judiciary), under either 
a presidential or parliamentary system.
The PRC’s institutional framework involves, at least formally, a centralised 
system controlled by the authoritarian Party leadership and administered 
by the executive (the State Council). Within this party-state framework, 
the State Council has modernised its organisational structures through the 
introduction of umbrella ministries and related agencies. Coordination 
within the executive arm is undertaken by the General Office of the State 
Council and core ministries such as the National Development and Reform 
Commission and the Ministry of Finance, within which the National 
Budget Office has responsibility for managing an increasingly modern 
budgetary system. Line ministries and related agencies have a high degree 
of specialisation and exercise varying degrees of devolved autonomy, 
5
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which cascades down levels of government with coordination at each level 
supported by the corresponding arm of the finance ministry (each level 
also having its own party-state framework of devolved authority).
Non-core agencies and non-government 
service providers
As Wanna highlights, a key issue in structural design is the balancing 
of political control and ‘relative autonomy’. Podger refers similarly to 
varying ‘degrees of independence’. Arguably, this balancing has been 
at the forefront of Australian institutional design, although forces of 
independence and control should be seen as contending discourses.
The Australian experience reflects longstanding organisational pragmatism 
informed by Western democratic theory, suggesting that administration 
requires a degree of independence for optimal performance (and to some 
extent limiting political risk). Whether based on the United Kingdom’s 
1854 Northcote–Trevelyan Report (Northcote & Trevelyan 1854) or 
the 1886 Woodrow Wilson lecture on ‘The study of administration’ 
(Wilson 1886), most Western democracies have established professional 
merit-based civil services that are relatively impartial and non-partisan, 
while nonetheless implementing the policies of the elected government 
(if at times through the bureaucratic lens of self-interest).
In Australia, successive public service legislation since 1902 has formalised 
the separation of politics from day-to-day administration and this applies 
to both core and most non-core agencies. There are, nonetheless, varying 
degrees of independence according to the formal structures used as well 
as to informal conventions and practices. The main determinant of 
independence is whether the organisation function is classified within 
the ‘public service’ (low independence), as opposed to being classified 
in the wider ‘public sector’ (higher independence) – and a similar set 
of arrangements exists in neighbouring New Zealand.
The Australian chapters identify the main structures that have evolved 
within jurisdictions. Apart from the ‘core’ ministerial departments 
with limited degrees of independence from political control, these 
include non-departmental service delivery agencies, statutory regulatory 
authorities, integrity organisations and government business enterprises. 
Wanna dissects such a classification into the different dimensions of 
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authority that may be exercised with a degree of autonomy. Podger 
highlights how the use of different structures and their accountability 
frameworks have changed over the last 30 years under new public 
management (NPM) and new public governance (NPG) (such as through 
contracting out, commercialisation, privatisation and networking). 
In drawing attention to increasing inconsistencies in recent years, with 
some functions being subject to increased political control while similar 
functions have been allowed greater independence, Podger’s concern is that 
such inconsistency may adversely affect performance. He suggests a more 
coherent and consistent approach so that formal structures and informal 
processes complement each other in setting the degree of independence 
appropriate to the particular function.
Mike Woods and David Gilchrist explore in more detail Australia’s 
developments with regard to the delivery of aged care and disability 
services. Recent innovations in these two areas reflect both institutional 
theory and neoliberal ideas. Although these contrasting sources of 
ideas differ in some important respects, they are both premised upon 
or presuppose a  considerable degree of independence from politics, 
especially through the use of non-government organisations (NGOs) 
to deliver services as well as greater consumer control over what services 
are delivered. The reliance on NGOs to deliver services brings with it the 
need for careful financing arrangements and effective regulation to protect 
consumers: the new structures that have been established to meet these 
requirements are more independent of political control in the case of 
disability services than in the case of aged care services. To date, Australian 
governments have not relied as much as Singapore’s administration on 
consumer or client satisfaction (or the obverse – complaint systems used 
to recalibrate service and improve customisation).
David Gilchrist examines developments in the relationship between 
government and the not-for-profit (NFP) sector in Western Australia 
(WA). Following an economic audit of the WA public sector in 2009, 
the then government established a Delivering Community Services 
in Partnership (DCSP) policy aimed at strengthening the relationship 
between government and the NFP sector and improving the delivery of 
community services. A partnership forum was established with a view 
to supporting a more collaborative approach to policy and practice, to 
recognise the value of the NFP sector and to identify practical improvements 
to the way the sector is used. Gilchrist led a series of evaluations of the 
related initiatives that found further infrastructure investment was needed 
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within government and within the NFP sector, including for training and 
systems and to streamline contracting processes; they also found there had 
been insufficient funding of change management to effect the paradigm 
change intended. 
Annwyn Godwin, a former merit protection commissioner in Australia, 
describes the way her office operated as an example of an ‘integrity 
organisation’, and how she was influenced by a number of models of 
public administration accountability promulgated in Australia since the 
early 2000s. These models responded to the growth in the number of 
different agencies and the impact of NPM and NPG. While the panoply 
of integrity organisations she describes have considerable independence 
protections in their statutes, she suggests that a more complex balancing 
of control and autonomy amongst different ‘integrity organisations’ is 
emerging, which is in part related to the extent they are expected to pursue 
enforcement of appropriate behaviour within government or pursue more 
educative roles. She also sees advantage in integrity organisations working 
together to optimise their impact.
Yi-Huah Jiang provides a broad overview of Taiwan’s institutionalised 
internal monitoring practices involving its unique five arms of state and, 
in particular, the key functions of the Examination Yuan and Control 
Yuan that service and scrutinise the more familiar executive, legislative 
and judicial branches of government. In Taiwan’s extended separation of 
powers, the Examination Yuan protects Taiwan’s politically neutral public 
service, overseeing the application of the merit principle. In addition, 
the Control Yuan has administrative policy and oversight functions 
and is responsible for monitoring the other branches of government 
encompassing some of the key functions (such as audit and compliance) 
that, in Australia, are managed by so-called ‘integrity organisations’. 
By its very existence as a separate yuan, the Control Yuan has considerable 
independence from political control by the executive. The Control Yuan 
has yet to develop a taste for conducting an assurance measurement 
of performance of either agencies or programs.
Within the executive, Jiang refers to ‘functional institutions’ that may 
broadly be compared to ‘core’ ministries, ‘supportive institutions’ that 
help the Office of the Premier to coordinate and monitor the work of 
the ministries and ‘independent institutions’ with a range of regulatory 
responsibilities. While the last group clearly has substantial independence 
from political control, the second group’s degree of independence from 
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political control is not clear from Jiang’s chapter (despite being under 
the Office of the Premier) and may vary considerably. Jiang is also not 
convinced by calls for more independence and autonomy, noting the 
growing importance of collaboration across agencies.
The structures applying in the PRC are not addressed in this volume. 
Because there is a high degree of integration of politics and administration 
in mainland China, it is not possible to categorise PRC public sector 
organisations against a continuum from political control to independence 
and autonomy. There has been considerable effort in recent years to 
improve the professional capability of those advising government and 
making policy decisions and those delivering public services. Reforms over 
the last few decades indicate the potential to be clearer about organisations’ 
respective accountability arrangements and degrees of independence. 
PRC state-owned enterprises (SOEs), for example, have undergone 
reforms  requiring them to be subject to more commercial forms of 
accountability while allowing them greater management flexibility. 
Also, social public service institutions such as universities, schools and 
hospitals focus on service delivery in line with the policies, financing 
and administrative rules imposed by the core ministries. In some cases, 
there has been a growing trend to contract NGOs to deliver some 
services, in parallel with increasing numbers of NGOs in civil society and 
a relaxation of top-down controls over them.
Nonetheless, under President Xi Jinping, party control across government 
agencies, including SOEs, and party influence over civil society, have 
increased significantly (Podger & Chan forthcoming; Song 2018; Shen, 
Yu and Zhou 2020). This has not detracted from measures to improve 
‘talent’ and professional expertise amongst party cadres and other civil 
servants (Chen et al. 2015).
In other Chinese-based jurisdictional entities, such as Hong Kong, 
Taiwan and Singapore, community-based organisations have a much 
longer involvement in the provision of community support services. 
In this collection, José Chiu-C Chen and Helen K Liu explore the role of 
community-based organisations in Hong Kong and Taiwan, highlighting 
their potential role not only in delivering public services but also in 
representing their communities and providing space for active deliberation 
within their communities. Implicit is not only a degree of independence 
from the vicissitudes of contemporary politics and government policies, 
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but the possibility of contributing to political deliberations consistent 
with moves towards ‘collaborative governance’. Chen and Liu also suggest 
that the use of these organisations contributes to capacity building in the 
broader public sector.
Horizontal management and 
informal processes
Since the 1990s, Australia has joined other Anglophone countries in 
placing more emphasis on horizontal or whole-of-government approaches 
to address intractable policy challenges and so-called ‘wicked problems’. 
This is now reflected in public service and financial management and 
accountability legislation promoting cooperation across and beyond 
government, even though formal accountability is still based primarily 
on vertical lines from departments and agencies through ministers 
to parliament. 
This development, and the role of informal processes of collaboration, 
referred to in the articles by Wanna, Podger and Godwin, is still in its 
relative infancy. While it is clear that more funding and resources are 
committed to intractable social and environmental problems, marked 
improvements in outcomes are not yet evident. For instance, after more 
than a decade of attempting to ‘close the gap’ between the wellbeing of 
Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians, only two of the targets set 
were on track according to the 2020 report (DPMC 2020); improvements 
were reported in some other areas including employment and health but 
no more than those experienced by non-Indigenous Australians.
The chapters by Fanrong Meng, Zitao Chen and Pichamon Yeophantong 
and by Bo Yan and Jiannan Wu address the challenges of horizontal 
management and the role of more informal process in the PRC.
Meng et al. examine why provinces in the PRC nominate to be pilot 
regions for vertical management of environmental protection. Two sets of 
conditions are identified, one relating to poorer provinces and the other 
to richer provinces. In both cases, horizontal competition plays a critical 
role, but poorer provinces have fewer environmental problems to address 
and better ecological resources and hence less public pressure and risks 
from being a pilot. In contrast, richer provinces have greater problems, 
more public pressure and the resources to deal with the issues, so the risks 
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of not participating may be significant. The vertical management pilots 
are intended to identify ways to strengthen environmental protection 
through stronger central controls and greater professional expertise. 
Political control may well become stronger, but based more firmly on 
evidence of what works. As the authors caution, how vertical management 
fits alongside provincial horizontal management is yet to be determined.
Bo and Wu provide a fascinating case study of how a county’s small 
leading group successfully pursued major reform despite doubts about the 
county’s capacity and the possible implications for government employees. 
Critical to success was the role of the county’s first deputy mayor, who led 
the small group of cadres responsible for the relevant county functions, 
and his style in managing meetings. The informal processes drew upon 
Chinese cultural mores to reward or shame participants, as well as 
acceptance of compromise to make progress. The group demonstrated 
how horizontal management can succeed in responding to vertical 
management directions.
Contrasting performance management 
and accountability in Anglo versus 
Chinese settings
A number of chapters highlight how different structures and their 
different  balances of political control and independence give rise 
to different performance accountability arrangements: to whom are they 
accountable and for what?
Bennis Wai Yip So provides an interesting historical perspective on 
Taiwan’s experience with performance management, contrasting this with 
the experience of Anglophone countries. He not only traces the long 
history of performance monitoring in Taiwan (and earlier in mainland 
China under the Kuomintang), but also how this was originally focused 
solely on ensuring the proper implementation of policies of the successive 
heads of government. Taiwan’s performance management pathway, 
therefore, differed considerably from that of Anglophone countries 
implementing NPM reforms. With democratisation, however, Taiwan 
has more recently applied aspects of the NPM approach as it shifted first 
from policy implementation to management, and then to NPM-styled 
performance evaluation and public accountability.
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Conclusions
The context within which reform of institutional structures is debated and 
pursued in these jurisdictions varies greatly. There are differences in the 
wider political institutional frameworks, jurisdictional histories, stages of 
economic development and social contexts. This results in numerous and 
diverse public policy and management challenges.
There is, however, shared interest in improving accountability and 
performance in government, and in finding the structures that best 
support accountability and performance.
In practice, many factors affect the structures used and the balancing 
involved between political control and administrative independence, 
and between conformity and flexibility. Nonetheless, some degree 
of independence and flexibility is conducive to professionalism and 
performance, and to ensuring outward accountability to organisations’ 
clients and the broader public as well as upwards to organisations’ 
governing  supervisors. This is perhaps best illustrated by the growing 
interest across all jurisdictions in the use of NGOs to deliver some 
public services. 
While typologies of structures and functions differ across these 
jurisdictions, the chapters in this book suggest that functions could be 
usefully mapped to different degrees of independence (and different areas 
of autonomy) to optimise performance and accountability, and hence to 
different structures. ‘Core’ functions assisting governments to set policies 
and determine priorities might best be situated towards the close political 
control end of the spectrum, while some regulatory functions requiring 
strict and consistent legal determination, and some government oversight 
or ‘integrity’ functions, might be towards the more independent end, 
with service delivery lying somewhere in between. Government business 
enterprises also need considerable management flexibility for high 
performance, but only if they are also subject to firm commercial-oriented 
accountability.
Such a mapping, however, will never provide more than a general guide, 
and a myriad of factors must also be taken into account, including 
experience, reputation and proven performance, and political interest. 
Informal practices and relationships also always affect the way different 
structures operate in practice.
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In the final short chapter, Andrew Podger presents his reflections on 
possible lessons, particularly for the PRC. This is drawn not only from the 
material in the book and the workshop in 2017, but also from his wider 
observations of public administration practice in China over the last 
decade. Drawing on his close observation of developments in Australia, 
he also emphasises that reform of institutional structures is an ongoing 
challenge and indeed that Australian experience demonstrates serious 
risks to capability and performance from slowing or backtracking reform. 
In addition, he notes ways that Australia could learn from China without 
compromising its firm democratic principles.
References
Chen, L, Chan, H, Jie, G & Jianxing, Y 2015, ‘Party management of talent: 
building a party-led, merit-based talent market in China’, Australian Journal 
of Public Administration, vol 74, no 3, pp 298–311.
Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPMC) 2020, Closing the Gap: 
Prime Minister’s Report 2020, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra.
Northcote, SH & Trevelyan, CE 1854, Report on the Organisation of the Permanent 
Civil Service, House of Commons, London.
Podger, A & Chan, H (forthcoming), ‘The challenge of comparing public 
administration in China and Australia: developments and prospects for 
China’, in M De Percy, C Althaus & A Podger (eds), Public Administration 
and Politics in Practice: Essays in honour of John Wanna, ANU Press, Canberra.
Shen, Y, Yu, J & Zhou, J 2020, ‘The administration’s retreat and the party’s 
advance in the new era of Xi Jinping: The politics of the ruling party, the 
government and associations in China’, Journal of Chinese Political Science, 
vol 25, pp 71–88.
Song, L 2018, ‘State-owned enterprise reform in China: past, present and 
prospects’, in R Garnault, L Song & C Fang (eds), China’s 40 Years of Reform 
and Development 1978–2019, ANU Press, Canberra, doi.org/10.22459/
CYRD. 07. 2018.19.
Wilson, W 1886, ‘The study of administration’, Teaching American History, 







purpose, function and form, while 
counter‑posing political control 
versus bureaucratic autonomy
John Wanna
Recognisable forms of public bureaucracy and administrative cadre date 
back millennia and were especially prominent in ancient Egypt, Persia, the 
Graeco-Roman period and ancient China. These ancient bureaucracies 
were the earliest forms of state institutions that invented and/or developed 
some of the basic fundamentals of statecraft such as the creation of writing 
and record keeping, systems of taxation and tithes, property entitlement, 
investments in infrastructure, maintenance of public order, security and 
foreign affairs, as well as monumentalised forms of regime glorification 
and celebratory displays of power.
Most public bureaucracies from mediaeval to modern times modelled 
themselves on the two pre-existing forms of hierarchic organisation with 
which they were familiar and against which they could map themselves 
– religious and military institutions – with the churches providing more 
enduring examples of continuity and collective memory. The important 
lessons drawn from alternative hierarchies came to be regarded as 
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principles geared to the maintenance of authority and organisational 
capacity (see Weber 1978) – including hierarchic structures and systems 
of authoritative control, with clear lines of command; the establishment 
of an administrative class enjoying fixed salaries, tenure of employment, 
selection on competence or experience and without having a proprietorial 
interest in the organisation; specialisation and the division of labour, the 
disaggregation of work duties and tasks giving organisations distinct areas 
of competence; organisations governed by internal rules and procedures 
providing stability, predictability and consistency; the assembly of official 
records and the significance of record keeping in exercising not only 
administration but also power; and, in later modern forms, the rational-
legal determination of decision-making rather than dilettantism or 
personal whim.
Many of these inherited attributes of public organisation are evident 
in today’s public organisations. Max Weber also noted sociologically 
that public bureaucracies developed informalities, collective norms and 
internalised modus operandi. They acted in covert ways, often developed 
secret languages or codes of communication and sometimes operated 
concealed budgetary systems (Weber 1978: 992). Public bureaucracies 
were simultaneously part of the edifice of the nation state but also 
a ‘shadow state’ operating from within. 
Of course in practice many of these empirically observable ‘principles’ 
(which were transformed into generic normative guidance) were often 
more honoured in the breach than in the observance (see Gouldner 1954). 
Hierarchic control could be undermined by distance or powerful rival 
actors. Clear lines of command could be contravened, violated or 
convoluted. Offices were sometimes sold to willing aspirants, or given to 
kith and kin, and bribery and corruption prevailed. Staff often developed 
a virtual proprietorial interest in the organisations in which they served. 
Competency was aspirational not guaranteed. Decisions could be based 
on emotion or ad hoc grounds and justified by administrative fiat. 
Records were often incomplete or corrupted and available only to the 
initiated. And internal rules could be arbitrary or fickle and variable in 
application. The perennial dilemma in bureaucratic modes of organisation 
is if bureaucrats are conditioned to following orders, rules and procedures 
throughout their tenured careers, who provides the leadership qualities at 
the pinnacle of the pyramid that is essential for the bureaucracy to function? 
This is sometimes called the ‘Weberian paradox’ (Beetham 1974).
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Prior to the early 20th century (and in Weber’s seminal writings), these 
largely inherited principles essentially related to the organisational design 
of bureaucracies and the administrative tasks at hand – favouring insular 
structures; the inculcation of inward-looking perspectives; the imperatives 
of operational transactions (competence and efficiency), with some notions 
of standardisation, equity of conditions and treatment; and service-wide 
endeavour. There was little appreciation of the need for such bureaucratic 
structures to demonstrate democratic accountabilities, or for these 
organisations to be publicly accountable both upward to their governing 
superiors (legitimate authorising officers) and outward to the wider 
community. Providing the ruler or ruling class was more or less satisfied 
with the administrative capabilities of their administrative echelons then 
all was well. Bureaucrats were not themselves held accountable for errors 
or maladministration, with political executives nominally answerable for 
their supportive administrative organs to the legislature and/or monarch, 
the media and general public.
Greater interest in the overall accountability of the bureaucracy began 
to develop in the late 19th century, initially addressing issues of legality, 
judicial and financial probity, administrative due process, legislative 
scrutiny of administrative spending and the independent assurance of 
resource usage (with audit acts and auditors-general who were increasingly 
made independent from the executive), followed by expanding notions 
of answerability to the legislature of ministers or other important office 
holders. In the United States the accountablity of Congress to the 
electorate played an important role in demanding accountability from 
federal office holders from the president down (both in their appointment 
and execution of their roles). Various regulatory functions administered 
oversight through such things as the Pendleton Civil Service Reform Act 
1883, which insisted on propriety; the Wilsonian emphasis on roles and 
competencies; and the enforcement of greater transparency through the 
Freedom of Information Act 1966. 
In parliamentary jurisdictions, with a reliance on conventions of 
‘responsible government’, regular explanations to parliament over policy 
decisions, public service performance, maladministration or mishaps 
became the norm, especially as disciplined party dominance increased 
the tenure of governments. Waves of interest in expanding and codifying 
accountabilities increased in the post–World War II years, so that the 
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imperatives of accountability and transparency now play a more significant 
part in organisational structures, cultures and dynamics (Shergold 2004; 
Mulgan 2003).
Contemporary public organisations have to continually balance their 
organisational form and performance with their need for reputational 
standing and multidimensional legitimacy (in the eyes of the public, 
political supervisors, peer groups, stakeholder groups and experts in the 
field). They have to deal with many eventualities that will affect their 
organisational form and shape – e.g. planning and research, budgeting 
and resourcing, administrative or policy design, regulatory mandates and 
enforcement, coordination and communication as well as a panoply of 
accountability requirements. It is also imperative that public agencies 
retain legitimacy in the eyes of their stakeholders, and maintain public 
trust and confidence (a phenomenon most keenly observed when agencies 
lose this credibility). These factors influence organisational design and 
adaptation and shape the possibilities or scope for relative autonomy. 
In an alternative conceptualisation, Carpenter (2001) enunciated these 
qualities or necessary conditions as organisational differentiation from 
political influences, organisational capacities often uniquely framed, and 
reputational credibility.
Various authors have identified some of the (contestable) principles or 
rationales for organisational design, usually with some post hocery and 
a degree of backward mapping. They prompt the awkward question of 
how much intentional design was purposefully commissioned from the 
beginning and how much was subject to incremental adaptation (see 
Podger 2013). Many of these principles focus on the range and extent 
of their activities, the types of complexity public bodies have to handle, 
their client bases and service imperatives, and the degree of political 
dependency/independence warranted by the function. Historically, the 
main organising principles for public bodies were tied to purpose, place 
or location, processes undertaken, or the persons served (Gulick 1937).
More recently, scholars have added the principle of consolidation to the 
notion of a prime function or purpose by joining like-with-like functions 
to amalgamate units and create better economies of scale (Pollitt 2013; 
see also Davis et al. 1999 who review machinery of government changes 
over 50 years). Others have argued that organisational form tends to be 
shaped by what successive governments regard as the most important areas 
of public policy that they want represented at the cabinet table. Since 
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the 1980s, many governments have hived off specialist delivery agencies 
from departments (executive agencies) in the belief that as relatively 
autonomous business units or cost centres they will perform better both 
for the government and clients (James 2003; Halligan & Wills 2008).
But other realpolitik factors also played a part in contouring bureaucratic 
forms. Sometimes governments wished to make symbolic statements 
about priorities, or they resorted to making machinery of government 
changes to paper over administrative shortcomings or policy crises. 
In addition, weak ministers or perceptions of ministerial overload could 
lead to agencies being divided or broken up, and restructuring might be 
triggered by dissatisfaction with the quality of policy advice or service 
delivery. These surreptitious rationales were rarely admitted openly by 
governments for fear of inciting scepticism or even ridicule. 
To what extent does purpose and 
function determine organisational form 
in public bureaucracies?
To ascertain whether an agency’s purpose and functions determine its 
organisational form (as normative theory suggests they ought), we need 
first to ask generically how far public organisations are able to customise 
their structure and form. This is not a simple question because many 
overlapping and contending requirements simultaneously apply to any 
public organisation, including constitutional and/or statutory obligations, 
administrative policies and procedures, centrally specified instructions, 
guidelines and memorandums. Organisations also face pressure to adapt 
their presence to their responsibilities, which are often closely geared to the 
nature of their interactions with clients or constituents (e.g. social service 
departments have community-based branches, educational departments 
operate community-level schools and training facilities, agricultural 
departments typically operate regional structures to be close to their 
clients or to provide research and testing facilities). Hence, governments 
and their organisation components must balance the requirements 
imposed from top-down imperatives and bottom-up pressures to service 
their clientele.
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Accordingly, organisational form is shaped primarily by twin forces. On the 
one hand, there are pressures for conformity, imposing commonality, 
consistency and standardised application aimed at making organisations 
similar, routinised and comparable. Similar management structures, 
budgetary and corporate planning requirements, staffing profiles and 
remunerations, and reporting obligations are generally imposed either by 
parliaments or by core executive agencies operating in the name of the 
legislature. Often the specific rationales for these conformist requirements 
are not spelled out in detail, nor are agencies necessarily aware of them. 
They are often imposed by decree out of a compulsion for political 
control and/or to comply with standardised operating procedures and 
accountability criteria.
Many agencies find conformist pressures to be constraining and 
frustrating – even claustrophobic – and often counterproductive, adding 
little to the ability of the agency to address its responsibilities. Some 
conformist requirements distract, undermine or erode the capacity of the 
agency to conduct its business or meet its expected performance levels. 
These impediments include onerous reporting requirements or regimes 
unrelated to their core business.
Traditionally, conformity was promulgated centrally as a means of exerting 
control over the fragmented organisational structure of government, 
particularly in the era when most public services were delivered ‘in-
house’ by public servants and government employees. Centrally imposed 
edicts gave governments and core executives a semblance of control and 
orderly systems of administration (see, for example, the Australian Public 
Service and Merit Protection Commission 2001). They enabled central 
agencies to observe the behaviour and practices of their departments and 
agencies, and imposed a blend of public accountabilities and executive 
accountabilities over administrative units (with much of the latter being 
internally imposed).
More importantly, consistent reporting was expected to provide the centre 
with comparable data about compliance to procedural requirements and 
performance. Regular tinkering with central edicts was often a reflection 
of frustration at not getting sufficient information from decentralised 
units or a fear that the utility and effectiveness of routine requirements 
would decline over time as agencies became used to them. Sometimes 
the demands from the centre increased and expanded, at other times 
arbitrary changes were made with the intention of keeping line agencies 
on their toes.
19
2 . THeoriSinG PuBLiC BureAuCrACieS
More recently, and especially alongside the adoption of new public 
management (NPM) and new public governance (NPG), central agencies 
examined the efficacy of traditional central controls to discern whether 
they were anachronistic or counterproductive. A raft of ‘dysfunctional’ 
central impositions and controls were abolished or reduced in significance 
and annoyance. Centrally imposed control over employee numbers and 
grades was gradually removed, budgetary flexibilities were introduced, 
managers were given greater freedoms and managerial discretion to 
achieve objectives, and onerous procurement mandates were relaxed; in 
most cases, these ‘impeding’ central controls were replaced by a raft of 
results-oriented central requirements. So, although agencies were given 
greater operational freedoms (Pollitt & Bouckaert 2004), they were 
nevertheless subjected to a more centralised set of guidelines on processes 
and reporting (e.g. budgets, staff management, community engagement, 
annual reporting, performance reporting).
In theory, this meant that agencies had greater latitude to reshape their 
organisational structures and delivery arms (Osborne 2010). In practice, 
many agencies used their new freedoms to divest themselves of lower 
grade  staff (clerical workers and assistants) and inflate the size of their 
middle-level  executive and, particularly, the numbers appointed to 
the most senior levels (e.g. senior executive service). Arguably, many 
agencies across the Western world became inordinately top-heavy 
compared to 20 or 30 years ago, with a panoply (or public exhibition) 
of executives designated to monitor every conceivable functionality. 
As self-administering organisations, universities were particularly 
susceptible to this inflation of executive positions (Coaldrake & Stedman 
2013; Marginson & Considine 2000). Going forward, we may see the 
reimposition of staffing controls or quotas for senior executives.
A further interesting aspect of modern public administration in the NPG 
era (or ‘new political governance’ era, see Aucoin 2012) is that agency 
executives can ask whether their current bureaucratic form is suited to 
purpose and aligned to their core businesses. Agency heads could not 
realistically ask (or do anything about) this question in bygone eras, but 
there are now possibilities for customisation if agency heads are prepared 
to explore them. The experimentation with ‘executive agency’ models 
provides some heuristic examples for emulation, but also offers some 
cautions and warnings about the dangers of ‘roguish’ behaviour. 
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Empirically, there is now scope for scholars to gauge how far have agency 
heads have gone in exercising their ability to shape their agencies. It is 
worthy of more detailed research to explore the extent that agency 
executives (and to some extent their presiding ministers) have proactively 
exploited their new latitude.
Dimensions of independence – balancing 
‘control’ and ‘relative autonomy’
It is common to conceptualise the balance between ‘political control’ and 
‘organisational autonomy’ as a spectrum ranging from no independence/
autonomy through to full independence/autonomy (see O’Faircheallaigh 
et al. 1999; Wanna 2008). Similar exercises in classifying a desired degree 
of political control versus autonomy have been undertaken for statutory 




















Non‑statutory bodies are created readily and can be restructured without the need for parliamentary support. 
Figure 2.1. Spectrum of political control over public sector organisations
Source . o’Faircheallaigh et al . (1999)
Public agencies range from ministries and departments that are close to 
executive government and under direct political control, to judicial bodies 
and integrity commissions that enjoy a relative degree of independence 
for their operations and decision-making (but not necessarily over the 
appointment and/or dismissal of senior staff, which may still be politically 
determined). Different traditions of governance are also important here 
(see Public Administration, special issue, vol 81, no 1, 2003) as, under 
Westminster parliaments, ministers and departments tend to possess 
little intrinsic autonomy, whereas, in many European parliamentary 
democracies with Rechtsstaat traditions, ministries retain considerable 
autonomy within their portfolio responsibilities. North American 
1  See especially Chapter 2, ‘The rise of corporate and public governance’.
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jurisdictions tend to be more programmatically driven (and include the 
imposition of sunset clauses) where agencies effectively ‘house’ programs 
and may gain a degree of autonomy through the particular provisions of 
specific programs. 
Being convenient and close to government, the departmental form 
has not waned in popularity, although their number, size and range 
of responsibilities has been altered regularly (through machinery of 
government changes, which perform essentially the same function in the 
public sector as mergers and demergers do in business). Departments 
possess the important advantages of being politically flexible, sensitive 
to ministerial preferences/priorities and able to work confidentially on 
sensitive topics out of the public gaze. The extent of political control can 
range from dirigisme and overt directives over bureaucratic directions, 
priorities and agendas, to a latent semblance of figureheading positional 
power or an amorphous ‘authorising environment’ where things may be 
done ‘in the minister’s name’ (see Moore 1995). Some (but by no means all) 
departments are beholden to (or captured by) professional standards and 
cultures that can serve to enhance their independence (e.g. departments 
of health or social services, or environment or transport). 
New Zealand and the United Kingdom typically have a large number 
of ministerial departments (30+) often with multiple ministers 
within a  portfolio or multiple ministries reporting to a minister. 
Some jurisdictions, like New Zealand, distinguish ‘departments’ from 
‘ministries’, with departments largely having combined policy and 
administrative roles and ministries being largely administrative or service 
delivery units (but now the terms seem interchangeable and ministries 
include the portfolios of environment, defence and civil defence, 
economic development, education, foreign affairs and trade, and social 
development). This segregation (which seems to outsiders somewhat 
artificial or idiosyncratic) may hark back to the wartime separation of the 
New Zealand War Cabinet from the War Administration during World 
War II, with the former charged with decision-making and the latter ‘with 
responsibility for all matters connected with the war’.
Generally, departmental organisations (and ministries) are subject to 
ministerial direction and control, but some have won or been allowed 
a degree of discretion in selected areas of their activities (e.g. operational 
matters, choosing their style of management, initiating research, 
funding specific activities). Government-wide statutes may also provide 
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departments with the capacity to make quasi-autonomous decisions 
(i.e. not involving ministerial direction), as with compliance to public 
service acts, freedom of information (FOI) acts, and the requirements 
of accountability acts governing financial administration, audit, 
secrecy and integrity. Together these acts provide statutory protections 
(and  requirements) for departmental executives that underscore the 
public accountability of them as public organisations. Ministers generally 
have no involvement in the appointment of departmental staff, and this 
is primarily a form of protection for ministers against accusations of 
favouritism or nepotism.
Statutory bodies (such as advisory boards, regulatory bodies, health boards, 
research institutes, sporting administrators) generally have a higher degree 
of autonomy but are still subject to overall direction from the government 
– the so-called ‘strategic control’ variously exercised over such authorities. 
Often with the establishment of statutory authorities, the main objective 
is to depoliticise a particular function and to prevent ministers from either 
meddling or being blamed for unpopular decisions (i.e. to avoid political 
control or political accountability).
The range of specialist functions that governments may wish to keep 
at arms’ length from political interference not only include regulatory, 
judicial and integrity bodies, but also railways, utilities, cultural entities, 
universities and some independent bodies serving as funding providers 
(e.g. grant administering bodies in research or artistic excellence). But, as 
Warhurst (1980) argued some decades ago, governments have a myriad 
of ways of influencing nominally independent statutory bodies by 
making ministerial changes to board representation, adjusting budgets, 
altering the empowering act of the body, making them subject to other 
legislation, using departmental oversight, and even having a ‘quiet word’ 
with a minister or ministerial staffer. Judicial and integrity commissions 
have been given the most autonomy, but are still subject to budgetary 
review and financial controls, politicised appointment processes and the 
odd rebuke or criticism from ministers.
Specialist agencies, in particular, tend to develop and protect their level of 
autonomy through professional norms, codes of practice and inculcated 
trainings. Professional norms and practices are important to bureaucratic 
independence not only because disciplinary training and culture creates 
particular values and mindsets, but because external professional 
requirements can dictate behaviour, predetermine decisions and stipulate 
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what can and can’t be done. Examples include accounting standards, 
health requirements, educational pedagogies, engineering compliances, 
legal precepts and codes, and cultural conventions. 
The professions have also created powerful associational interest groups 
that speak for them and can shape accepted practices and regulatory 
policies. Comprised of quasi-independent specialists and technicians, 
these professional associations can dictate how their members behave 
and decree what decisions are deemed appropriate. They have external 
credibility and authority. Tensions between governments and their 
architects, accountants, medical practitioners, engineers and educators are 
legendary in many jurisdictions. Often the heads of public organisations 
with large professional workforces are themselves members of the same 
profession and share the same world views as their staff, perhaps making 
them compliant with professional demands.
Bureaucratic independence or autonomy is never absolute in the public 
sector; rather, ‘relative autonomy’ is a more likely condition to which 
agencies can aspire or can acquire. So, what forms of departmental ‘relative 
autonomy’ might be identified? The following is a list of possibilities 
where degrees of autonomy might be practised:
• structural separation from the political sphere and executive control
• the ability to make policy decisions and determine the agency’s 
priorities and agendas
• the ability to initiate research independently and, perhaps, publish the 
product of this research
• budgetary freedom to deploy resources within a departmental expenses 
account and, where appropriate, retain a portion of external revenue 
generated as a result of its activities
• the ability to determine the location and physical presence of the 
agency, including selecting properties, buying or leasing facilities, 
co-locating or decentralising
• the ability to establish a staffing profile; make appointments; recruit, 
promote and train staff; and the ability to investigate internal practices 
and cultures
• the ability to hire and fire external consultants and other advisory 
actors
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• the ability of senior management to communicate directly with the 
public, parliament and the media; for instance, by speaking publicly 
on policy and administrative topics within their portfolio, making 
submissions to or public appearances at inquiries, and clarifying 
misunderstandings in the public realm
• the ability to report their activities, performances and finances as they 
see fit, subject to some legislative or executive guidance for wholly 
public bodies.
Agencies are unlikely to enjoy all these possible dimensions of ‘relative 
autonomy’ simultaneously. Some ‘freedoms’ come with additional 
constraints imposed. For instance, greater latitude in operational policy 
matters or administrative discretion may come at the cost of greater 
reporting requirements or performance expectations. Other ‘freedoms’ 
may be held but exercised with caution or a degree of self-censorship. 
Examples might include agencies with the capacity to initiate research 
and publish findings that selectively publish only those reports that do not 
embarrass the government or sit within the government’s comfort zone. 
To illustrate this point, the Australian Treasury retains the ability to initiate 
its own research on economic matters and routinely does so, and has on 
occasions attempted to keep such research confidential. For example, 
it  chose to release a stringent critique of government overspending 
at the time of the change of government in 2007 (from Liberal under 
Prime Minister John Howard to Labor under Kevin Rudd), rather than 
at the time when the excessive spending was occurring under Howard 
(Laurie & McDonald 2008). It also collated research on housing 
affordability (which was becoming prohibitively expensive for sections of 
the community) and chose not to release such information so as not to 
embarrass the government of the day, even resisting FOI requests seeking 
the information’s release. The chart below depicts various dimensions 
of bureaucratic autonomy, mapped against different types of structural 
organisation.
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Exercising autonomy through operational 
and informal structures
In practice there are myriad supporting operational factors underlying 
and sustaining these freedoms, including program design and 
implementation, budget submissions and the ability to redeploy financial 
resources, collaborative engagement with other public bodies, stakeholder 
and network relationships (including the capacity to negotiate through 
veto points), public relations and media management, and audit and 
performance review. In terms of implementation and operational 
capacities, agencies possess a bounded but proximate autonomy to make 
decisions because they are closest to the action and have discretionary 
latitudes. Moreover, not everything within an agency’s mandate is open to 
transparent oversight, so it often has wiggle room for increased discretion.
In addition to public organisations being allowed (or managing to 
achieve) certain degrees of formal independence and relative autonomy, 
they can also exercise autonomy through informal cultures and 
structures. These informal structures typically increase where authorising 
environments are distant or latent, mandates are contested or unclear, 
boundary issues are malleable or in dispute, and external changes 
punctuate routines. Informality may also increase to the extent that the 
agency has a determined leadership and management skills championing 
certain policy or administrative options (and conversely may be found 
in agencies characterised by corruption or maladministration). And, as 
already mentioned, professional cultures can enhance the scope for agency 
discretion and local autonomy.
Looking outwards, agencies can engage in building professional networks 
and stakeholder alliances as latent supportive constituencies and active 
players protecting the agency’s mission. Turning to supportive networks 
can be important in politically charged circumstances, where agencies 
enjoying credibility with stakeholder/interest groups are able to withstand 
pressures from the political executive and perhaps gain backing for 
alternative proposals.
Earned autonomy
‘Earned autonomy’ is not a measure of autonomy from ministers, but rather 
a performance and budgetary concept that is invoked to grant a certain 
degree of latitude to agencies considered by government executives and 
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central agencies to be performing well. This is a concessionary measure 
granted by central agencies to high performing or competently managed 
agencies (even according to reputational recognition) to enable them 
to direct their administrative efforts to their core business (and divest 
themselves of onerous but often less meaningful accountability reporting). 
Success provides them with circumscribed freedoms. Even so, no agency 
is totally free to determine its own budget.
Agencies with earned autonomy may enjoy more freedom to deploy their 
resource envelopes and may also be granted privileges including enjoying 
less onerous forms of formal accountability, such as reduced budgetary 
scrutiny. Service-wide requirements (e.g. right to information, equity, 
financial compliance and so on) continue to apply to these agencies, 
however, and they must still achieve meaningful results and convince the 
traditional layers of oversight of their above-average performance.
Earned autonomy is often closely associated with the influence of 
public choice methodologies in NPM/NPG jurisdictions that favour 
specialisation. Agencies using principal–agent theory to organise their 
activities tend to rely on contractual management rather than autarkic 
provision. Providing contracts deliver value for money and desired 
outcomes, these agencies may be less onerously reviewed by central agencies 
or the relevant legislatures. Simply relying on principal–agent models, 
however, is no ‘cure-all’ and no guarantee of heightened performance, 
and often has severe limitations not to mention associated perversities.
Notions of constitutional bureaucracy
Ideas about the constitutional role of the bureaucracy became popular 
after the Gomery Inquiry into accountability in the Canadian federal 
government under Prime Minister Jean Chrétien in 2004–06, and they 
have found some support in other Westminster jurisdictions including 
in the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and Singapore. The key 
argument maintains that the bureaucracy is the bedrock of the modern 
state, with wide and important constitutional responsibilities concerning 
stewardship of the state and, possibly, the longer term public interest. 
Such notions of the public service enjoying a privileged constitutional 
status within the state apparatus (which formally it doesn’t, but the 
idea can be traced back to the United Kingdom’s Northcote–Trevelyan 
Report of 1854) are based on traditional (nostalgic) custodian ideas 
of  the public service constituting an ongoing permanent institution of 
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state that is distinct from the comings and goings of daily politics but 
governed by an array of externalised legislation and guidelines subject to 
ministerial control.
This contested and controversial set of ideas is not least disputed by the 
political executive (in the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia). 
Those promoting this view argue that the bureaucracy ought to play 
a  stewardship role – serving the interests of the government of the 
day, while  also monitoring and protecting the integrity of public 
administration,  including guarding against improper requests or 
misconduct from ministers or their staff. Gomery even recommended that 
departmental heads write formally and inform parliament if they suspect 
their minister of improper behaviour – a recommendation rejected by 
subsequent Canadian governments (see Wanna 2006).
Following criticisms of the utilitarian nature of NPM in Australia, the 
notion that public agencies and departmental heads should have the 
responsibility to exercise stewardship has been written into the revised 
amendments to the Public Service Act 1999. However, ‘stewardship’ is not 
defined or given specific parameters – it is not clear whether it means 
responsibility for good administration, stewardship over the maintenance 
and augmentation of organisational capacities, or a broader custodian 
role acting in the public interest. The latter interpretation was particularly 
argued by Louis Sossin (2006) in his submission to the Gomery 
Commission in which he laid out the ‘constitutional argument for 
bureaucratic independence and its implication for the accountability of 
the public service’. Expressions of constitutional bureaucracy can include 
cases where senior public officials claim to be serving the Crown foremost, 
rather than the minister or the government of the day. Some police 
commissioners (and perhaps some senior military officers) in Westminster 
systems have typically been the type of functionaries who have claimed 
independence from government and higher loyalty to the monarch (e.g. 
the Salisbury affair in South Australia, see Cockburn 1979).
Independence has limits
No form of bureaucratic independence, whether awarded or acquired, 
is limitless. Independence comes with the responsibility to exercise it 
appropriately, astutely and justifiably – and, as Moore (1995) reminds us, 
has to be protected, prosecuted and renegotiated vis-à-vis the changing 
political environment and circumstances. Even the judiciary, which enjoys 
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high degrees of independence, faces political and public criticism of its 
sentencing and bail decisions. In Australia, mainstream media criticism 
has been directed at the Australian Human Rights Commission for 
overstepping its mandate and especially its former head, Professor Gillian 
Triggs, for politicising the commission (see Wanna 2015). Similarly, the 
Productivity Commission, a fiercely independent adviser on economic 
and social policy has intentionally self-censored its independence by 
preferring only to take formal references from government (the Treasurer), 
rather than independently initiate research and investigations (which 
it theoretically can do). It has (perhaps sensibly) chosen to provide 
independent hard-headed advice to government and be respected for the 
quality of that advice, rather than be independent of government. Other 
integrity-type bodies and independent commissions often face similar 
dilemmas (such as auditors-general, parliamentary budget offices and 
information commissioners).
Conclusions
On balance, a degree of ‘relative autonomy’ is probably a ‘good thing’ to 
aim for and offers encouragement to lift performance and aspirations 
to  improve capabilities for the public good. It has the potential to 
expand the horizons of public executives and their management teams, 
underscoring the value of public service and good public administration. 
But it is not without risks and potentially negative aspects (open to 
bureaucratic capture, goal displacement, covert operations). The Latin 
phrase quis custodiet ipsos custodes readily comes to mind (who guards 
the guards themselves). Done well, relative autonomy requires strong 
oversight from governing boards or corporate management teams within 
the agencies concerned (including from community representatives, 
experienced former ministers and stakeholder representatives). 
When they choose to act, ministers retain the authority to curtail 
autonomy, amend an agency’s mandate or priorities, restructure agencies, 
increase oversight, change management personnel, and merge functions 
or disassemble them. Ministers or cabinets are not likely to do this on 
a whim, but changing political preferences and priorities, or performance 
concerns may push them in that direction.
DeSiGninG GovernAnCe STruCTureS For PerForMAnCe AnD ACCounTABiLiTY
32
Importantly, as a final point, it is worth remembering that bureaucratic 
independence versus political control is not just an ‘either/or’ condition, 
or a zero-sum game. Other dimensions of organisational capacities remain 
significant and readily observable. For example, agencies may aspire to 
be high performers in terms of integrity, performance and the quality of 
client service without necessarily changing the degree of overall political 
control or level of independence. ‘Relative autonomy’ is an important 
concept to explore as we go forward in public administration but it is no 
silver bullet to defeat malfeasance or maladroit administration.
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Theory and practice in public sector 
institutional design in Australia1
Andrew Podger
Introduction
Government administration in Australia is separate from politics, but the 
degree of independence varies. Broadly, the main functions of Australian 
government administration, such as policy advising, service delivery, 
industry regulation and oversight of government, can be mapped to its 
main organisational structures: ministerial departments, service delivery 
agencies, statutory authorities and government business enterprises 
(GBEs). Over recent decades, particularly as governments have 
focused on performance – including by using market-type mechanisms 
to  improve  efficiency and networks across and beyond government  to 
1  This article builds upon presentations made by the author to a United Nations Development 
Programme workshop held in Beijing in 2013 (not published), and earlier to a 2011 workshop at 
The  Australian National University hosted by the HC Coombs Policy Forum on ‘Accountability 
structures for citizen-centred public services’ (Podger 2011). In 2019, the author drew on the material 
in this article in major submissions to the Independent Review of the Australian Public Service 
(Thodey Review).
DeSiGninG GovernAnCe STruCTureS For PerForMAnCe AnD ACCounTABiLiTY
36
improve effectiveness – the mix of structures has changed and their 
accountability frameworks have adjusted. The mapping of functions to 
structures remains complex – rather like ‘signposting the zoo’, as a former 
New Zealand colleague suggested – in part because of continuing debates 
over the appropriate degree of the administration’s independence from 
politics for different government activities.
This chapter proposes a framework of formal and informal structures and 
processes that might guide future governance arrangements for different 
functions in the Australian public sector, with a view both to promote 
organisational performance and to ensure appropriate accountability to 
the public.
First, the chapter provides some background on institutional theory as 
well as political and organisational theory and practice, and their relevance 
to public sector organisational structures in Australia. This suggests that, 
while there is no single or static optimal governance structure, generally, 
‘form follows function’ and public sector structures are shaped by 
judgements about the balance between political control and organisational 
independence appropriate for the functions involved.
The main organisational structures now used in Australia for different 
types of functions – and their governance arrangements – are then 
described, including how the legal framework has evolved over the last 
three decades in response to new public management (NPM), new 
public governance (NPG) and subsequent reforms. Examples are given 
of developments in structural arrangements for the different types of 
organisations as these reforms have been introduced and reviewed. This 
highlights some of the contemporary challenges Australia faces, including 
to develop a consistent approach towards balancing political control and 
bureaucratic autonomy,  and to identify structures most appropriate to 
providing citizen-centred services.
The chapter finishes with a possible framework of both formal rules 
and informal processes that would support greater consistency and 
coherence, and that might enhance the performance of organisations with 
different functions and ensure their appropriate public accountability. 
The framework draws on both the theoretical discussion and the history 
of Australian practice, as well as the contemporary challenge to provide 
services that are responsive to the needs and preferences of citizens and 
their families and communities.
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Theoretical considerations
Institutions2
Institutions set the ‘rules of the game’; that is, the way in which people 
organise regular interactions (Ostrom 2005). There are often multiple 
layers of institutions and each layer is shaped by and, in turn, influences the 
others (for example, in the public sector, the layers comprise constitutions, 
laws, policies and policy processes, and administration). They may involve 
formal rules, laws and structures, and also informal processes, conventions 
and practices. Preferably these are self-reinforcing and mirror beliefs and 
cultures, but they may sometimes be in conflict with them.
Institutions help to reduce uncertainty, setting constraints and coordinating 
the views and actions of those involved. Accordingly, they can foster 
efficiency. At the same time, however, there may be costs involved with 
institutional weaknesses and failures.
Institutions change and evolve, affected by social, environmental and 
technological developments. They themselves also affect societies and 
polities: they are political actors in their own right (March & Olsen 1984). 
An ‘agency perspective’ focuses on how individuals shape the system; while 
a ‘structuralist perspective’ focuses on how institutions react to exogenous 
changes and, in turn, establish a new cohesive social structure that shapes 
people’s behaviours.
Political institutions
Institutions are particularly important to the study of politics and public 
administration as they have an impact that goes beyond how people 
interact to the way they make choices (Ostrom 2005). They shape the 
opportunities that people have, as citizens, to be heard, to participate in 
decision-making and to access public services (Lowndes & Roberts 2013). 
Informal institutional rules can be as powerful as the formal ones, for 
example, in setting a professional public service ethos.
2  This brief summary draws heavily on the literature review in Talbot-Jones (2018).
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McIntyre argues that the ‘power concentration paradox’ creates 
dangers in political frameworks that disperse control of decision-
making too far, as well as those that unify decision-making too firmly 
at the centre (McIntyre 2003). A balance is required to ensure that the 
political system can  respond flexibly, decisively and in a timely way to 
changing circumstances, while also limiting the scope for capricious 
or arbitrary behaviour.
Advanced democracies have ‘a thick web of social and economic 
regulatory institutions’ (to use McIntyre’s phrase), which generally avoid 
the extremities of centralised and fragmented power. This web includes 
the judiciary, the legislature (often bicameral), a free press, a multi-level 
government structure, multiple parties, a range of semi-independent 
authorities (separate from the political executive), and non-state actors 
that monitor and contest policy and performance.
The question explored here is whether, within this ‘thick web’, and 
particularly within the bureaucratic arm of the executive, there is 
sufficiently explicit understanding of the degree of independence appropriate 
to different functions in order to achieve the optimal balance.
Australia’s political institutions
Australia’s public sector organisational structures operate in the context of 
a market economy and a strong civil society, and within a parliamentary 
democracy and a federal intergovernmental framework.
• Market economy: government activity is generally limited to 
addressing market failures or delivering public goods, ensuring a fair 
distribution of income and material wellbeing, and setting a  stable 
social and economic framework within which individuals and 
businesses can go about their daily lives and business with confidence.
• Civil society: government activity complements a strong civil society 
by supporting extensive networks of non-government organisations 
(NGOs) providing community services and representing and 
advocating for various society interests.
• Parliamentary democracy: the executive government comprises the 
party with majority command over the elected parliament (or at least 
the lower house), is accountable to the parliament and is subject to the 
law. The judiciary is independent of the executive and the legislature. 
There is a clear separation between politics and administration 
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within the executive, in which services are managed by professional, 
non-partisan public servants in line with the policies and programs set 
by the elected government.
• Federalism: Australia’s provincial governments (states and territories) 
are sovereign or semi-sovereign authorities and are responsible 
for the delivery of most public services (schools, public transport, 
hospitals, police).
Within this essentially liberal-democratic framework, public sector 
organisations within the executive arm of government are:
• accountable to the parliament (and hence to the public) through 
the system of ministerial accountability, with each organisation 
reporting to a minister and each minister being held accountable to 
the parliament
• accountable for their performance in utilising public resources 
efficiently, effectively, economically and ethically in accordance with 
the law and the organisation’s purposes as set by the elected government 
and/or the parliament.
The ways in which this accountability operates vary with the functions 
involved and the requirements set by the parliament. The separation of 
politics from administration gives administrators a degree of independence 
to ensure that their decisions are impartial, non-partisan and according to 
the law while remaining in line with the lawful directions of ministers 
and the policies of the elected government. This degree of independence 
varies, with some organisations having statutory powers provided 
by the legislature that constrain ministerial directions. The nature of 
the ‘performance’ for which agencies are held accountable also varies 
depending on the functions being performed.
The balance between political control and organisational independence 
is also affected by informal conventions and practices. The degree of 
bureaucratic autonomy, regulated through formal rules and structures or 
informal conventions and practices, may be affected by such factors as 
the importance that the legislature or the public place on impartiality, 
the reputation of the organisation for its expertise or pursuit of the 
national good, and the strength of its relationships with the public or with 
powerful stakeholders (Carpenter 2001). These factors or considerations 
demonstrate that the organisational structures within government are 
determined not only by the formal frameworks but also by the behaviours 
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of the organisations themselves and associated informal arrangements, 
and that the formal frameworks set by the legislature may be fashioned by 
the past and expected future behaviour of the bureaucrats involved.
In line with NPM reforms, accountability arrangements over the last 
four decades have shifted from an emphasis on conformance with rules 
and processes to an emphasis on performance for results. Organisations’ 
governance arrangements have also evolved with a shift to devolution of 
management authority, the use of markets for the delivery of services and 
an associated change in functions within government to purchasing and 
regulating rather than delivering services (Keating 2004). There has also 
been a ‘thickening’ of the relationship between politics and administration 
in recent decades (Light 1998) with increased resources for partisan 
support of ministers and a more general ‘professionalisation’ of politics.
More recent NPG and post-NPG reforms have modified NPM’s emphasis 
on vertical accountability to promote horizontal or whole-of-government 
coordination and wider networking with civil society (e.g. Rhodes 1997; 
Osborne 2010; Pollitt & Bouckaert 2011), and take advantage of new 
technology. The use of third parties to deliver public services has been 
extended to encourage greater collaboration focused on ‘citizen-centred’ 
services that are responsive to individual needs and preferences. Associated 
with these developments is more ‘downwards and outwards’ accountability 
direct to citizens complementing the formal ‘upwards’ accountability 
through ministers to the parliament, with administrators and their non-
government partners expected to achieve ‘public value’ (O’Flynn 2007). 
This idea of ‘public value’ is not without its critics, who are uneasy about 
constraining the role of elected politicians in Australia’s parliamentary 
system of government (Rhodes & Wanna 2007).
These developments, as indicated further below, have affected governance 
arrangements for organisations with different functions, in some cases 
allowing greater independence within defined performance expectations, 
and in others imposing closer political control. Similarly, there are instances 
in which structures have been merged to achieve greater coordination and 
other instances where organisations have placed greater reliance on data 
linkages and other more informal networking processes. A key question 
is whether these developments warrant some adjustment to either the 
formal rules or the informal conventions and practices that give effect to 
the degree of independence of different administrative functions.
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Organisational theory and practice
Organisational theory has evolved over the last century from Frederick 
Taylor’s ‘scientific management’ (Taylor 1947), emphasising formal 
structures with clear authority, firm rules and distinct jobs based on 
skills; Max Weber’s ‘bureaucracy’ (Weber 1978), delivering products and 
services efficiently and consistently on a large scale; to the identification 
of  ‘organic’ as distinct from ‘mechanistic’ functions (Gulick & 
Urwick 1937), and the importance of behavioural factors (e.g. Maslow 
1954; Simon 1957; McGregor 1960; Likert 1961; Herzberg 1968) 
and informal, non-hierarchical arrangements that support individual 
performance, productivity and innovation.
Australian practice in government broadly followed these theoretical 
developments, first with the use of semi-independent authorities to 
develop and manage the railways and various utilities and the emphasis 
in the public service on merit-based appointments, firm establishments 
and defined jobs (Public Service and Merit Protection Commission 2001; 
Australian Public Service Commission (APSC) 2003); and then, much 
later, the increasing employment of economists and other social science 
graduates and the shift away from detailed job classifications in the 1980s, 
when technological development drove radical changes.
More recent organisational theory emphasises both formal and informal 
structures and processes, the nature and mix varying with different 
organisational functions and circumstances. Mintzberg, for example, 
describes five types of structures that are suited to different organisational 
purposes and situations (Mintzberg 1979). Evidence of continued 
technological change places further emphasis on ‘flexibility’ and ‘agility’ 
to promote and respond to innovation, though it is not always clear 
what this specifically requires in terms of formal and informal structures 
and processes other than the greater use of ad hoc project teams, new 
start-up organisations and capacity to quickly reorganise and integrate 
horizontally rather than control vertically. There remain, however, 
functions that are more suited to stable structures with firm controls, 
including in professional fields reliant on high levels of training and 
associated professional regulation as well as businesses with ongoing 
products and services requiring stable divisions led by middle managers 
under central oversight. 
DeSiGninG GovernAnCe STruCTureS For PerForMAnCe AnD ACCounTABiLiTY
42
Current Australian public sector management rhetoric focuses on 
‘innovation’ and ‘agility’ (Parkinson 2016; Independent Review of the 
APS 2019), but the implications for organisational structures are yet to be 
explained. Moreover, Weberian bureaucratic attributes such as consistency 
and impartiality remain core values in the public sector notwithstanding 
the importance of embracing and responding to change (Podger 2016). 
It may therefore be likely that organisational structures within the public 
sector will continue to change with the functions being performed, and to 
involve mixtures of formal and informal rules and processes.
Australia’s main public sector 
organisational structures and their 
legal framework
The main public sector functions in Australia are:
• provision of policy advice to ministers
• purchasing of public services
• delivery of public services
• regulation of industries and services
• provision of expert research and statistics
• oversight of various aspects of government activity
• commercial delivery of services where there is market failure, such as 
where there is a natural monopoly.
Very broadly, these functions can be mapped to Australia’s main 
organisational structures:
• departments undertaking policy advising and purchasing of services 
and which work directly to ministers who are elected politicians
• service delivery agencies or executive agencies, operating within 
the policies set by ministers and funded by government, sometimes 
on a  purchaser/provider basis through ministerial departments, 
with a  focus on effective and efficient management and on meeting 
the needs of clients
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• statutory authorities the functions of which are set out in legislation 
and that operate with considerable independence of ministers, often 
undertaking regulatory functions or specialist research or oversight 
of government activities (the last group is sometimes referred to as 
‘integrity’ organisations)
• GBEs operating primarily commercially with limited reliance on 
government resources.
These distinctions are not always clear. For example, some service delivery 
agencies have their own legislation and are therefore statutory authorities, 
and services are frequently delivered by departments rather than non-
departmental organisations; other structures fall between these major 
types (e.g. museums and specialist service providers that rely mostly on 
government revenue but operate in a quasi-commercial manner); and 
organisational arrangements within some larger agencies handle particular 
functions somewhat differently to the agencies’ primary functions 
(e.g.  independent statutory committees and semi-independent bodies 
working within ministerial departments responsible for regulatory functions, 
and bureaus within departments conducting semi-independent research). 
There are also various types amongst these main structures (e.g. GBEs that 
are corporations or companies, and companies that are limited by shares 
or guarantees). Department of Finance reports since the early 2000s have 
identified this complex array of organisations (e.g. Department of Finance 
and Administration 2005a; Department of Finance 2020).
At the national government level, public service and financial management 
law is the primary legislation setting out the formal rules for governance 
and accountability. Both have been substantially reformed since the early 
1980s (APSC 2003) and the most recent changes came into force in 2013 
and 2014 (Podger 2018).
Public service legislation
The new Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia passed 
legislation for its public service shortly after federation in 1901. The Public 
Service Act 1902 covered all employees of the fledgling Commonwealth 
Government, with a central employer and a rules-based approach to 
establishing a firm ‘merit-based’ career public service to implement 
the decisions of the elected government and its ministers. While the 
legislation was replaced in 1922, this approach continued until the 1970s 
(Minns 2004).
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Starting in the late 1970s, the central employer (the Public Service Board) 
began to allow more flexibility by delegating powers to the agencies it 
oversaw. This began with establishments (internal agency structures 
and numbers and levels of positions) and moved on to recruitment and 
promotion and, in the 1980s, aspects of pay and conditions. In 1987, the 
Public Service Board was abolished and replaced by the smaller and less 
powerful Australian Public Service Commission, with more employment 
powers devolving to agencies. Much of the oversight of agencies shifted 
to the finance department through its budget processes, which reinforced 
the move to performance management based on outputs and outcomes.
The Public Service Act 1999 (PS Act) confirmed agency heads as the 
employers of staff. All employees must uphold legislated public service 
values including impartiality and being ‘apolitical’ (non-partisan) and 
accountable, and the merit principle. These attributes imply a degree 
of independence from ministers notwithstanding the requirement to be 
responsive to the elected government and subject to lawful directions 
by ministers. The PS Act also strengthened the accountability of agency 
heads for agency management and performance.
Most publicly funded government organisations are now subject to 
the PS Act. Those outside its regulation include GBEs, bodies with 
military-style employment (police and defence force) and bodies with 
distinct workforces and significant independence of government (e.g. the 
Australian Broadcasting Corporation and the Commonwealth Scientific 
and Industrial Research Organisation). Just over half of all Commonwealth 
public sector employees are currently covered by the PS Act and the rest 
are employed under their organisations’ authority or other legislation.
The legislation was reviewed following the Moran Review (Review of 
Australian Government Administration 2010), and an amended PS Act 
came into force in July 2013. The amendments addressed some problems 
arising from the degree of devolution introduced during the reforms 
(which had gone further than devolution in any other country) and 
promoted more collaboration across government. They also strengthened 
the role of the public service commissioner and made departmental 
secretaries responsible for the ‘stewardship’ of their agencies, addressing 
ongoing capability as well as current performance. 
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Importantly, these changes strengthened the formal distinction in 
Australia between politics and administration, increasing the degree of 
independence of the public service in terms of its apolitical, impartial and 
professional character, whether the public servants work in ministerial 
departments or service delivery agencies or statutory authorities. This shift 
is partly in response to strong trends in the opposite direction in recent 
years via informal practices through, for example, the growing number 
and influence of political advisers outside the public service working for 
ministers (Podger 2013a); those informal practices remain significant.
Financial management legislation
Until 1997, financial management and accountability was governed by 
the Audit Act 1901, which was also passed by the new Commonwealth 
Parliament shortly after federation. The legislation and its associated 
regulations and directions set out detailed processes for authorising 
expenditure of public moneys appropriated by parliament, giving the 
Treasury (and, after 1977 when Treasury was split, the Department of 
Finance) considerable powers over the financial management of all 
government agencies.
Throughout the 1980s in particular, Finance increasingly delegated its 
powers, especially in the case of agencies that were not so dependent 
on government revenues (by allowing these to retain and spend the 
moneys they raised), as it shifted its attention to performance in terms 
of results rather than proper use of inputs (Management Advisory Board 
and Management Improvement Advisory Committee 1992). Separate 
controls over allocations for salaries, consultancies, travel, training and 
office consumables were replaced by controls over aggregate ‘running 
costs’ and performance measures and targets were introduced. Those not 
reliant on government revenues were relieved of all detailed controls and 
required to report only on such measures as returns on assets and the 
delivery of community service obligations (see below regarding GBEs).
This devolutionary process and the distinction between types of agencies 
culminated in new legislation passed in 1997, the Financial Management 
and Accountability Act (FMA Act) and the Commonwealth Authorities and 
Companies Act (CAC Act). Broadly, the FMA Act applied to agencies that 
were financially dependent on general revenue and came under direct 
control by ministers: it gave their chief executives considerable authority 
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for financial management of appropriated moneys so long as this was done 
efficiently, effectively and ethically, and there was open accountability for 
performance of the agency through the chief executive to the minister and 
the parliament. The CAC Act applied to agencies operating on a more 
commercial basis and those with some statutory independence from 
ministers: it provided further devolution of authority and, for commercial 
bodies, accountability arrangements akin to those applying to private 
firms under corporations law.
Both Acts were principles-based rather than prescriptive and, for the most 
part, proved successful in giving effect to NPM’s emphasis on devolved 
authority in exchange for much tighter accountability for results.
The legislation’s bifurcation led, however, to some problems due to 
inconsistency in the allocation of agencies to one Act or the other, and 
difficulties arising from the application of commercial rules to non-
commercial statutory authorities; there was also concern about the lack 
of a single set of principles applying to all agencies. A 2003 review of 
statutory offices and officeholders (Uhrig 2003) attempted to convey 
firmer guidance on when agencies should have boards or just chief 
executives but did not address the legislation. The Department of Finance 
subsequently issued guidance on the appropriate structures for different 
government functions, drawing on the Uhrig Report and advising on the 
suitability of financial management law to individual organisations and 
whether they should be under the PS Act or not. The guidance clearly 
favoured ministerial departments as the default option (Department of 
Finance and Administration 2005b).
Criticism of the Uhrig Report (and to a lesser extent the Finance 
guidance) was widespread (Wettenhall 2004–05; Gourlay 2004; Halligan 
& Horrigan 2005), mainly for its failure to appreciate the complexity of 
public sector management and the range of structures that are appropriate 
for different functions, and for imposing a firmly private sector approach.
Commencing around 2010, the Department of Finance conducted 
the Commonwealth Financial Accountability Review (CFAR) 
(Department of Finance and Deregulation 2012). This broader review 
was the trigger for new legislation, the Public Governance, Performance 
and Accountability  Act 2013, which replaced both the FMA and CAC 
Acts. It  provides a more coherent whole-of-government approach to 
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performance management and accountability and expands the previous 
legislation’s principles approach while simultaneously recognising the 
appropriateness of a wider range of agency types. It uses a more practical 
bifurcation of agencies, essentially on the basis of the extent of reliance 
on government revenues, with ‘Commonwealth entities’ being those 
more reliant and ‘Commonwealth companies’ being those operating 
commercially (and  subject to corporations law). The classification of 
different Commonwealth organisations remains complex, however, 
as is evident in the Department of Finance’s Australian Government 
Organisations Register (Department of Finance 2016a) and its most recent 
‘flipchart’ (Department of Finance 2020).
The Department of Finance has updated its 2005 advice on the 
most appropriate structure for different government activities. The 
assessment template (Department of Finance 2016b) guides reviews of 
existing  organisations as well as proposed new organisations through 
a series of ‘gateways’:
1. whether the Commonwealth has the constitutional power to 
undertake the activity
2. whether the government is best placed to undertake the activity, in 
whole or part, compared to an external body
3. whether the activity can be conducted by an existing Commonwealth 
body, in whole or in part.
The guidance seeks information to substantiate whether the activity 
requires  statutory independence or should operate commercially, 
and also requires cost–benefit analysis of viable options for a body’s 
governance structure. This seems likely to continue the 2005 guidance 
that favoured ministerial departments or, at least, large organisations 
with economies of scale (or the use of shared corporate services with 
other organisations). The  template does not, however, include specific 
views on the appropriateness of certain structures for certain functions, 
but simply requires reviews to present arguments. The Department of 
Finance nonetheless presumably assesses the arguments presented and 
advises ministers, and the chances are that it gives more weight in its 
decision-making to the cost–benefit analysis and ministerial control than 
to other factors.
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Examples of structural developments 
and reforms
Ministerial departments
Departments provide the closest support to ministers through policy 
advice, assisting with the preparation of legislation required to implement 
government policy and ensuring that the government’s policies and 
programs are properly managed. In many cases, particularly at provincial 
government level where the emphasis is more on service delivery than 
high-level policy, departments often directly manage the government’s 
programs. As indicated below, Australia has not moved as far as some 
other countries down the NPM path of separating policy advice 
(in departments) from service delivery (in executive agencies), though it 
has always had some services managed in non-departmental organisations.
The prime minister has the authority to determine the allocation of 
responsibilities between ministers and departments via the Administrative 
Arrangements Orders. This power to change departmental responsibilities 
and structures is exercised frequently in Australia and presents considerable 
flexibility in the overall structure of government, with the corollary of 
administrative disruption. Factors in the allocation of functions include 
not only promoting improvements in performance via better linking 
of related functions and adjusting to new priorities and circumstances, 
but also political considerations such as balancing the governing party’s 
geographic and factional interests.
A significant development in Australia was the introduction of ‘super 
departments’ overseen by a portfolio minister with support from 
assistant ministers. This approach began at the Commonwealth level in 
1987 and has been replicated by most provincial governments. The two 
main advantages have been to give departments sufficient breadth of 
responsibility to manage effectively their public service and financial 
powers and to support better policy coordination by having every portfolio 
(and its department) represented in the cabinet by its senior portfolio 
minister without allowing cabinet to become unmanageably large, and 
by each portfolio minister having one or more junior ministers to ensure 
sufficient political attention to the range of issues for which he or she had 
responsibility. A further advantage claimed at the time was that the new 
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arrangement would ensure more stability over departmental structures 
and responsibilities through the combinations of functions with strong 
long-term connections.
Key respects of the 1987 restructuring have been sustained for the last 
30 years. The concept of portfolio ministers and portfolio secretaries 
(the  public service heads of the portfolio ministers’ departments) has 
continued and to a degree strengthened. On the other hand, after a few 
years of greater stability, the precise responsibilities of portfolios began 
again to change frequently, particularly following changes in prime 
ministers. While key long-term linkages were mostly retained, on occasion 
they were not and, in some cases, the arrangements were not consistent 
with the original portfolio structure principles (particularly the December 
2019 arrangements, which blurred lines of accountability to the ministry 
and cabinet (Podger 2019)). Nonetheless, the Australian Government 
continues to have no more than 20 departments (currently  13), 
though there are currently 23 ministers in the cabinet. Some provincial 
governments operate with fewer departments and portfolio ministers.
The Health portfolio provides an example. The Minister for Health is 
currently assisted by three junior ministers with specific responsibilities 
for aged care, senior Australians, youth, sport and regional health (one 
of the junior ministers also has responsibilities in a different portfolio). 
Their responsibilities are set in part by the prime minister and in part at 
the discretion of the portfolio minister. The Australian Department of 
Health is responsible for advising these ministers and the government on 
all aspects of national policy on health, aged care and sport – this includes 
health financing issues and intergovernmental agreements and detailed 
matters such as the listing of medicines for the Pharmaceutical Benefits 
Scheme and of medical services for the Medical Benefits Schedule. 
The department also manages significant regulation functions such as 
the safety and efficacy of therapeutic goods, and manages some service 
delivery programs including residential and home-based aged care 
services programs (purchasing these services from non-government 
providers), Indigenous health programs (again mainly purchased from 
non-government providers) and public health programs. These various 
functions of the department often utilise external expertise through 
statutory committees, and sometimes have their own organisation within 
the department (such as the Therapeutic Goods Administration).
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While the department has retained responsibility for managing many 
regulations and service delivery programs, the portfolio includes a number 
of separate agencies undertaking various regulatory, research and 
service delivery functions. The departmental secretary is also known as 
the ‘portfolio secretary’ and has responsibility, for example, for budget 
coordination across the portfolio, policy advice across the portfolio and 
advising on appointments to the other portfolio agencies.
Non-departmental service delivery agencies
There is provision in the PS Act for ‘executive agencies’ to be established 
separate from departments but without their own legislation. In practice, 
Australia has generally made little use of this structural option, though 
it was for a time promoted in other countries pursuing NPM reforms 
(e.g. New Zealand and the United Kingdom via Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher’s ‘next steps’), separating policy from administration under 
purchaser–provider arrangements that imposed firm performance regimes 
on the executive agencies. More frequently, Australia has used agencies 
with their own statutes to deliver certain government-funded services 
independently of ministerial departments. Longstanding arrangements 
include the Australian Taxation Office, for which independence from 
politics is seen to be particularly important. There are in fact more than 
100 statutory authorities at the Commonwealth level, and similarly large 
numbers at the provincial level. This subsection considers those whose 
main function is to deliver government-funded services while those with 
a regulatory, integrity or research role are included in the following two 
subsections, and those that are primarily commercial are discussed in the 
subsection on GBEs. 
As mentioned above, many service delivery programs continue to be 
managed by ministerial departments. Nonetheless, a reform trajectory 
can be identified in a number of areas of service delivery: from wholly 
departmental management of policy and service delivery to their 
separation between departments and non-departmental agencies, 
to a further separation of purchasing, usually by a ministerial department; 
from providing by non-departmental agencies, to competitive tender 
with government providers (now commercialised) and non-government 
providers, which some cases has evolved into ongoing collaborative 
partnerships with NGOs; and, finally, to privatisation of government 
providers. This trajectory was by no means the standard approach, but it 
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can still be seen as an undercurrent in many contemporary political and 
academic debates about the future of such human services as health, 
schools and disability support.
Perhaps the most radical example of this trajectory is employment 
services. Unemployment benefits were paid by the Commonwealth 
Department of Social Services (DSS) from the 1940s and were managed, 
along with other pensions, benefits and allowances, via a network of DSS 
offices. In the late 1940s, the government sought to more actively assist 
jobseekers and introduced employment services to link unemployed 
people to employers seeking workers. This was managed by a new 
legislated corporation, the Commonwealth Employment Service (CES), 
working under the Minister for Labour and National Service and in 
conjunction with his department. The nationwide network of CES offices 
registered job vacancies and drew them to the attention of jobseekers, 
even arranging job interviews and advising on selections in some cases. 
Responses by jobseekers in receipt of benefits were used for the purposes 
of the benefit work test managed by DSS. CES offices were often located 
close to the DSS offices.
In 1997, DSS was split and its service delivery role transferred to a new 
statutory authority, later named Centrelink (Halligan & Wills 2008). 
Centrelink was also given the responsibilities of the former CES along with 
responsibility for the delivery of some other human services (e.g. housing 
assistance). DSS and the Department of Education, Employment, 
Training and Youth Affairs (DEETYA) each retained policy responsibility 
for their respective functions, as did other departments affected by the 
split (e.g. housing). The initiative reflected the NPM interest in improving 
efficiency by separating policy from administration, but with the added 
element of establishing a ‘one-stop-shop’ and allowing rationalisation of 
offices across the country. 
Around this time, DEETYA experimented with contracting private sector 
organisations to help longer term unemployed people gain sustained 
employment, through training and rehabilitation services. This involved 
not just separating policy from administration but also separating 
purchasing from providing. In 1998 this experiment was translated into 
a much wider tender process for employment services with payments 
based on successful employment outcomes. Initially, the Job Network 
involved both private sector providers (including for-profit and not-for-
profit organisations) and an in-house provider, Employment National, 
DeSiGninG GovernAnCe STruCTureS For PerForMAnCe AnD ACCounTABiLiTY
52
created out of the former CES component of Centrelink. In a later 
tender process, however, the government provider was not successful 
and was subsequently wound up. Job Network (now called Job Services 
Australia) remains today a system of non-government providers paid by 
the Department of Employment via competitive tender with payments 
based on successful outcomes (Jarvie & Mercer 2017).
While this is an example of a classic NPM trajectory, more recent 
developments with other human services demonstrate some reversal 
of direction. The creation of Centrelink in 1997 proved to be highly 
successful (Halligan & Wills 2008) and, in 2004, the then government 
decided to press further the idea of integrated human services by 
establishing a small Department of Human Services (DHS) overseeing 
Centrelink and several other service delivery agencies (including the 
Health Insurance Commission responsible for most Medicare entitlements 
and the Child Support Agency responsible for ensuring maintenance 
payments for children in families whose parents have separated). DHS 
was given responsibility for service delivery policy as distinct from service 
delivery (which remained with Centrelink and the other service delivery 
agencies) while the development of functional policies on social security 
and Medicare remained with the respective line departments and their 
ministers. DHS’s responsibility involved ensuring information systems 
were linked and further rationalisation of offices, and encouraging 
experimentation with greater collaboration with clients and external 
organisations (the ‘citizen-centred services’ agenda, see Bridge 2012).
In 2008, the then Labor government took this approach in a new 
direction by incorporating the separate agencies within the ministerial 
department (DHS) and forcing much greater integration and stronger 
ministerial involvement. Legislation to formalise this arrangement was 
passed in 2011. Critics feared this would in time reduce the focus on 
clients and professional service delivery as the department spent more 
time ‘looking upwards’ rather than ‘downwards and outwards’, and might 
dilute the vital links between functional policies and their administration 
(Podger 2013b). Recent criticism of the department’s handling of clients 
provides evidence in support of these concerns (Parliament of Australia 
Community Services Reference Committee 2017).
In December 2019, the government announced the abolition of DHS 
and the intention to replace it with a new executive agency attached to the 
Department of Social Services, a partial move back towards having service 
delivery separate from a ministerial department (Prime Minister 2019).
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Another example of changing directions concerns Indigenous programs. 
In  the 1980s, a statutory authority, the Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islanders Commission (ATSIC), was established with a unique governance 
structure including a board of elected representatives of Indigenous 
communities. Continuing problems with this governance arrangement, 
including over the chief executive’s dual accountability to the board and the 
minister, led to its abolition in 2005, with responsibility for its programs 
being transferred to a ministerial department (initially the Department 
of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs). In 2013, this 
responsibility was transferred to the Department of Prime Minister and 
Cabinet (PM&C), ostensibly to demonstrate the priority being given to 
Indigenous wellbeing. Critics, however, have expressed concern that the 
department has no service delivery experience and that a separate agency 
would ensure a stronger focus on clients and communities (National 
Congress of Australia’s First Peoples 2016).
Notwithstanding the partial reversal of the trend towards separating 
policy from administration, interest in greater autonomy in other service 
delivery fields including health, education and disability services has 
increased. The state of Victoria introduced a purchaser–provider split for 
hospital services in 1995 using a system of ‘casemix’ funding related to 
hospital outputs based on episodes of care (developed previously by the 
national Department of Health). Public hospitals were no longer part 
of the department but operated as independent corporations with their 
own executive boards. While other states have been slow to follow this 
example (which delivered substantial efficiency gains as hospitals, working 
with professional independence from their parent departments, focused 
more carefully on costs and the management of their patients), national 
governments have increasingly pressured them to do so.
In 2010, a new intergovernmental agreement (Council of Australian 
Governments (COAG) 2010) imposed a nationwide purchaser–provider 
split based on casemix funding that has given all public hospitals 
(or networks of hospitals) greater autonomy in exchange for more 
disciplined funding and performance reporting. Regional primary health 
organisations were also established (Department of Health and Ageing 
2010) with autonomy based on community and professional governance 
arrangements, with their role being to help with the planning and 
coordination of primary care services (which are mostly provided by 
doctors working in private practice but funded via Medicare). Under 
the Liberal governments of Tony Abbott and Malcolm Turnbull, these 
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organisations have been reorganised as primary health networks with 
even greater independence from the Health Department but subject to 
performance oversight (Dutton 2014).
A report on school education (Gonski 2011) was largely endorsed by 
both sides of politics, particularly in regard to needs-based funding and 
proposals for greater school autonomy subject to community participation 
and improved performance management. 
The National Disability Insurance Agency (NDIA) is a statutory 
authority sitting within the Social Services portfolio but separate from 
the relevant ministerial department (the DSS). It is currently introducing 
a new disability insurance scheme across Australia involving decentralised 
service delivery tailored to the needs and preferences of individuals and 
their families, and with most service provision by NGOs. The NDIA has 
a board that includes people with strong professional and community 
experience in the field.
These examples demonstrate that, notwithstanding the reforms of the 
last 30 years, there remains a range of different approaches to service 
delivery structures in Australia. Arguably, separate and more independent 
government or non-government service delivery organisations are better 
positioned to be responsive to citizens’ needs and preferences than 
ministerial departments, though they need to share information to 
promote good policies and deliver coordinated services.
Statutory regulatory organisations
Australia frequently utilises statutory authorities to manage regulations 
that are sensitive and require an emphasis on procedural fairness without 
political consideration and/or require specialist expertise. Ministerial 
departments may also manage regulations (as mentioned above) and, when 
they do, they must act impartially and properly under public service and 
administrative law. The perception of independence is, however, generally 
greater when a separate statutory authority manages the regulation or 
other activity. Such independence is often reinforced by greater security 
of tenure for the agency head.
In most cases, these organisations are funded by government revenues 
(and/or levies on the industries involved) and they are subject to the same 
financial management regime as departments; their staff are also usually 
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employed under the PS Act and are therefore required to uphold public 
service values and obey the code of conduct. They are also subject to 
administrative laws that require open and fair decision-making.
The NPM reforms that have reduced the government’s role in direct service 
provision and increased its role in purchasing have also led to an increase 
in the extent of regulation and to some increase in the number of statutory 
authorities. In the health area, for example, the new system of casemix 
purchasing of hospital services led to the establishment of a new authority 
(the Independent Hospital Pricing Authority) to set the ‘efficient price’ 
for these services and also to a new performance monitoring authority 
(the National Health Performance Authority). Subsequent concerns 
about the number of new regulatory agencies and their cost led to the 
abolition of some and the transfer of their responsibilities to other existing 
organisations in line with the Department of Finance’s assessment template 
(most often the transfer has been back into ministerial departments).
Another field where regulation activity has undergone significant change 
is in ensuring the efficient operation of the market. On the one hand, 
this has involved a degree of ‘deregulation’ as government intervention in 
the market (such as promoting cooperatives of producers or protecting 
small producers) has been reduced, and on the other hand it has involved 
new regulatory activity to promote competition and stop collusion or 
other anti-competitive practices, and to ensure transparency and proper 
governance of private companies. This regulation is conducted mostly 
by new or strengthened statutory authorities such as the Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission and the Australian Securities 
and Investment Commission, which operate in the Treasury portfolio but 
independently of the department and the minister (the Treasurer).
Integrity organisations
The statutory authority model is also standard for ‘integrity organisations’ 
such as the auditor-general’s office (Australian National Audit Office), the 
electoral commissioner, independent commissions against corruption, 
ombudsman’s offices, public service commissions and the bureau of 
statistics. In some cases the integrity officer heading the agency is referred 
to as an ‘officer of the parliament’ to convey his or her independence from 
the executive arm of government and the organisation’s closer attachment 
to the legislature; some have close links with the judiciary.
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The strengthening of administrative law and emphasis on human rights 
over recent decades has resulted in an increase to the number of these 
authorities. They include such bodies as the Office of the Australian 
Information Commissioner and the Australian Human Rights 
Commission.
Their independence from ministers is based on their role in overseeing 
aspects of executive government, protecting the integrity of the democratic 
process or providing authoritative data for the operations of government 
and the market. The degree of independence is set out in their respective 
legislation. There is some debate as to which organisations sit within this 
category as some must operate within the executive and independently of 
it (e.g. public service commissions).
Government business enterprises
A broad trajectory of reform of the governance of public enterprises 
is identifiable over the last 40 years or more, from management 
within departments to separate agencies or statutory authorities to 
commercialised  businesses and, in some cases, to privatised businesses. 
That said, Australia has long used government-owned authorities 
and companies to undertake some activities, such as infrastructure or 
utilities services, reflecting in part Australia’s limited private capital 
and the historical lack of capacity for competition for such services 
(Wettenhall 1996, 1998).
These organisations interacted with ministers before reform, though not 
generally in regard to the professional delivery of services, and, in their 
case, the reform trajectory has been truncated so that social objectives 
(‘community service objectives’) have been more clearly identified and 
funded directly from the budget or via transparent discounts from profit 
targets and dividend payments; ministerial oversight has increasingly 
been limited to these and to broad direction akin to that of major 
shareholders; and, subsequently, consideration has been given to partial 
or full privatisation with community service obligations funded directly 
through government programs.
Postal and telecommunications services perhaps present the most 
significant  example of Australia’s GBE reforms. For most of the  last 
century, the biggest national government organisation was the 
Postmaster-General’s Department (PMG). Established from former 
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provincial organisations shortly after federation in 1901, it employed well 
over half of all Commonwealth public servants from 1901 until 1975. 
While structurally a ministerial department, the PMG was responsible 
for administering the Post and Telegraph Act 1901, which set out the 
powers and responsibilities of the minister (the postmaster-general) and 
the head of the department (the director-general). It required substantial 
government-funded infrastructure to provide postal and telegraphic 
services that were seen to be natural monopolies and that should be 
available to all Australians (an  important social objective). Employees 
were public servants under the PS Act, and the department was subject to 
standard, centralised financial management controls.
In 1975, the PMG was split with the establishment of two statutory 
corporations (Australian Postal Corporation – later known as Australia 
Post – and the Australian Telecommunications Corporation – later 
known as Telecom) separate from the ministerial department (initially 
still called the PMG but later the Department of Communications). 
Policy remained with the minister and policy advice with the department, 
but administration was left to the two statutory corporations, which were 
expected to operate in a more commercial way while still reporting to 
the minister. The corporations were each governed by a board appointed 
by the government and with a chief executive officer (CEO) (initially 
also appointed by the government but later by the board). Staff were 
no longer employed under the PS Act but directly by the corporations. 
The corporations were still subject to the Audit Act but with considerable 
delegation of authority from the Treasury. The extent of ministerial and 
Treasury oversight was, however, the cause of ongoing tension for the 
next decade.
In the 1980s, as the NPM agenda emerged more clearly, a new set of 
guidelines for statutory authorities and GBEs was issued by the then 
Minister for Finance (Walsh 1987). The ‘Walsh guidelines’ articulated 
more clearly the respective roles of ministers and the GBE’s boards and 
management. Ministers would not only appoint the board but also set each 
GBE’s commercial performance target (e.g. its rate of return on assets), 
approve the board’s strategic plan, agree on the disbursement of profits 
(usually requiring dividend payments to government) and major new 
investments or divestments, and identify ‘community service obligations’ 
(e.g. a standard price for all domestic letters, access to a telephone line at 
a capped price). 
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The board and management would have responsibility for operational 
matters, including employment, allocation of resources and contracting, 
but would report publicly to ministers and the parliament on their 
commercial performance and in respect of community service obligations. 
These guidelines broadly reflected corporations law requirements in the 
private sector, with the role of ministers being akin to that of shareholders 
and the role of the board akin to that of a private sector board. They 
were given effect through the delegations and oversight approach of 
the Department of Finance. Australia Post and Telecom were amongst the 
first to be subject to these Walsh guidelines.
The 1997 financial management legislation, with its distinction between 
FMA Act bodies and CAC Act bodies, consolidated existing practice for 
Australia Post and Telecom as set out in the Walsh guidelines, placing 
them under the new CAC Act.
The late 1980s and early 1990s saw a transfer of Telecom’s regulatory role 
to an independent regulator and the opening of the telecommunications 
market to competition. Following a review of structural arrangements in 
1990 among the then three carriers (the Overseas Telecommunications 
Corporation Limited (OTC) and a government-owned satellite company, 
Aussat, having also been established), Telecom was merged with the OTC 
to form the Australian and Overseas Telecommunications Corporation 
Limited (AOTC), which was subsequently renamed Telstra Corporation 
Limited (Telstra) in 1993. Aussat was sold along with the right to operate 
a second fixed-line carrier in competition with Telstra.
It was against this background – and the prospect of the opening of 
Australia’s telecommunications market to full competition in July 1997 – 
that the then Labor government decided to partly privatise Telstra while 
retaining majority public ownership. Almost half (49.6%) of the shares 
in Telstra were subsequently issued to the public in two tranches: the first 
in 1997 (33%) and the second in 1999 (16.6%). The partial privatisation 
was criticised by advocates of public ownership and those of a more 
market-based approach, the latter arguing either for full privatisation 
or the separation of the copper wire network (arguably still a natural 
monopoly at the time) from the provision of services over the network, 
which might be fully privatised and open to competition.
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A new conservative government subsequently decided on full privatisation. 
Additional shares in the company were issued to the public in 2006 
with the residual 17 per cent government shareholding transferred to 
a government investment company (the Future Fund) that was established 
to fund liabilities accumulated by unfunded government employee 
superannuation funds. 
The reform trajectory was more recently interrupted by the Labor 
government’s decision in 2008 to create a national broadband network 
(NBN). The government’s policy was for 93 per cent of premises to have 
access to the NBN through fibre optic cable and the remaining 7 per cent 
of premises to be connected to the NBN through fixed wireless and 
satellite technologies. The government established NBN Co Ltd, a wholly 
government-owned company, to roll out this network. This company’s 
role is restricted to infrastructure provision and the supply of wholesale 
services; it is not allowed to offer retail services over the network.
NBN Co Ltd has subsequently entered into a multi-billion-dollar contract 
with Telstra to participate in the rollout. These developments have been 
accompanied by new regulatory arrangements that limit competition 
developing in the broadband market, a move designed to enhance the 
financial viability of NBN Co Ltd. The Labor government’s stated 
intention nonetheless was to eventually fully privatise NBN Co Ltd.
The Abbott (conservative) government, elected in 2013, revisited these 
arrangements with a view to reducing construction costs and the rollout 
timetable through the use of fibre-to-the-node technologies rather 
than fibre-to-the-premises connections. Its policy includes removal 
of regulatory impediments to the construction and operation of non-
NBN access networks, though it is locked in for now to the existing 
contractual arrangements between Telstra and NBN. The commitment 
to the full privatisation of NBN Co Ltd once construction of the NBN is 
completed remains.
Australia Post remains a fully government-owned corporation. 
In  responding to market forces and new technology, however, it has 
moved far from its origins. Most of its physical service outlets are now 
franchised through local supermarkets and newsagents; its offices offer 
a wide range of services beyond traditional postal services (including as 
one-stop-shop access points for government services in many rural 
areas); it is responding to the emergence of a private delivery industry as 
internet purchasing has expanded; and it does much of its business online. 
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Despite this transformation, it still has community service obligations to 
meet, particularly with regard to the price of stamps for domestic letters 
and ensuring access to postal services around the country. The advance 
of the internet and increasing competition from private parcel delivery 
companies raises the serious possibility of privatising Australia Post, 
although neither side of politics has agreed to take that step. 
This general trajectory, in full or in part, can be seen in other national 
commercial-type services such as Qantas (originally a private company, 
but nationalised in the 1940s for national development purposes, 
commercialised, partially privatised and finally fully privatised) and in 
many provincial government utilities such as power companies (some fully 
privatised, others only commercialised). The approach was made more 
systematic after 1995 when COAG established an intergovernmental 
agreement on competition policy (COAG 1995) requiring all jurisdictions 
to review systematically where government action, whether by regulation 
or government provision, might restrict competition. 
Internal government services
In parallel with the GBE reform trajectory, Australia has experienced an 
interesting sequence of reforms to its management of internal government 
services such as government property and asset services, government cars, 
construction and employees’ and welfare recipients’ health tests.
Many of these services were owned and managed by a ministerial 
department (mostly the Department of Administrative Services (DAS) at 
the Commonwealth level). During the 1980s and 1990s these arrangements 
went through amendments to improve efficiency (Tanzer 1992). Broadly, 
these steps were:
• First, agencies using the services were required to pay user charges 
(rents for property, hire charges for cars, etc). Agencies received 
partial supplementation to their budgets in recognition of these 
additional charges and budgetary funding to the DAS was withdrawn. 
The  imposition of the charges encouraged agencies to review how 
much of each service they really needed.
• Second, agencies were allowed to negotiate better deals with alternative 
providers of services. Many shifted to private rental properties, for 
example, or contracted with private hire car firms and used private 
publishing services.
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• Third, the DAS was permitted, within limits, to offer its services 
beyond its government agency clients.
• Fourth, as a consequence of the second and third developments, DAS 
conducted an internal restructuring, establishing each of its service 
delivery functions as a ‘business’ with an advisory board to help set 
its commercial strategy and with accrual accounting introduced to 
help assess its commercial performance. These ‘businesses’ were legally 
under the control of the department’s secretary and his minister, but 
an effort was made to change the culture from a bureaucratic one 
to a customer-focused one.
• Fifth, some of the businesses were incorporated as government-owned 
companies (e.g. the car business became AusFleet), and some others 
were wound up (e.g. Australian Construction Services). Assets were 
sold (e.g. inner city properties) during this process, to the considerable 
advantage of the government, which was seeking to reduce its debts 
at the time.
• Finally, a number of the businesses were privatised (e.g. AusFleet) and 
remaining policy oversight was shifted to the Department of Finance.
The overall effect was to achieve efficiencies and budget savings, while 
also ensuring that government agencies could tailor required services to 
support their business rather than be forced to accept a one-size-fits-all 
arrangement.
Intergovernmental bodies
Australia’s federal system of government has led to the creation of some 
intergovernmental organisations aimed at supporting cooperation and 
coordination amongst governments and allowing, in some cases, shared 
responsibility for particular functions.
Key intergovernmental forums were informal for many years and 
functioned without dedicated staff operating in a separate organisational 
structure. These included the Premiers’ Conference (regular meetings 
of first ministers) and the Loan Council (meetings of treasurers that set 
ceilings on each government’s borrowings). Both these forums were chaired 
by the Commonwealth and, as its revenue-raising capacity surpassed that 
of provincial governments, the Commonwealth was increasingly able to 
control agendas and influence decisions.
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The Commonwealth’s dominant role in revenue raising also facilitated 
what became an important principle in the federation: horizontal fiscal 
equalisation (HFE). This involves ensuring provincial governments have 
equal capacity to deliver services to their populations, with a distribution 
of Commonwealth revenues to make up for variations in revenue-raising 
capacity and costs of delivery. The intergovernmental Commonwealth 
Grants Commission (CGC) was established in the 1930s to advise 
governments on the distribution of revenues needed to give effect to 
HFE, with decisions then taken by the Premiers’ Conference. The CGC 
is legally a Commonwealth statutory authority, but it is led by a board 
of commissioners with members nominated by the Commonwealth and 
the states. As a highly professional, technocratic organisation, its advice 
is rarely ignored.
Over the last 40 years or more, the Commonwealth has broadened its 
policy interests and used its financial powers to influence many provincial 
government programs including in such service delivery areas as hospitals, 
schools, housing and community services. This increased sharing of 
responsibilities has required the development of greater capacity for 
coordination and cooperation. COAG replaced the Premiers’ Conference 
from the early 1990s and brought a wide range of supporting ministerial 
councils that had emerged over previous decades within its general 
purview. Some of these ministerial councils developed small full-time 
secretariats attached to a relevant state or Commonwealth department 
that supported both the ministerial council and the advisory committee 
of relevant departmental secretaries.
COAG itself is supported by staff in PM&C. An intergovernmental 
agreement was reached in 2008 to clarify roles and responsibilities within 
a new financial framework aimed at improving performance across 
jurisdictions in areas of national importance. The agreement included the 
establishment of an independent COAG Reform Council with dedicated 
staff resources to monitor and evaluate jurisdictional performance 
(O’Loughlin 2013). Under the Abbott government, however, this 
council was abolished as a budget savings measure, leaving PM&C solely 
responsible once again for supporting COAG.3
3  As this book was in production, the Prime Minister announced that the ‘National Cabinet’, 
which had operated to oversee the cross-jurisdictional response to the COVID-19 pandemic, would 
continue into the future replacing COAG as the central forum for inter-governmental relations.
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Other bodies have emerged over the last 30 years to support or manage 
shared responsibilities. For example, the Australian Institute of Health 
and Welfare (AIHW) was established in 1987 as a Commonwealth 
statutory authority but with a board that includes state nominees and 
people with experience in nominated fields such as health, housing and 
community welfare. The AIHW is a statistical and research body that 
uses administrative data from all jurisdictions to report publicly on 
the state of Australia’s overall health and welfare and on the activities 
of all governments in these fields. The Great Barrier Reef Marine Park 
Authority is also a Commonwealth statutory authority but managed 
through shared powers with the State of Queensland. In managing this 
World Heritage park it has been given some powers over environmental 
management of the neighbouring Queensland coastal area. The shared 
approach began in 1975 with initial Commonwealth legislation and 
was subsequently reinforced through an intergovernmental agreement 
and the establishment of the Authority, which has a board including 
representatives of Queensland.
In some areas, the intergovernmental arrangements involve New Zealand 
as well as Australian jurisdictions. New Zealand is an active observer 
at COAG and all its ministerial councils and, in some cases, it has 
agreed to be bound by decisions taken. A particular example is in the 
field of food safety. Food Standards Australia New Zealand (FSANZ) is 
formally a statutory authority under the Commonwealth of Australia but 
the legislation sets out a joint governance arrangement across the two 
countries. FSANZ is responsible for the food standards code for both 
countries and this is enforced in each country by regulations managed 
locally (in Australia, mainly by provincial and local governments). Policies 
that guide the food standards set by FSANZ are determined through 
the Legislative and Governance Forum on Food Regulation, which 
is effectively a ministerial council comprising health and agriculture 
ministers from the Commonwealth of Australia, New Zealand and the 
Australian state and territory governments.
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A possible, more coherent framework 
of formal and informal governance rules 
and processes for Australian Government 
organisations
Despite NPM and related reforms over the last 30 years, and more recent 
attempts to provide a coherent legislative framework for the governance 
of public sector activities in Australia that promotes organisational 
performance and ensures public accountability, Australia still has an eclectic 
mix of structures and governance arrangements and, notwithstanding 
the Department of Finance’s assessment template, lacks firm policy on 
optimal future arrangements. Australia is hardly alone in this respect: the 
colourful term ‘signposting the zoo’ to describe attempts at coherence 
about when to use which structure originated in New Zealand.
As indicated by institutional, political and organisational theory, 
governance arrangements are always likely to involve a mix of formal rules 
and informal conventions and practices, and the degree of bureaucratic 
autonomy is determined as much by political judgements as by the 
particular functions to be performed.
That said, there are a number of factors that should influence those 
political judgements and the formal governance structures imposed to 
promote performance and ensure public accountability. These reflect the 
fact that there are several and, at times, competing principles behind 
the  management of public sector activities, whether in Australia or 
elsewhere, such as:
• ‘The public interest’: public policies and programs should reflect the 
collective interests and preferences of the people, whether they be 
determined through formal democratic processes (such as Australia’s 
parliamentary system and the role of elected ministers in determining 
policies in the public interest) or other forms of public engagement 
and consultation.
• Fairness and justice in decision-making: within the policy frameworks 
set by the government in the public interest, administrative decisions 
should be made impartially and professionally, strictly according to 
the law, and without influence from personal connections or political 
or social affiliations.
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• Performance: public resources utilised for the delivery of government 
services should be applied effectively to meet the government’s policy 
objectives, and used as efficiently as possible.
• Public accountability: decisions should be made transparently and 
decision-makers should be held accountable to the public whether 
through democratic processes or other public review arrangements.
While all these principles are important, the balance between them 
may vary with the function being performed. Judgements about the 
appropriate formal structure in the Australian political context might be 
influenced primarily by:
• the degree to which the function relies upon government revenues 
rather than user charges
• the importance of responsiveness to the government’s political 
direction  in the public interest as compared to the importance 
of  independent decision-making for reasons of fairness or justice or 
professional expertise
• the importance of a focus on meeting the needs of clients compared to 
the importance of responsiveness to the government’s political direction.
NPM, NPG and more recent developments, which are driven in part by 
technological changes and associated changes in community expectations, 
have added to the array of structural options (including the use of third 
parties) as well as further dimensions (or principles) of good public sector 
management. The latter include in particular:
• the ability of citizens and communities to directly influence services
• the capacity for collaboration across public services to meet the needs 
and preferences of citizens and communities.
The lack of coherence in current Australian structural arrangements is not 
just a theoretical concern. It may also contribute to weaknesses in public 
sector capabilities and performance, as revealed in recent reviews and debates 
(e.g. APSC 2014; Shergold 2015; Banks 2008 and 2018; Independent 
Review of the APS 2019), such as in longer term strategic policy advising, 
implementation of new policy measures and management of risk.
Table 3.1 sets out guidance on how well different formal structures in 
the Australian framework address competing principles, and hence their 
suitability for different functions.
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Informal processes and arrangements may be used to complement the 
formal structure chosen to address perceived weaknesses and to reinforce 
strengths. Table 3.2 illustrates the sorts of (mostly) informal arrangements 
that may be used.
Table 3.2. Possible complementary and more informal processes
1 . Democratic/ministerial oversight and control may be strengthened by:
a . ministerial approval of strategic directions
b . ministerial ‘statements of expectations’ about the way in which an independent 
agency should administer its responsibilities
c . agreements between ministerial departments and agencies
2 . Administration may be made more independent by:
a . statutory obligations including in‑program legislation
b . delegated authority
c . decision‑making and reporting frameworks and processes (including public 
reporting and the use of advisory committees and boards)
3 . Citizens/communities’ capacity to influence may be strengthened by:
a . advisory committees and other consultative arrangements
b . reduced legislative prescriptions
c . delegated authority
d . budget flexibility, funds pooling
e . appropriate agency culture, ‘public service motivation’, staff continuity, 
career paths
4 . Capacity for collaboration may be strengthened by:
a . shared information and shared corporate services
b . linked data
c . inter‑agency committees with appropriate political authority
d . regional or local cross‑agency forums
e . pooled budgets
5 . Expertise in particular fields may be strengthened by:
a . identified specialist units and advisers in departments
b . public reporting
c . staff continuity, particular career paths
d . partnerships and staff interchange with external specialist organisations
6 . Links between policy and administration may be strengthened by:
a . regular committee processes, joint task forces
b . protocols about reporting experience and initiating policy proposals
c . purchaser/provider agreements with the policy departments
7 . More ‘commercial’ approaches to program management may be strengthened by:
a . separate decision-making and reporting processes for identified programs
b . appropriate financial incentives and budgetary flexibility.
Source . Author’s presentation
DeSiGninG GovernAnCe STruCTureS For PerForMAnCe AnD ACCounTABiLiTY
68
Some inconsistency is apparent in the current complex Australian 
approach, which favours greater use of NGOs to deliver public services 
(these are sometimes also purchased by an independent statutory authority 
(e.g. NDIA)) and the greater use of purchaser–provider arrangements 
(e.g. in health), and simultaneously to favour returning service delivery 
functions to ministerial departments (e.g. Centrelink, Indigenous affairs). 
Greater consistency might be gained, along with improved client services, 
if Australia returned to making more use of non-departmental agencies to 
deliver a range of services.4 As with the contracted non-government service 
delivery arrangements, care is needed to ensure that complementary 
formal and informal processes provide adequate linkages between policy 
and administration.
In part, the apparent inconsistency may be related to wider changes that 
are underway in Australian public administration. Firmer political control 
over administration has been evident now for some time, including through 
ministerial appointments of partisan support staff, and the desire for such 
control may sometimes override other considerations. At the same time, 
governments that need to negotiate with other parties to have legislation 
passed may agree to demands for more independent administration of 
certain functions despite the appearance of inconsistency.
Conclusion
Australia has long used a wide range of organisational structures for 
different government functions. The structures and processes in tables 
3.1 and 3.2 are relevant to Australia’s particular context of parliamentary 
democracy, market economy and a federal government framework. They 
involve a mix of formal rules and informal processes and practices, drawing 
on organisational as well as political theories. The appropriate mix of 
formal structure and informal processes reflects political judgements, the 
reputation of the agencies involved and public attitudes to the functions 
being performed.
The story of gradual reform over the last 30 or 40 years reveals a process 
designed to improve government efficiency and effectiveness in a world 
of increasing global competition driven by new technology. Structural 
reform has been a significant component of Australia’s reform experience. 
4  Perhaps the 2020 replacement of DHS with Services Australia represents a step in this direction.
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Recent action has attempted to present a more coherent financial and 
personnel framework that could help to identify the appropriate structures 
for different functions and their accountability processes. There remain, 
however, significant inconsistencies in current practices and more could 
be done to clarify which structures are most suited to which functions, 
and what informal arrangements might best complement the formal 
rules. This is most evident with respect to service delivery.
It seems likely that the next stage of reform will focus on further 
increasing the responsiveness of government-funded services to the needs 
and preferences of individuals and different communities. Support for 
the use of non-government agencies to deliver services is based on their 
independence and flexibility to respond to individual circumstances, yet 
there are simultaneous moves to bring some government service delivery 
back under closer political control within ministerial departments. The 
challenge is to find the structures and processes most suited to responsive 
service delivery while also ensuring appropriate accountability to the 
government and the wider Australian community.
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The efficiency of government has long been one of the major concerns 
of public officers, entrepreneurs, non-government organisations (NGOs) 
and scholars of public administration. The public services that government 
provides to citizens – ranging from education, health care, transportation, 
affordable housing, to job opportunity and social security – involve 
substantial public expenditure. It is therefore reasonable for the general 
public to demand that the government is efficient and effective.
To improve government efficiency, scholars have attempted to analyse the 
parameters of public performance and examine the relationship between 
public expenditure and citizen satisfaction with government services 
(Hauner & Kyobe 2008; Morgeson 2014). Government reforms in 
different countries and regions have been carefully studied with regard to 
their similarities and differences (Pollitt & Bouckaert 2011; Christensen, 
Dong & Painter 2008; Meyer-Sahling & Yesilkagit 2011; Cepiku 
& Meneguzzo 2011). One of the issues that has not been thoroughly 
explored, however, is the relationship between governance structure and 
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administrative efficiency. The structure of government – namely, how 
government agencies and departments are organised to manage their 
functions – is critical to public sector performance. The attempts made 
by many countries to reform their organisations is a testament to the 
importance of finding the best governance structure to realise the mission 
of serving the people efficiently and cost-effectively.
This chapter explores the relationship between government structure and 
administrative efficiency by examining the case of organisational reform 
in Taiwan since 2008. It begins with a brief introduction to the structure 
of the Taiwanese Government and some background to the organisational 
reform that began in 2008. This is followed by a detailed analysis of the 
reform scheme and what has been accomplished so far. As the structure 
of government is still undergoing adjustment, it is only possible to 
evaluate its initial achievements and to identify the limitations it faces. 
The chapter provides this assessment and some lessons to be learned from 
the experience to date on the political and administrative sides. This 
is followed by some thoughts on factors beyond organisational reform 
that affect government efficiency and that deserve further investigation, 
including the influence on Taiwan of the constitution, regime and 
intergovernmental relations. The  chapter concludes that Taiwan needs 
to consider constitutional change, not just organisational reform, if it is to 
achieve necessary efficiency in government administration.
Taiwan’s governance structure 
and its problems
The central government of Taiwan is constructed according to the 
Constitution of the Republic of China (ROC), which follows its 
founding father Dr Sun Yat-sen’s idea of a ‘five-power constitution’. 
Instead of the more popular approach of ‘three-power’ checks and 
balances between the executive, the legislative and the judiciary, Dr Sun’s 
constitutional framework consists of five branches of government power: 
the Executive Yuan, Legislative Yuan, Judicial Yuan, Examination Yuan 
and Control Yuan.
The Executive Yuan is the highest administrative institution of the 
country. Its leader, the premier, is appointed by the president of ROC 
and is responsible for the planning and implementation of all public 
policy except national security policy, which falls within the jurisdiction 
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of the president. The premier nominates ministers and high-ranking 
political officers to the president for appointment. The premier and his 
or her ministers hold weekly meetings to discuss and decide the bills to 
be submitted to the legislature for deliberation, the major policies of the 
country, and the government budget necessary for their implementation.
The Legislative Yuan is the legislative body of Taiwan. As the only 
representative chamber in the unicameral system, the Legislative Yuan 
is generally regarded as the parliament of the country. Of the 113 seats 
in the Legislative Yuan, 73 are elected from single-member districts, 
34 are elected based on the proportion of nationwide votes received by 
participating political parties, and six seats are reserved for the indigenous 
people of Taiwan.
The Judicial Yuan is the highest judiciary institution of Taiwan and 
comprises the president and vice-president of the Judicial Yuan and 15 
Justices from the Council of Grand Justices. They are nominated and 
appointed by the president of ROC, with the consent of the Legislative 
Yuan. The Council of Grand Justices is responsible for the interpretation 
of the ROC Constitution and its laws.
The Examination Yuan is in charge of all national examinations and 
management of civil service personnel. In this capacity, it independently 
governs the qualification screening, protection, death benefits and 
retirement of civil servants. The Examination Yuan consists of a president, 
vice-president, two ministers and 19 council members, who are nominated 
and appointed by the president of ROC, with the consent of the Legislative 
Yuan. In effect, it protects the professional non-partisan civil service that, 
in other countries, lies within the executive arm of government, keeping 
it separate from politics.
The Control Yuan is an investigatory agency that monitors the other 
branches of government. It is composed of a president, vice-president and 
29 council members, who are nominated and appointed by the president 
of ROC, with the consent of the Legislative Yuan. Council members can 
investigate and impeach high-level officers, including the president of the 
country. Its unique institutional design is based on the traditional Chinese 
Censorate. The Control Yuan is sometimes compared to the Court of 
Auditors of the European Union, the Government Accountability Office 
of the United States and the Australian National Audit Office, but it 
also encompasses other oversight (or ‘integrity’) functions, such as those 
performed in other countries by ombudsmen.
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The president of ROC is the highest leader of the country. He or she not 
only selects the premier and ministers of the Executive Yuan, but also 
nominates all the presidents, vice-presidents, grand justices and council 
members of the Judicial Yuan, the Examination Yuan and the Control 
Yuan. The president is directly elected by the people through general 
elections, and is in charge of national security; that is, national defence, 
foreign affairs and cross–Taiwan Strait policy. Although the president does 
not chair cabinet meetings (which are convened by the premier), he or she 
is free to hold meetings with the premier and ministers. The president’s 
decision on important matters of public policy is usually final.
When people talk about ‘government’ in Taiwan, they might refer to the 
five-branch government led by the president, or the executive branch 
only. Officially, the five yuans are parts of the central government, but 
the Legislative Yuan is not conventionally regarded as such. For the 
purpose of simplicity and consistency, the term ‘government’ is used to 
refer to the Executive Yuan in the rest of this chapter unless explained 
otherwise. Discussion of governance structure, organisational reform and 
administrative efficiency refers to what happens in the Executive Yuan 
because that is where the central administration is located.
Originally the ROC Government consisted of 10 institutions under 
the Executive Yuan, including eight ministries (such as Interior, Foreign 
Affairs, National Defence and Finance) and two commissions (Mongolian 
and Tibetan Affairs and Overseas Chinese Affairs). As time passed, more 
institutions were created to manage the new responsibilities commensurate 
with the country’s socioeconomic development. By 2006, the number 
of institutions under the Executive Yuan reached a record high of 37, 
including eight ministries and 29 commissions or councils (Chu 2012; 
Hsiao 2012). 
Most of the 37 institutions are functional institutions that provide 
specific public services to the people, such as the Interior, Foreign 
Affairs, National Defence, Finance, Education, Justice, Economic Affairs, 
Transportation, Health, Labor Affairs, Agriculture and Environmental 
Protection. Some other institutions are supportive institutions and 
support the Office of the Premier to monitor and coordinate the work 
of various ministries, such as the Central Personnel Administration; 
Commission for Research, Development and Evaluation; Council 
for Economic Development; Government Information Office; and 
Office for Budget, Accounting and Statistics. In addition to these two 
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categories, there are independent institutions that perform their duties 
independently and without political considerations, including the Central 
Bank, Central Election Commission, Fair Trade Commission, Financial 
Supervisory Commission and National Communication Commission. 
Fixed-term appointments guarantee the impartiality of the members of 
these independent institutions.
The increase in the number of institutions over the years is an example 
of  the  government’s desire to respond to the emerging needs and 
expectations of the people. If an institution does not exist to meet 
a specific demand, the easiest response is to create a new institution to deal 
with it. The negative impact of organisational proliferation is, however, 
too obvious to neglect. The following shortcomings have been discussed 
repeatedly in the past decades (Yeh 2002; Shih 2005; Hsiao 2012).
1. Size: it is generally held that, to maintain effective communication 
and administration, an organisation should have fewer than 20 
subordinate organisations. A central government with 37 ministries 
and councils is certainly beyond a reasonable span of control. It is 
difficult for the premier to communicate with all the ministers in 
an efficient way, let alone make quick decisions when emergencies 
occur. A higher transaction cost results from negotiation with more 
than one ministry.
2. Confusion: according to its original design, there is a clear 
distinction between the ministry and the commission or council 
in the Executive Yuan. The ministry is an agency responsible for 
a  specific domain of public services, such as national defence, 
foreign  affairs, economic development, finance, education, justice 
and transportation. The commission or council is an agency designed 
for cross-area negotiation and cooperation, such as the National 
Development Council or the National Science Council. Yet many 
newly established institutions do not follow this rule, which has 
confused the respective functions of ministries and commissions. 
For instance, in principle, a ministry should take care of labour 
affairs, but it has instead become the business of a council. The same 
is true for agriculture, cultural affairs and public health.
3. Overlap: as the number of public service institutions increase, 
it is inevitable that the function of one institution will overlap 
that of another from time to time. For example, the Council for 
Hakka Affairs  regards itself as responsible for the promotion of 
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Hakka  culture  (such as music and dance). Yet the Council for 
Cultural Affairs also sees Hakka culture as part of the national culture 
within its remit. It is difficult, therefore, to apportion responsibility 
for those cultural activities that have some Hakka element but 
are not entirely Hakka. Overlap and conflict with regard to sport 
education and athlete training also occurs between the Ministry 
of Education and the Council for Sports Affairs, and between the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs and the Council for Youth with regard 
to the development of youth enterprise and youth employment.
4. Lack of flexibility: Taiwan’s institutional framework is ‘hard’ 
rather than ‘soft’ because of strict regulations relating to the number, 
functions and personnel of the institutions. The Acts concerning 
those institutions can only be amended with the approval of the 
Legislative Yuan. Especially for tier-three agencies (namely, the 
subordinate institutions of the ministries and councils, such as 
the Immigration Agency of the Interior Ministry or the Customs 
Administration of the Finance Ministry), all the directors must 
be permanent civil servants and cannot be recruited from the civil 
society. The advantage of this system is a more stable and consistent 
public service. Its disadvantage is the lack of flexibility, innovation 
and responsiveness in administration. To alleviate the problem, 
the government may open some key positions to talented people 
who are not permanent civil servants, such as the director of the 
Tourism Bureau.
5. Non-responsiveness: the government is accountable to the people, 
and ministries should also be responsive to the demands of the times. 
In a fast-changing society and with the onset of globalisation, many 
new issues and challenges need to be addressed by the government 
so that the people can enjoy a secure and comfortable life. Salient 
concerns include environmental change, cross-border crime, the 
prevention of epidemics, cyber security, global terrorism, a low 
birth rate, an ageing society, and enhancement of new high-tech 
industries. These are issues that previous government agencies have 
not seriously addressed and they must be responded to with more 
effective reorganisation or restructuring of government.
6. Inefficiency: efficiency and effectiveness are always the top priority 
of government performance; however, this is difficult to achieve in 
a government with 37 tier-two institutions and more than 100 tier-
three agencies. To be sure, size is only one reason for governmental 
inefficiency in Taiwan. The procedure to initiate, deliberate and 
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decide a public policy is as critical as the number of institutions 
or agencies that the policy involves. Decision-making procedures 
would be improved by simplifying the steps for policy innovation, 
and creating a more transparent administrative environment in 
which transaction costs are significantly reduced.
It is for these reasons that the demand for organisational reform is 
increasingly urgent. Streamlining government and making it more efficient 
and responsive to the expectations of the people is so widely agreed among 
politicians, bureaucrats, scholars and NGOs that, no matter which party 
is to lead the country, organisational reform is expected to occur quickly.
The scheme of the 2008 organisational 
reform
The earliest proposal for organisational reform was expressed in 1987, 
when the Executive Yuan set up an ad hoc committee to streamline 
the government. Progress was slow due to a lack of determination and 
opposition expressed from the institutions or agencies that were to be 
merged. Versions of the restructure have also changed over the years, 
reflecting the ideas of different administrations. The major achievement 
before 2008 was to pass the Basic Code Governing Central Administrative 
Agencies Organizations, which prescribed that the number of tier-two 
institutions should be limited to 22, including 13 ministries, four councils 
and five independent institutions. This code does not, however, specify 
what these ministries and councils should be. That difficult question needs 
to be solved in an amendment of the Organizational Act of the Executive 
Yuan 2010.
In 2008, with the inauguration of President Ma Ying-jeou, the process 
of organisational reform was reinvigorated. A new ad hoc committee 
was established in the Executive Yuan, chaired by the vice-premier. 
The Commission for Research, Development and Evaluation was in charge 
of the task of developing a new scheme and coordinating all 37 ministries 
and councils to complete the reorganisation. The scheme was announced 
publicly in 2009 with the stated mission to ‘create a streamlined, flexible 
and efficient government’. Echoing the demands from academia, the 
business sector and civil society, the major goals of the reorganisation 
were set out as (Jiang 2013; Song & Hu 2013; Hsiao 2012; Song & 
Hsieh 2009):
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1. to reduce the number of ministries and councils from 37 to 29 by 
merging and restructuring
2. to clearly distinguish the respective nature of ministries, councils 
and independent agencies
3. to define the function of each ministry to avoid overlapping of 
business or oversight of government services
4. to strengthen the capability of the Executive Yuan by increasing the 
number of ministries without portfolio and restructuring the offices 
inside the Executive Yuan
5. to reduce the number of tier-three institutions from 100 to 70
6. to allow some tier-three institutions to have heads who are not 
permanent civil servants so as to introduce innovation and 
breakthrough to government activities
7. to restructure government agencies so that emerging challenges can 
be adequately addressed
8. to dramatically simplify administrative procedures and improve 
administrative efficiency
9. to control the total number of central government civil servants with 
quotas for various types of personnel
10. to create a new form of governance (the administrative corporation) 
that carries out specific public duties but has more flexibility in 
personnel and financial management
11. to make the policy decision-making process more transparent to the 
general public
12. to promote e-government so that the people will have easier access 
to government.
Details of how the major institutions were to be merged and restructured 
under the organisational reform are set out below and an overview of the 
organisations before and after the merging plan provides a rough idea as 
to what is happening under the organisational reform (See Table 4.1).
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Table 4.1. List of institutions before and after the reform
Institution before the 
reform
Transition Institution after the reform
Ministry of the interior Ministry of the interior
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ministry of national Defense Ministry of national Defense
Ministry of Finance Ministry of Finance
Ministry of education Ministry of education
Ministry of Justice Ministry of Justice
Ministry of Economic Affairs Ministry of economic 
and Energy Affairs
Ministry of Transportation Ministry of Transportation 
and Construction
Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs 
Commission
Merged into Council 
of Mainland Affairs
Overseas Compatriot Affairs 
Commission
Overseas Chinese Affairs 
Council
Council for Cultural Affairs Ministry of Culture
Council of Labor Affairs Ministry of Labor 
Veterans Affairs Commission Veteran Affairs Council
national Youth Commission Merged into Ministry 
of education
Atomic energy Council Merged into the 
Premier’s Office
Mainland Affairs Council Mainland Affairs Council
national Science Council Ministry of Science and 
Technology 
research, Development and 
evaluation Commission
Merged into national 
Development Council
Department of Health Ministry of Health and Welfare
environmental Protection 
Administration
Ministry of environment 
and nature resources 








Merged into Ministry 
of Transportation 
and Construction
Council of Agriculture Ministry of Agriculture
Council for economic Planning 
and Development
national Development Council
Council of indigenous Peoples Council of indigenous Peoples
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Institution before the 
reform
Transition Institution after the reform
Council for Hakka Affairs Council for Hakka Affairs
national Palace Museum national Palace Museum
Sports Affaires Council Merged into Ministry 
of education
Coast Guard Administration Ocean Affairs Council





Directorate‑General of Budget, 
Accounting and Statistics






Fair Trade Commission Fair Trade Commission





Source . The author
While the scheme announced in 2009 has not yet been fully implemented, 
it remains the basis for the restructuring underway. Under the scheme, 
six new ministries were to be created. To enhance the government’s 
capacity to protect the environment and to manage natural resources, the 
Environmental Protection Administration was to become the Ministry 
of Environment and Natural Resources. To integrate the capability 
to assist the least advantaged through social welfare and medicare, the 
Department of Health was to merge with the agencies of social welfare 
and become the Ministry of Health and Welfare. To promote cultural 
innovation and cultural industry, the Council for Cultural Affairs was 
to incorporate international cultural exchange and be upgraded as the 
Ministry of Culture. To show the government’s determination to help 
workers and farmers, the Council of Labor Affairs and the Council of 
Agriculture would be expanded and transformed into the Ministry of 
Labor and the Ministry of Agriculture respectively. Finally, to facilitate 
the development of future industry, the National Science Council would 
become the Ministry of Science and Technology.
To streamline the government and reduce the problem of overlapping 
responsibilities, the following institutions would be merged with relevant 
ministries: Coast Guard Administration; Commission for Research, 
Development and Evaluation; Consumer Protection Commission; 
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Council for Atomic Energy; Government Information Office; Mongolian 
and Tibetan Affairs Commission; National Youth Commission; Public 
Construction Commission; and Sports Affairs Council. With the merger 
of nine institutions, and the creation of the Ocean Affairs Council, the 
total number of tier-two institutions would be reduced from 37 to 29.
All the other institutions of the Executive Yuan would remain more or 
less the same, although some would change their name to reflect a new 
mission following the incorporation of other institutions. For instance, the 
Ministry of Transportation would become the Ministry of Transportation 
and Construction because it has taken over the responsibilities of the 
former Public Construction Commission.
The organisational reforms involve a profound and comprehensive 
restructuring of the central government in Taiwan. As the legislature must 
amend more than 100 Acts, it was hard to estimate how much time it would 
take to complete the reform. The Commission for Research, Development 
and Evaluation hoped for the project to be completed by the end of 2011, 
but that proved wishful thinking. Until now, four of the new proposed 
ministries have been created, but another three are still struggling in the messy 
negotiation process of the Legislative Yuan. Among the nine institutions to 
be merged, six have disappeared, but three remain. With the coming to 
power of President Tsai Ing-wen in 2016, the momentum for organisational 
reform has declined because the new government is less enthusiastic about 
promoting administrative efficiency through institutional streamlining.
Assessment of organisational reform 
in Taiwan
Although organisational reform is not yet complete, it is possible to 
estimate the initial impact of the scheme by comparing the pre- and post-
reform efficiency of the Taiwan Government.
According to the World Competitiveness Rankings published by the 
Institute for Management Development (IMD), Taiwan’s performance 
improved dramatically after the organisational reform scheme was passed 
by the Legislative Yuan in 2010. Before the reform scheme was launched 
(2007), Taiwan was ranked 18th out of all the evaluated countries. It then 
jumped to 13th with the beginning of the reform (2009), but dropped to 
23rd in 2009 because of the global financial crisis. Following the passage 
of the Organizational Act of the Executive Yuan, several new ministries 
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were created between 2010 and 2014, while others were merged. Taiwan’s 
ranking rose to somewhere between 8th and 13th, which is a substantial 
upgrade compared with the previous years.
The World Competitiveness Rankings is composed of four major factors 
(economic performance, government efficiency, business efficiency 
and infrastructure). Government efficiency is most relevant here and 
Taiwan’s ranking for this factor shows significant improvement since 
2010, even better than its performance in world competitiveness as 
a whole. The same pattern appears when probing into the sub-factor of 
institutional framework, which may be directly related to organisational 
reform. Taiwan’s performance reached a record high during 2010–13, 
but has gradually declined since, probably because the reform process 
was held up in the legislature (see Table 4.2 and Figure 4.1). 
Table 4.2. Taiwan’s performance in the IMD rankings
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
World 
competitiveness
18 13 23 8 6 7 11 13 11 14 14
Government 
efficiency
20 16 18 6 10 5 8 12 9 9 10
institutional 
framework
29 23 20 14 13 15 16 20 19 16 15


























2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Competitiveness Government efficiency
Figure 4.1. Taiwan’s competitiveness and government efficiency in the 
IMF rankings
Source . iMD (2007–17)
87
4 . GovernAnCe STruCTure, orGAniSATionAL reForM AnD ADMiniSTrATive eFFiCienCY
The Global Competitiveness Report published by another international 
NGO, the World Economic Forum (WEF), reveals a similar pattern for 
Taiwan’s performance during these years (see Table 4.3).
Table 4.3. Taiwan’s performance in the WEF rankings
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Competitiveness 14 17 12 13 13 13 12 14 15 14 15
Source . WeF (2007–17)
These rankings make it clear that Taiwan’s government efficiency 
significantly improved after the implementation of organisational reform, 
especially following the mergers and restructuring that were carried out 
in 2010–13. Some caution is warranted, however, about the correlation 
between organisational reform and government efficiency because the 
latter encompasses several indicators, and organisational streamlining is 
only one of them. A more systematic and thorough study is yet to be done.
In addition to this evidence suggesting the reform has contributed to 
improvements in Taiwan’s government efficiency, there are other important 
lessons to be learned from Taiwan’s organisational reform experience so 
far. These lessons reflect the reality and subtleties of a concrete reform 
that inevitably has positive and negative impacts. They are based on the 
author’s observations and thoughts and draw on his practical experience 
in government as well as his current academic perspective.
To begin with, opposition from the institutions to be merged is always 
a major obstacle of organisational reform. Some institutions vehemently 
resist the change because they do not want to be incorporated into 
other institutions. Some institutions engage passively and reluctantly in 
the reform process and try to postpone the merger. A sense of dignity, 
institutional loyalty, memory of the past and anxiety about the uncertain 
future are all reasonable grounds for individuals to resist or hesitate. 
The leaders of these institutions may also publicly and privately lobby the 
legislature against the merger plan. Some compromises often need to be 
made in order for the project to proceed.
Second, the effect of institutional mergers is not always as positive as the 
proponents envisage. In some cases, the incorporating institutions do 
not appreciate the value of the incorporated agencies and, therefore, the 
integration turns out to be less organic than intended. Organisational 
dysfunction frequently results when two or three institutions merge but 
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do not really become one body. It takes time for them to find a way to work 
together. The vision and mentality of the leader of the enlarged institution 
is critical. If he or she can take the opportunity to set a new vision for all 
the agencies under his or her control, the ministry can create a brand-new 
image, owned by all parts of the organisation, and deliver a new message 
to the people as to what public service it provides. Otherwise, the merger 
may turn out to be no more than a reduction of institution numbers.
Third, the political cost of institutional merging is yet another price 
of organisational reform. The merged institutions have pre-existing 
‘constituencies’ – service recipients and NGOs that need their subsidy 
or support. When the service is transferred to another institution, the 
constituency may well complain or even protest in the belief that their 
interests are under threat. For instance, athletes and sports associations 
are not happy about the incorporation of the Sports Affairs Council into 
the Ministry of Education because it means downgrading the former to 
a tier-three agency. Similarly, many consumers and consumer associations 
are reluctant to see that the Consumer Protection Commission will 
disappear, although another institution will continue to perform the 
function of consumer protection. When angry ‘constituents’ express their 
dissatisfaction and bitterness in elections, the current government pays 
a political price.
Fourth, a purpose of organisational reform is to introduce flexibility by 
prescribing that only the tier-one institution (the Executive Yuan) and 
tier-two institutions (ministries and councils) need to be enacted by the 
legislature. The organisational code for tier-three institutions (agency and 
bureau) would not need legislative amendment and this will allow the 
government to reform subordinate institutions more easily to cope with 
a changing social environment. The Legislative Yuan, however, does not 
agree and insists that the organisational Acts concerning all three levels 
of institution must be passed and amended by the legislature. As a result, 
there are still many bills held up in the legislature, and no hope that 
they will be passed soon. The legislature itself is one of the reasons for 
government inefficiency.
Fifth, the reform’s mission to reduce the quota of government 
employees has resulted in many institutions finding it difficult to provide 
the quality public services that the people expect. One important feature 
of modern democracy is that people expect more from government, and 
that politicians promise more to voters. It is a dilemma for government 
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to provide more services with reduced manpower. Of course, solving 
this dilemma is at the centre of government efficiency – getting 
more things done more quickly with less cost. But there is a limitation 
to this golden rule. When the size of government is streamlined to an 
extent beyond reasonable capability, the necessary public services simply 
cannot be delivered.
Sixth, multiple institutional design is a good idea in itself because it 
can make the governance structure more flexible, creative and efficient. 
That is the reason why Taiwan has not only conventional ministries 
and agencies, but also independent institutions and administrative 
corporations. It is important, however, to use the most appropriate type 
of institution for the function involved. As independent institutions, the 
Central Election Commission and the Central Bank are good examples 
of impartial policymaking and implementation. The function of the 
National Communications Commission (NCC), however, fails many 
people’s expectation. NCC is responsible for supervision of mass media 
competition and promotion of the communications industry. The weight 
that it places on scandal prevention in its regulatory role, unfortunately, 
makes NCC a nightmare for the telecommunication industry to approach 
in looking for support. A possible solution is to separate the two major 
functions of NCC so that another institution takes responsibility for 
industrial development.
Seventh, a government institution’s autonomy is important in 
shouldering  the responsibility of specific public service delivery or 
administrative regulation. Yet, in an age when most businesses are 
cross-boundary in nature (such as e-commerce, international worker 
immigration and climate change), inter-organisational negotiation and 
cooperation is even more important than institutional autonomy. The role 
of a minister without a portfolio has been created to mediate differences 
among institutions and make coordinated decisions involving cooperation 
across agencies to address complex issues on behalf of the premier, so 
that important public policy will not be too narrowly conceived or too 
favourable to any particular interest group. To have a more efficient and 
effective government, the task of inter-departmental negotiation is an 
essential responsibility requiring efficient processes.
Eighth, the job of streamlining administrative procedures is no less 
important than that of streamlining government. If procedures are 
hampered by unnecessary checks and balances, government becomes 
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a major source of private sector frustration and resentment. Especially 
when organisational restructuring is too difficult to be accomplished, the 
only way to help the government move forward is to revise and simplify 
administrative procedures.
There are many lessons to be learned from Taiwan’s experience of 
organisational reform so far. The ones outlined above may be of relevance 
to any other government considering comprehensive reform. Although 
the background, motivation and problems to be solved will differ from 
one country to another, the underlying challenges and obstacles are likely 
similar, whether they be overlapping of government functions, proliferation 
of institutions, opposition expressed by merged organisations, or the 
political cost to be paid for a serious reform. If political practitioners and 
academics who envision government reform could pay attention to as 
much experience as possible from preceding cases, the chance of success 
would be greater.
Thoughts beyond the organisational reform
This chapter has focused on factors that are directly related to Taiwan’s 
program of organisational reform that began in 2008. The enhancement 
of government efficiency, nevertheless, is not merely a question of 
institutional restructuring. Some broader institutional factors are no 
less important for the improvement of government efficiency. In this 
section, two specific elements are explored as having a profound impact 
on government performance in Taiwan: the constitutional framework and 
central–local relations.
Taiwan’s constitutional framework establishes a semi-presidential political 
system. After election by the people via general election, the president 
is the leader of the country. The Executive Yuan, however, is led by the 
premier, who is appointed by the president and is not an elected politician. 
According to the ROC Constitution, ministers are selected by the premier, 
to whom they are responsible. The president has direct control only over 
the ministers of National Defense, Foreign Affairs and Mainland Affairs. 
The Executive Yuan is accountable to the Legislative Yuan and the premier 
and ministers must regularly answer questions from the legislature 
regarding policy and budget. A system in which the leader of the country 
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(the president) and the leader of the government (the premier) are two 
different people is also known as a ‘dual-head’ system (Elgie, Moestrup & 
Wu 2011; Wu 2016).
Semi-presidentialism differs from a parliamentary system in that its 
popularly elected head of state is more than a ceremonial figurehead. 
It differs from a presidential system in that the cabinet, which is led by the 
premier, is responsible to the legislature, which may force the cabinet to 
resign through a motion of no confidence. Many countries have adopted 
semi-presidentialism as their political system, including France, Russia, 
Portugal and Poland. The system’s merits rest in the political stability 
achieved by protecting the fixed-term president from harsh criticism 
by the legislature or the people, and in the opportunity to change 
unwelcome policies by asking the premier (but not the president) to 
resign. The system’s shortcoming is frequent confusion of accountability 
as to who (the president or the premier?) should take responsibility for 
policy failures. The possibility of government inefficiency also arises 
because the cabinet is accountable to the president (who unofficially 
decides the position of ministers) and the legislature at the same time 
(Shen & Wu 2017).
The disadvantage of semi-presidentialism is manifest in Taiwan where the 
problem of government inefficiency is increasingly evident. Government 
efficiency is not merely a matter of how public officers plan and execute 
policy quickly. It also relates to the formation and effective and transparent 
communication of policy between the executive and the legislature. 
Semi-presidentialism creates a complex network of responsibility for 
public officers. Ministers and high-level officers must have the support or 
endorsement of the president and the premier before announcing policies. 
When the opinions of the president and the premier differ, the officers 
must revise their plans to accommodate the two leaders, which can be an 
exhausting, frustrating and time-consuming process.
After the administration makes a decision, policy is further scrutinised and 
revised in the legislature. If the opinion of the legislature differs from the 
opinions of the president and the minister, negotiations begin again until 
a consensus can be reached among the three stakeholders. The  quality 
of Taiwan’s legislature, unfortunately, is very poor. It takes limited 
responsibility for its role in determining informed policy and efficient 
government. Rather than focus on the content of a bill or policy, it more 
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often seeks the attention of the mass media by presenting irrelevant and 
populist questions. In the past few decades the government budget has, 
without exception, been passed only after the budget year has long started.
Nor does the legislature follow its own rules and procedures, and endless 
negotiation replaces the rule of the majority. Numerous bills are blocked 
in subcommittees and the plenary committee year after year, as is 
exemplified by the delays in enacting the bills regarding organisational 
reform. Other important bills, such as those concerning food safety, 
epidemic prevention, assistance to the disabled or a free trade zone, have 
been victims of legislative dysfunction and inefficiency. Government 
efficiency is the task of the ‘whole government’, including the president 
and the legislature. To  address efficiency without considering Taiwan’s 
constitutional framework and its operation will never lead to the 
right answer.
The problem of the relationship between the central and the local 
government is another important aspect affecting government efficiency 
(Shen, Liu & Zeng 2016). To effectively implement policy, the central 
government must make reasonable decisions that are well executed at the 
local level. Cooperation between the central and the local government, 
therefore, is critical to the success of public policy. In the case of food 
safety, several scandals over recent years have involved tainted milk powder, 
toxic starch, plasticisers in prepared foods and adulterated cooking oil. 
These crises highlighted the shortcomings of the food safety management 
system, from manufacturing processes to product inspections. To cope 
with this problem, the Executive Yuan held a series of inter-departmental 
meetings between the Ministry of Health and Welfare, the Council 
of Agriculture, the Environmental Protection Administration, the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs, the Ministry of Justice, and several other 
agencies. As a consequence, the central government established a farm-
to-table production traceability system to monitor agricultural products 
throughout their production, manufacture, distribution and sales. It also 
amended laws to prescribe heavier punishments and higher fines for 
violation of the regulations. Because the central government cannot reach 
every corner of the country, it is up to the local government (especially 
health and the police departments) to carry out the examinations 
and inspections. 
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It is difficult for the general public to appreciate which part of government 
work is done by the central government or the local government. 
Whenever a food scandal happens, people tend to criticise the central 
government when, in fact, it may be a failure of local government. It is 
pointless to argue who is to blame during a food safety crisis; people long 
for a safe and happy life. When a government cannot guarantee the safety 
of food or water, the responsibility of a particular tier of government 
is immaterial; it is the lack of efficiency or effectiveness that is readily 
apparent to the community.
Cooperation between central and local governments is essential to 
government efficiency. In a complex world, only multiple coordination and 
cooperation within the government, with some sharing of responsibilities 
but clear and distinct roles by the different players, can provide efficient 
and satisfactory public service. It is a lesson that we cannot learn from the 
limited perspective of organisational reform.
Conclusion
This chapter explores the overall governance structure of Taiwan 
(the  Republic of China) and the scheme of organisational reform that 
was launched in 2008. Such a reform is necessary for Taiwan to improve 
its administrative efficiency, and some gains have been made, though not 
yet as many as proponents of reform had hoped. The reform process has 
been a valuable effort, even if the government has paid a high political 
cost. It is hard to imagine, however, how an oversized and increasingly 
ossified government can handle the pressing challenges of globalisation 
without adjusting its organisation and functions. The pity is that, with 
the inauguration of a new government in 2016, the incomplete reform 
process lost momentum and there seems little likelihood of progress in 
the near future.
Administrative efficiency requires more than organisational reform within 
the Executive Yuan. The constraint imposed by Taiwan’s semi-presidential 
constitution, which requires the Executive Yuan to be accountable to 
both the president and the Legislative Yuan, must also be addressed. 
The relationship between politics and administration is always complex 
and it is difficult for ministers and senior officers to strike a subtle balance 
between loyalty to the leader of the country and the leader of the executive, 
to move the government forwards with due respect and accountability to 
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the legislature, to insist on the professionalism of the civil service and be 
open to the diversified demands and expectations of the general public, 
and to establish a productive partnership with local governments so 
that policy can be faithfully implemented. This can only be achieved in 
a complex political system with patience, skill and wisdom. The efficiency 
of a government is never only a matter of organisational restructuring.
In The Origins of Political Order (2011) and Political Order and Political 
Decay (2014), Francis Fukuyama contends that a stable modern political 
order is based on the three pillars of state capacity, rule of law and 
democratic accountability. State capability (or state building) concerns 
the capability of a government to manage public affairs with bureaucratic 
autonomy and administrative efficiency. Political accountability is best 
achieved when the government is held accountable to a democratically 
elected legislature that constitutes an effective check to the potential 
abuse of government power. Yet, as Fukuyama notes, tensions exist 
among these three elements. Too much democratic accountability may 
cripple government efficiency, such as the ‘vetocracy’ of contemporary 
US politics. Too much administrative discretion, for its part, can hurt 
the foundation of the rule of law, as is evident in the authoritarian rule of 
communist China. Rule of law can be a good balance to the arbitrary will 
of the majority, but ‘judicial activism’ may be as dangerous as a judiciary 
system, which is too susceptible to political will (Fukuyama 2014).
From the experience of organisational reform in Taiwan, institutional 
restructuring and administrative streamlining can help to improve 
government efficiency. Yet Taiwan’s constitutional framework of a 
‘dual-head’ system with distorted relations between the executive and 
the legislature make the government less able to carry out policies 
in  the interest of the people. If the regime type can be changed from 
semi-presidentialism to either presidential or parliamentary, the problem 
of ‘confusion of accountability’ and ‘inconsistency of power and 
responsibility’ could be significantly improved, which in turn should 
enhance administrative efficiency in Taiwan. In the same vein, if the 
relations between the executive and the legislative could be modified so 
that legislative scrutiny became more rational and constructive, it would 
also promote government efficiency. These remedies, however, require 
the amendment of the constitution and some fundamental changes in 
Taiwan’s political culture.
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Aged care and disability services 
reform in Australia
Mike Woods and David Gilchrist
Introduction
In Western democracies such as Australia, the provision of human services 
(the care and supports provided to people who fall into specific ‘at-risk’ 
cohorts such as the aged or people living with disability) is a central 
element of the drive to build equity and social cohesion (Frumkin 2002).
In Australia, the consolidation of the concept of the welfare state following 
World War II was preceded by a half century of initiatives including the 
development of pensions and the pursuit of welfare through the industrial 
relations system and parliamentary review. There was similar debate and 
experimentation in Britain, including publication of the Beveridge Report 
into social insurance (Beveridge 1942). Constitutional changes in Australia 
during the mid-1940s empowered the Commonwealth to provide an 
extended range of income support (including for the unemployed and 
widows) and benefits (such as for medical and pharmaceutical expenses, 
child endowment and maternity allowances). This represented a broader 
acceptance by governments of their responsibility for the provision of 
human services (Butcher & Gilchrist 2016). The changes formalised 
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many aspects of the almost anti-theoretical approach of policymakers and 
actors that was recognised as Australian pragmatism and that developed 
from the time of colonisation (Metin 1977).
Within a decade of the establishment of the welfare state in British-linked 
Western democracies such as Australia, however, scholarly movements 
emerged that attacked the fundamental theoretical underpinnings of 
economic and political science that held sway for the first half of the 
20th century at least – namely, institutional theory. Indeed, the primacy 
of the institution as a vehicle for policy implementation (of which the 
welfare state was the ultimate exemplar) was undermined by work that 
took a diametrically opposed view, replacing the institution with the 
individual as the focus of policy development (Peters 2012).
Much of the subsequent literature dichotomises these two ideas as being 
polar opposites.1 For instance, from the mid-1950s, theoretical schools – 
such as that of public choice (Buchanan 1954) – developed a discourse 
that elevated the influence of the individual and discounted the influence 
of the institution. By the 1980s, what had been a primarily scholarly 
exercise became a political drive reflected in Australia by the advent of 
neoliberal thinking. In the context of the provision of human services and 
supports, it emphasised the individual and invoked such ideas as ‘mutual 
obligation’ (Mendes 2008).
Based on an analysis of two significant national human services policy 
reforms in Australia – the restructuring of the provision and funding 
of aged care services and the introduction of the first national disability 
services individualised funding scheme – this chapter argues that these 
two apparently dichotomised theories have been brought together in 
practice to effect the changes.
We use these two reform processes as a foil to argue that policymakers are 
seeking to exploit the opportunity inherent in both institutional theory 
and neoliberal ideas, such as public choice, to influence consumer and 
service provider behaviour. The objectives include improving individual 
outcomes and at least stabilising fiscal sustainability by implementing 
human services delivery and funding arrangements via quasi-market 
structures.
1  Rhetoric of scholarship.
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This chapter is divided into four sections. In section two we briefly review 
the theoretical underpinnings of institutional theory and behavioural – 
or individualist – neoliberalism. In section three we describe the broad 
framework for the delivery of aged care and disability services in Australia 
and the reforms being implemented in terms of the theoretical framework 
discussed above, using these two sub-sectors of human service delivery 
to exemplify our argument. We provide concluding remarks in the 
final section.
Theoretical underpinnings
An ongoing discourse of the first four decades of the 20th century grew out 
of late 19th-century examinations of the economic state of the working 
poor, and discussion and experimentation with respect to the best course 
of action aimed at mitigating the extreme effects of poverty and inequity 
primarily derived from the consequences of the industrial revolution. This 
discourse culminated in setting aside the liberal tenets of individualism 
and self-help that were hallmarks of popular 19th-century economic 
thinking. It was replaced with ‘scientifically’ developed ideas pertaining 
to institutional resolutions to the endemic and wicked problems of 
inequity and poverty (White 2012; Deane 1980). Predominantly, 
these ideas were developed and promulgated by people who considered 
themselves the founders of sociology and who believed that institutions 
were the appropriate vehicle for the implementation of policy and the 
management of human behaviour (for example, see Webb & Webb 1965; 
Tawney 1964).
The popular champions of the move to place the institution at the point 
of primacy in public policy implementation included Max Weber (1947) 
from a scholarly perspective and William Beveridge (1942) from a public 
policy perspective. Beveridge’s report Social Insurance and Allied Services 
set out the framework and logic of the United Kingdom’s welfare state 
that was subsequently implemented through the establishment of such 
institutions as the National Health Service. 
This brief analysis of the development trajectory and basis of institutional 
theory focuses on the central tenets of this school of thought. In particular, 
the rule of law is a critical precondition providing the necessary foundation 
for the creation of a civil society – that is, there is a hierarchy of society 
and a respect for institutions. Institutions are the lever used to develop, 
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guide and manage that society (Peters 2012). Accordingly, structure is 
considered to drive personal behaviour, shape policy and act as the 
political frame.
We focus on the two main streams of institutional theory: (1) what might 
be termed classical institutional theory; and (2) new institutionalism. 
The former constitutes the original theoretical framework while the 
latter relates to a revision or revival of institutional theory in response to 
neoliberal ideas pertaining to individualism such as public choice. Peters 
(2012) argues that the latter form resulted from a reprise of classical 
institutional theory that broadened the theory particularly to include 
informal institutions in order to maintain the centrality of these ideas in 
the context of the significant advance of neoliberal thinking. 
Institutionalism is a normative theoretical framework (Ostrom 2007). 
Fundamentally, it considers that the institution drives behaviour and 
that policymakers need to design institutional responses to the wicked 
problems of human services provision in order to ensure equity of access 
and outcome. As the 1970s and 1980s wore on, though, the scholarly 
push to replace institutional theory with neoliberal ideas of individual 
behaviourism became mainstream. Policymakers argued that individuals, 
who make preference choices regardless of the nature of the institutions 
serving them, should be the focus of policy development. 
This idea saw a move away from a focus on bureaucratic institutions 
toward a broader conception of collective action (Denhardt 2011) – which 
incidentally led thinking away from the idea of government responsibility 
(the classical welfare state mentality) to collective responsibility in which 
government is one actor amongst a number. Indeed, in relation to human 
services provision in Australia, by the mid-1990s public choice theory was 
the driver of much public policy (Barraket 2008).
This policy framework manifested itself in a number of fundamental and 
important ways. For instance, the idea of mutual obligation in relation 
to human service provision and financial support was established at this 
time.2 Additionally, as these services are increasingly provided in Australia 
by not-for-profit and charitable organisations, governments began 
2  Perhaps re-established is a better phrase as this idea was a significant part of the 19th-century 
liberal thought that was displaced by institutional theory in the 20th century.
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to utilise market-based procurement regimes, including competitive 
tendering and  the use of the term ‘client’ to describe service users 
(Alford & O’Flynn 2012). 
While, at a policy development level, the acceptance of such neoliberal 
ideas was almost universal, a number of scholars did not accept the turn 
that theory and practice had taken. They warned (and continue to warn) 
of the unintended consequences manifesting as a result particularly 
of quasi-market funding rationing systems and the primacy of the 
individual, essentially arguing that ‘a rising tide [does not] lift all boats’ 
(Stiglitz 2013: 1; see also, Rainnie et al. 2012; Davidson 2011; Van Slyke 
2007; Barraket 2008; McGregor-Lowndes 2008). 
Importantly for this chapter, by the second decade of the 21st century, 
many policymakers in Australia sought to establish quasi-market 
environments intended to empower consumers and create incentives for 
providers, while creating institutional structures that sought to correct 
for market failures. The former aimed to enable the individual service 
user to make choices about from whom they sourced their services and 
how they received them, and to own the decision and demand provider 
performance. Providers were encouraged to respond to ‘market signals’ 
thus delivering a better outcome more efficiently. The institutional 
reforms aimed to improve information and transparency so that service 
users could make informed choices, to ensure there were sound safety 
nets for individuals and enforceable quality standards and to instigate 
alternative interventions in ‘thin’ markets.
In effect, many policymakers made use of a combination of institutional 
theory and neoliberalism to elicit the policy outcomes that best served the 
interests of the community as a whole. In the next section, we examine 
this phenomenon by way of two policy examples being implemented 
in Australia.
Reform – aged care and disability services
In Australia, two significant human services reforms are underway relating 
to the provision of publicly funded aged care services and disability 
supports and care services – respectively referred to herein as aged care and 
disability services. In this section, we briefly describe the background to 
DeSiGninG GovernAnCe STruCTureS For PerForMAnCe AnD ACCounTABiLiTY
102
these reforms; examine the framework for reform, including aspects that 
demonstrate a reliance on both institutional theory and neoliberalism; 
and discuss the key features of both new structures.
While reform is being carried out in these two sub-sectors 
contemporaneously, government is, in fact, implementing differing 
systems for each. Whereas there is a common resort to neoliberalism 
underpinning both, the way in which institutional theory is drawn on 
takes a different form in each, with disability services reforms intended 
to result in greater transparency and accountability through reliance on 
governance bodies that are independent of the ministerial–departmental 
nexus that dominates aged care.
Partly this is to do with the historical policy settings that moulded each 
sub-sector, effectively forcing the Commonwealth government to drive 
change from different starting positions. Partly it is to do with the fact 
that aged care, and residential aged care in particular, has historically been 
the domain of the Commonwealth government, while the provision of 
disability services has been the domain of the sub-national jurisdictions 
making up the Australian federation, with each of those jurisdictions 
adopting different policies and programs. Finally, it is also partly to do 
with the fact that aged care is fundamentally an elderly and end-of-life 
care and support system while disability services form a whole-of-life care 
and support system.
Broadly, these reforms are being carried out by the Commonwealth 
government, with the involvement of sub-national jurisdictions where 
necessary – particularly for disability services. In terms of institutions, the 
reforms impact not-for-profit and for-profit contracted service providers, 
government departments and regulators at various levels. In terms of 
policy development, however, a critical element in the reform process 
is the role of the Australian Productivity Commission (hereafter, the 
Commission). It has investigated and reported upon aspects of aged care 
for over a decade, disability services more recently, and the role of the not-
for-profit and charitable sectors in Australia as fundamental institutions 
that support civil society (Productivity Commission 2010).
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Background to the aged care and disability 
care reforms
The current reforms of aged care and disability services have similar 
origins. Following the election of the federal Labor government in 2007, 
the Productivity Commission was issued with two terms of reference to 
undertake broad-ranging public inquiries into the policies, programs, 
regulations, funding and service quality of both sectors.
The Commission is an independent policy research and advisory body 
established under an Act of the Commonwealth parliament. It operates at 
arm’s length from government and conducts open and transparent public 
inquiries and research to inform itself and develop recommendations 
that are in turn provided to government and, importantly, are published. 
It  accepts its inquiry briefs from the Commonwealth government, 
however, and those briefs can prioritise, emphasise or curtail investigations 
in relation to specific areas of interest. As such, there is a tension between 
the nature of the brief being given and the interests of independent 
and transparent research and reporting practice. In this respect, the 
Commission draws on the independence inherent in its legislated powers, 
when it considers it necessary, to ‘also make recommendations in the 
report on any matters relevant to the matter referred’ (Commonwealth of 
Australia 1998 s.11(4)).
In the case of aged care, the Commonwealth government gave the 
Commission broad and open-ended terms of reference, asking it to 
develop options to redesign and reform Australia’s aged care system 
and to  recommend a transition path to a new system (Productivity 
Commission 2011a). More detailed terms of reference were also set out to 
provide a framework for the inquiry. 
In the case of the inquiry into disability services, the terms of reference 
required the Commission to examine a range of options and approaches 
for the provision of long-term care and support for people with profound 
disability (Productivity Commission 2011b). The Commission was 
required to examine a social insurance model on a no-fault basis, reflecting 
the shared risk of disability across the population, as well as other options 
that provided incentives to focus investment in early intervention, as an 
adjunct to, or substitute for, an insurance model.
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The Productivity Commission’s report (2011a) Caring for Older Australians 
documented a range of problems in the aged care sector. The issues included 
high levels of unmet demand; a lack of continuity of care as a person’s 
needs increased; inconsistent pricing of the different types and levels of 
care; limited incentives for service providers to become more efficient, 
improve quality or respond to consumer demand; workforce shortages; 
complex, overlapping and costly regulations; insufficient independence 
of the complaint-handling process from the Commonwealth Department 
of Health; and incomplete and overlapping responsibilities within and 
between jurisdictions.
The disability care story was much the same. The Productivity Commission’s 
report (2011b) Disability Care and Support concluded that most families 
and individuals could not adequately prepare for the risk and financial 
impact of significant disability. The costs of lifetime care could be so 
substantial for individual households that the risks and costs needed to be 
pooled across the community. The Commission found that the disability 
support system was underfunded, unfair, fragmented and inefficient, and 
gave people living with disability little choice and no certainty of access to 
appropriate supports. There was no nationally consistent level of care and 
support and the stresses on the system were growing, resulting in rising 
costs for individual households and all governments.
Governance of major policy review and reform
Rationales for government involvement in aged care and disability 
services exist in the national discourse. These include equity of access 
to appropriate care, the protection of vulnerable consumers and the 
correction of market failures such as gaps in the provision of information 
about available services and, in the case of disability, the probability of 
an individual having a disability being low but the lifelong costs that 
could ensue being potentially catastrophic (Gilchrist 2017; Knight & 
Gilchrist 2015). As such, evidence-based and objective governance over 
the development, examination and consideration of policy was critical 
to identifying measures that would provide access to appropriate care 
and support for service users, incentives for service providers to improve 
efficiency and effectiveness, and the achievement of greater value for 
money and fiscal sustainability for taxpayers. 
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The Commission’s institutional processes are well suited to undertaking 
major policy reviews. The three organisational design pillars of the 
Commission are that:
1. it is independent (it is ruled by commissioners who are appointed for 
up to five years and whose independence is protected by law)
2. it conducts its policy inquiries in an open and transparent manner
3. its guiding principle is improvement of the wellbeing of the 
community as a whole – it acts in the public interest.
Appropriately, the Commission’s role does not extend to final decision-
making or implementation. This separation of functions is an important 
element of sound governance design. Accordingly, its recommendations 
on the reform of aged care and disability services, both published in 2011, 
were subject to scrutiny by the central departments – as well as by the two 
departments primarily responsible for aged care (Department of Health) 
and welfare services (Department of Social Services). In both cases, 
the government also undertook extensive consultation processes and 
developed the final reform packages that were agreed to by the cabinet. 
The Aged Care (Living Longer Living Better) Act 2013 and the National 
Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 were subsequently passed.
Following government agreement to these major policy reforms, 
government service delivery departments and agencies commenced 
implementation and undertook ongoing monitoring and revision of the 
detail of the policy and its programs. Different governance arrangements 
have evolved for aged care and disability services, but each draws on 
institutional theory and neoliberalism. These elements are explored 
further in the following subsections.
Governance of service delivery management 
and accountability
This section examines and contrasts the governance model adopted for 
aged care, which is administered by the Commonwealth government 
through the Department of Health, with that of disability services, which 
is administered jointly between the Commonwealth and participating 
sub-national governments and a newly created independent institution, 
the National Disability Insurance Agency (NDIA). The two governance 
models bring with them differences in arrangements for the oversight of 
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policy and administration, funding and quality control. Notwithstanding, 
each establishes the institutional framework necessary for the governance 
of the publicly funded services, and at the same time establishes a quasi-
market environment within which services are demanded and supplied.
Aged care: A departmental model within one level 
of government
The funding and regulation of aged care is largely the responsibility of 
the Commonwealth government via the Department of Health, which 
reports directly to the Minister for Aged Care. The Aged Care Act 1997 
and related legislation provides the legal basis for the department’s actions 
and requires the department to report annually on its operations. There 
are no transparency or accountability requirements for publication of the 
minister’s directions to the department. The department closely manages 
the performance of all aspects of the aged care programs, from operational 
policy and regulation of service supply and delivery, to funding and a high 
level of direct involvement in the regulation of quality.
Although there are several formal non-departmental bodies that 
contribute  advice in relation to policy, management and funding, 
the Department of Health is involved in their operations, especially 
by providing the staff for their secretariats. As noted below, only the 
quality regulator operates as a fully independent statutory authority, but 
even it works jointly with the department, which is responsible for the 
enforcement of quality standards through the licensing of providers.
The services provided to service users, either in their own homes or in 
residential aged care facilities, are delivered by not-for-profit organisations 
or for-profit businesses (with a small number of facilities still run by 
sub-national governments) rather than directly by the Department of 
Health. Aged care subsidies are largely funded from the annual budgets 
of the Commonwealth government. User co-payments (both capital and 
operating) are made by services users according to the cost of the services 
being delivered and their capacity to pay.
Services delivered in users’ own homes have been reformed through the 
introduction of consumer-directed care, with funding being provided to 
users and providers having to compete for business. Supply-side limits 
still apply to both home care and to care delivered in residential facilities.
107
5 . PrACTiCAL ACTion, THeoreTiCAL iMPACTS
Disability services: An independent agency model across 
two levels of government
Prior to the recent reforms, each sub-national government provided for 
the care and supports for people with disability within its jurisdiction. 
This resulted in there being considerable diversity across jurisdictions in 
the types of care available for comparable levels of disability, the quantity 
and quality of services and the amount of funding made available to 
providers. As such, among other things, people with disability could not 
move jurisdictions with any assurance that they would receive, or be able 
to afford, the supports that they required.
All governments have now committed to a National Disability Strategy 
that aims to support people with disability, to improve their lives as well 
as the lives of their families and carers, and to provide leadership for a 
community-wide shift in attitudes towards disability.
Within the National Disability Strategy, the National Disability Insurance 
Scheme (NDIS) has been established to enact a fundamental change to 
how supports and services for people with permanent and severe disability 
are funded and delivered across Australia. The total number of people 
with disability being supported by the NDIS is limited by the eligibility 
criteria. Accordingly, considerable responsibility under the broader 
strategy remains with both sub-national and national health, education 
and community service agencies. The NDIS is an important part of the 
system, but it is not the whole system.
As explained further below, the governance structure for the NDIS is 
different to that for aged care. NDIS is managed by an independent agency 
that reports to the Council of Ministers from the Commonwealth and 
state/territory governments. The Commonwealth Department of Social 
Services coordinates Commonwealth policy advising and budgeting, but 
has no direct role in funding or regulating disability services.
The NDIS can pay for supports, housing modification, transport 
assistance, assistance to seek and sustain employment and other services 
that pass the test of being ‘reasonable and necessary’. This means that the 
services and supports are relevant to a person’s disability and are necessary 
for them to be able to live an ordinary life and achieve their goals. 
Services are delivered by approved providers who compete for customers 
in a quasi-market. Local area coordinators for the NDIS can also assist 
people with disability to access mainstream community services such as 
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medical care and education, and to participate in community activities 
and services.3 Sub-national jurisdictions continue to directly support 
those with disability who are not eligible for NDIS assistance.
Oversight of policy and administration
Aged care
Given the extensive nature of the aged care reforms and the decade-
long timeframe in which they are being progressively implemented, the 
Minister for Aged Care and the Department of Health4 closely monitor 
this implementation phase. The cost of the scheme, however, and aged 
care issues that may impact on broader policy settings such as taxation 
and the age pension, also attract the attention of the central departments.
The Department of Health has considerable internal capacity to undertake 
a policy-monitoring role. It has also established an Aged Care Sector 
Committee5 comprising members appointed from the major stakeholder 
groups such as consumers, large for-profit and not-for-profit providers, 
aged care worker organisations and the department. The department’s 
staff provide the secretariat for the committee. 
The committee’s Aged Care Roadmap offered advice to the minister on the 
future directions for aged care. This committee is the only broadly based 
institution capable of holding the government to account for its overall 
management of the aged care system; however, its communiqués issued 
after every meeting (averaging four per year) make only brief mention of 
matters discussed and do not report on the outcomes of its deliberations 
on those matters. The terms of reference of the committee require that 
members respect the confidentiality of the committee proceedings. 
Policy monitoring and review was entrenched in the legislation that 
gave legal force to the reforms. There is a requirement in the Aged Care 
(Living Longer Living Better) Act that the minister initiate an independent 
3  These arrangements are yet to be effectively implemented and, as can be expected with such 
a complex and large policy rollout, there have been identified many significant issues in the context 
of examining the intention and the reality; for example, see Gilchrist (2017).
4  For information relating to the structural components of this department, see ‘Aged Care Sector 
Committee’, Ageing and Aged Care, Department of Health, Australian Government, agedcare.health.
gov.au/aged-care-reform/aged-care-sector-committee.
5  For information pertaining to this committee, see ‘Terms of reference: Aged Care Sector 
Committee’, Ageing and Aged Care, Department of Health, Australian Government, agedcare.health.
gov.au/ aged-care-reform/aged-care-sector-committee/terms-of-reference-aged-care-sector-committee.
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review of the operation of the reforms provided for under the Act after the 
first three years of their implementation. The minister appointed the chair 
of the Aged Care Sector Committee as the independent reviewer and the 
department provided the research secretariat.
The government released the report of the legislated review in 2017. 
The review concluded that the reforms it examined (being a subset of the 
total reform agenda and excluding major issues such as funding and quality 
regulation) had successfully progressed the achievement of a consumer-
driven and sustainable system, but that there was further progress to be 
made (Department of Health 2017a, 2017b).
The aged care sector’s stakeholders, including consumer groups, providers, 
workforce organisations and health professionals have established the 
National Aged Care Alliance,6 which has played a long-term constructive 
role in improving aged care. It was particularly effective in contributing 
to the Productivity Commission’s 2010–11 inquiry and in subsequently 
assisting both sides of politics in the parliament to accept the reform 
framework.
Disability services
Responsibility for disability services policy and administration for those 
who are eligible for NDIS support is shared between the Commonwealth 
and sub-national governments in accordance with the various bilateral 
agreements discussed above. A new governance framework is being 
developed as part of the establishment of the NDIS.7 
A ministerial council – the Standing Council on Disability Reform – is 
the peak level of the strategy as a whole.8 It comprises the Commonwealth 
Minister for Social Services and state/territory ministers with disability 
and treasury portfolios, as well as a representative from the Australian 
Local Government Association. Building on the framework developed by 
6  For information pertaining to this organisation, see National Aged Care Alliance, www.naca.asn.
au/.
7  As of mid-2017, bilateral agreements with a number of sub-national governments were being 
negotiated and uncertainty exists with respect to those agreements currently in place. Inevitably, 
experience of the processes in practice will inform reflection on the original agreements.
8  For information pertaining to this council, see ‘Disability Reform Council’, Disability and 
Carers, Department of Social Services, Australian Government, www.dss.gov.au/our-responsibilities/
disability-and-carers/programmes-services/government-international/disability-reform-council.
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the Productivity Commission (2011a), the council ensures the strategy 
reforms are implemented through an intergovernmental National 
Disability Agreement.9 
The National Disability Agreement specifies that all participating 
governments have joint responsibility for a range of functions: developing 
national policy and reform directions, as well as funding and pursuing 
research and providing data that improves the evidence base for policy 
and reform. The agreement also provides that each jurisdiction can, 
where appropriate, invest in initiatives to support nationally agreed policy 
priorities, in consultation with other levels of government. The enabling 
legislation for the NDIS also required a review to be undertaken after two 
years of operation of the scheme.
Under the agreement, the Commonwealth is responsible for the provision 
of employment services for people with disability; income support 
targeted to the needs of people with disability, their families and carers; 
funding for the sub-jurisdictional governments to assist them in meeting 
their obligations under the scheme; and funding disability services 
for the elderly.
The participating sub-national governments are responsible for providing 
non-employment disability services; funding and regulating basic 
community care services, except for the elderly who have a disability; 
and funding community care packages and residential aged care delivered 
under Commonwealth aged care programs (again, except for the cohort 
aged over 65, which is a Commonwealth responsibility. There are, however, 
mitigating provisions for circumstances when people with disability enter 
the NDIS prior to turning 65 years of age). 
Additional bilateral agreements deal with various matters including, in 
the case of the Northern Territory, the issue of provider of last resort and, 
for Western Australia, in relation to the state retaining a more significant 
decision-making capacity. As described above, however, the rollout of the 
new arrangements has highlighted significant issues with these agreements.
9  Information pertaining to this agreement is available here: ‘National agreements’, Council on Federal 
Financial Relations, Australia, www.federalfinancialrelations.gov.au/content/national_agreements.aspx.
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The NDIS started with a small number of trials in several jurisdictions 
and is being progressively rolled out across the nation over a three-year 
period. Oversight is undertaken by the Standing Council on Disability 
Reform. The  Commonwealth minister  is responsible for administering 
the National Disability Insurance Scheme Act and exercises statutory powers 
with the agreement of states and territories, including a power to make 
the rules for the scheme and direct the newly created NDIA.
The NDIA is an independent statutory authority that was established 
under the NDIS legislation, rather than as a function of a ministerial 
department as occurs with aged care. It is governed by a board of directors 
that is responsible for the efficient and effective performance of the 
functions of the NDIA and for determining the strategies and policies 
of the agency. The NDIA reports to the Commonwealth Minister for 
Social Services as well as the intergovernmental Council of Ministers, and 
therefore sits within the Commonwealth minister’s ‘portfolio’. As noted 
earlier, the Department of Social Services is the ‘portfolio’ department but 
has no direct role in NDIS funding or regulation.
The NDIA produces annual reports of its operations together with 
quarterly reports updating the public on the scheme’s rollout. The 
Commonwealth minister may give directions as well as general strategic 
advice to the board provided it is in writing and has been agreed to by 
all participating jurisdictions. To ensure transparency and ministerial 
accountability, ministerial directions must be published in the NDIA’s 
annual reports.
The Act provides for the appointment of an independent advisory 
council10 to advise the board. The council is predominantly made up of 
people with disability and some carers of people with disability. In effect, 
the council provides a formal dedicated consumer voice to advise on the 
operation of the scheme. In contrast to the Aged Care Sector Committee, 
the disability governance model enforces greater transparency and 
accountability. The board of the agency is required to consider and respond 
to all advice from the independent advisory council and to inform the 
Standing Council on Disability Reform of the actions it is taking.
10  Information pertaining to this council can be found at ‘IAC’, NDIS, Department of Human 
Services, Australian Government, www.ndis.gov.au/about-us/governance/IAC.




Government subsidies for services delivered to eligible service users 
are funded directly from the budget of the Australian Government’s 
Department of Health. Service users are subject to a means test and 
make financial contributions commensurate with their capacity to 
pay. Consumer  contributions are also subject to annual and lifetime 
self-funding limits, reflecting a social insurance principle, with the 
government meeting full costs once those limits have been reached.
The government’s Aged Care Financing Authority (ACFA)11 has no 
funding role but, rather, monitors the financial performance of the aged 
care system and publishes an annual report on the system’s operation. 
The authority’s annual report states: ‘[its] role is to provide independent, 
transparent advice to the Australian Government on funding and 
financial issues in the aged care sector’ (ACFA 2017: 20). In effect, the 
authority is a committee of independent persons and representatives of 
significant stakeholders that is funded by the department and supported 
by departmental staff. The minister can request the authority to monitor 
and report on specific issues relating to the financial performance of the 
aged care programs such as changes to means-testing arrangements and 
accommodation payment changes.
Another institution established to regulate certain financial issues in aged 
care is the Aged Care Pricing Commissioner. This statutory office holder 
is supported by staff employed by the department. The functions of the 
commissioner include granting approval, where warranted, to providers 
who wish to charge capital payments for aged care accommodation that are 
above a maximum amount set by the minister, and to approve schedules 
of fees for a range of services that are of a considerably higher standard or 
scope than is required to be provided under the funded program. These 
are important risk-mitigating constraints in a quasi-market-based system, 
given the vulnerability of many consumers of residential aged care and the 
fact that the service users are ultimately exposed to the supply-side risk of 
providers failing or otherwise exiting the market. In those instances, the 
department works closely with other providers with the aim of supporting 
the elderly who are affected by the closure of a facility.
11  See Aged Care Financing Authority (2016).
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The level (and cost) of community care delivered in service users’ own 
homes is determined by Aged Care Assessment Teams based on the needs 
of the person. These teams are funded by the Commonwealth and comprise 
professional health workers such as doctors, nurses, social workers and 
occupational therapists. The level of co-contribution by a person deemed 
eligible for government-subsidised care is assessed according to their 
income and wealth. Under the quasi-market consumer-directed care 
reforms, the service user can choose from competing service providers 
to ‘purchase’ services from one or more providers, and can change the 
services and the providers. A user’s needs can also be reassessed as their 
circumstances change. The government protects fiscal sustainability by 
capping the number of community care packages available at any one time.
For care in residential aged care facilities, the government subsidises the 
service providers directly and maintains caps on demand (the number of 
care places) and supply (the number of bed licences issued to providers). 
This significantly constrains the benefits of market competition in 
residential care, though the government is committed to removing supply-
side constraints and introducing consumer-directed care in the future.
To improve the information available to service users, so that they can 
exercise their progressively increasing market power, the government 
has established the My Aged Care website and requires service providers 
to make up-to-date market information available to service users. This 
represents a bringing together of institutional and neoliberal approaches 
to reform to benefit empowered consumers and to elicit more competitive 
behaviour by providers.
Disability services
Funding arrangements for the disability scheme in 2017 reflected the 
transition from pilot trials to the scheme’s progressive nationwide rollout. 
They are complex due to the nature of disability services themselves and of 
the agreements in place. The Commonwealth makes National Disability 
Specific Purpose Payments to the sub-national jurisdictions in order to 
meet its contribution to the NDIS, while these jurisdictions continue to 
fund the original system as it is gradually replaced. As the scheme becomes 
fully operational in each jurisdiction, Commonwealth payments will be 
redirected to the NDIA. 
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Disability funding is governed by the intergovernmental National 
Disability Agreement and the National Partnership Agreement on 
Transitioning Responsibilities for Aged Care and Disability Services. 
The NDIA holds all NDIS funds contributed by the Commonwealth 
and sub-national jurisdictions in a single pool, administers assessments 
of eligibility and access by participants to the NDIS and approves the 
payment of individualised support packages. The NDIA’s annual report 
must contain an actuarial statement as to the financial sustainability of 
the scheme together with any risks to that sustainability and estimates 
of the future costs of the NDIS.
Assistance from the NDIS is not means tested and has no impact on 
a person’s eligibility for income support such as the disability support 
pension and carer’s allowance. Individuals are required to exhaust private 
insurance cover prior to accessing NDIS funds.
The NDIA has developed a price list that includes individual service 
elements grouped together as bundles that can be accessed by eligible 
service users (Gilchrist 2017). Service users are expected to co-create 
a care plan with the NDIA with reference to the price list. Once the plan 
is activated, service users can choose services from competing registered 
providers. In this way, the NDIS is intended to employ quasi-market 
principles with incentives to influence service provider behaviour to 
emphasise the interests of service users. While this neoliberal funding 
arrangement may well solicit certain outcomes, it is intended that quasi-
market behaviour is tempered by the institutions that surround the 
system, including the NDIA and quality control institutions.
Quality control
Aged care
One of the central elements of performance accountability within the 
aged care system relates to the quality and safety of the services being 
delivered to service users. This is especially important given that the client 
group are some of the most frail and vulnerable in society, with many 
having limited cognitive functioning. Indeed, approximately half of all 
residents in aged care residential facilities have a diagnosis of dementia, 
and many have other impairments and little financial security.
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To this end, the Commonwealth government has employed an 
institutional approach by establishing an independent Australian Aged 
Care Quality Agency under its own Act, with the power to employ its 
own staff. The  Act and its delegated legislation – the Quality Agency 
Principles 2013 – sets out the obligations with which approved aged care 
providers must comply.12
This agency is supported by an Aged Care Quality Advisory Council that 
provides advice to the agency on its functions and operations. The advisory 
council gives essential advice on safety and compliance so as to help align 
the quality agenda with community expectations.
But even in this sensitive area, there is a lack of clarity of roles and separation 
of powers. The government has, instead, created dual administration 
of quality control by the independent agency and by the department. 
They both have roles in monitoring the compliance of aged care service 
providers to the quality standards. Where noncompliance is identified, 
it is the department that assesses the performance of providers and takes 
appropriate regulatory action, including revoking a provider’s approval 
to deliver services when their standards of care have been found to be 
particularly poor.
High-profile failures in the regulation of quality in aged care have prompted 
the government to commission a public review in 2017. The  resulting 
report of the Review of National Aged Care Quality Regulatory Processes 
was released late in that year. In the words of the reviewers: 
Our consultations and research highlighted the need for better 
coordination of regulatory functions, expanded intelligence-
gathering capacity and a better system for sharing information 
on provider performance with the public and aged care service 
providers, to promote service improvement. We have also 
recommended changes to accreditation, compliance monitoring 
and complaints-handling processes to make them more responsive 
to emerging issues with care quality. (Department of Health 
2017b: ii)
12  The functions of this agency have been incorporated into the Aged Care Quality and Safety 
Commission (see www.agedcarequality.gov.au). 
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The government has also created the role of a minister-appointed 
statutory office holder, the Aged Care Complaints Commissioner, under 
the Aged Care Act. The role was promoted as creating complaint-handling 
arrangements independent from the department.13 The staff of the 
commissioner are departmental staff. 
An advocacy scheme for service users, their families and carers has also been 
established. This provides them with free, confidential and independent 
advice on matters relating to aged care and support. It is an important 
adjunct in helping this vulnerable group to resolve their concerns in 
circumstances in which they often feel powerless and confused.
Disability care
A core component of NDIS performance management and accountability 
is the quality of the services being delivered to people with disability. 
Service users bear supply-side risk in that they are directly impacted by 
market failure where service providers fail.
The core document is the NDIS Quality and Safeguarding Framework, 
which is designed to ensure high-quality supports and services delivered 
in safe environments for all people with disability who are participating in 
the scheme.14 The framework was endorsed by the Council of Australian 
Governments in 2016 and publicly released by the Disability Reform 
Council in 2017. The framework was developed in consultation with 
stakeholders, including people with disability, carers, providers and peak 
bodies. Public consultation helped to inform the final framework. 
The framework includes the following new national functions: a code of 
conduct; provider registration, including quality assurance; a complaint-
handling system; investigation and enforcement; and nationally consistent 
worker screening. The code of conduct will be overseen by the new NDIS 
Quality and Safeguards Commission, which was announced by the 
Commonwealth Government in 2017 and funded in the 2017–18 Budget. 
The commission will have powers to enforce action where providers or 
workers have engaged in unacceptable behaviours.
13  See Aged Care Quality and Safety Commission: www.agedcarequality.gov.au/.
14  ‘NDIS Quality and Safeguards Commission’, Disability and Carers, NDIS, Department of Social 
Services, Australian Government, www.dss.gov.au/ndisqualitysafeguards.
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An additional and important private institution, which is a significant 
contributor to the disability services infrastructure, is National Disability 
Services. This industry peak body has a crucial role in responding 
to regulatory, funding and quality issues on behalf of the service 
provider sector.
Concluding remarks
The advent and implementation of significant reform in the funding and 
delivery of aged care and disability services in Australia is multifaceted, 
time consuming and challenging for governments, providers and service 
users. These are complex, crucial and universal services. Policymakers 
have considered that neoliberal theories, such as public choice, can be 
employed to design systems to empower service users with choice and 
control and create a quasi-market arrangement with embedded incentives 
for providers to deliver consumer-oriented services with higher quality 
and lower costs.
A principle aim is to elicit better value for money outcomes for the service 
users and taxpayers more generally. The benefits derived from quasi-
market response behaviours by service providers are also seen as important. 
Essentially, if the provider is to be successful it is in the provider’s interest 
to respond to the quasi-market signals.
Nonetheless, consistent with institutional theory, institutions have been 
needed to protect the vulnerability of consumers and correct for market 
failures, such as by overcoming information asymmetry, improving 
transparency and intervening in thin markets. A number of institutions 
and associated government program and regulatory interventions have 
proven critical in the administration, oversight and evaluation of the 
policy frameworks. They influence the behaviour of service providers 
by setting rules relating to funding, quality, service content and service 
planning.
They also impact behaviour via the requirements for transparency and 
accountability of governance and the collaboration of institutions and, in 
the case of disability services, the various bilateral agreements that exist 
between sub-national and national governments. The latter impact 
a number of issues that are peripheral to the policy arrangements, but are 
nevertheless important, such as the impact of oversubscription.
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Within the ambit of institutional theory, there has been considerable 
divergence of approach, with the aged care framework being heavily 
reliant on a ministerial–departmental nexus while disability services 
are administered through more independent and clearly delineated 
institutions, with greater transparency and accountability. While this 
divergence has arisen in part from the different histories of the two 
frameworks (the long dominant role of the Commonwealth in aged care 
and the dominance of the states and territories in disability services until 
very recently), it is now opportune to reflect upon the merits of the two 
approaches and to consider what might be ‘best practice’.
In both service areas, there exist formal private institutions – called peak 
bodies – that act as conduits for information, feedback and the exchange 
of expertise in the implementation of new policy. Provider peak bodies 
also exert influence on the way their members deliver services.
The research focus of this chapter demonstrates the utility and purpose of 
applying multiple theoretical frameworks. The two case studies illustrate 
that the employment of a neoliberal strategy of quasi-market systems 
and public choice, which aims to empower service users and give service 
providers incentives to improve efficiency, effectiveness and responsiveness 
to consumer demand, is being tempered by resort to institutional theory. 
The latter is based on control by institutions focused on administering 
the provision of funding and service rules, correcting market failures and 
enforcing quality standards.
Future research could investigate the extent to which a multiple-theory 
implementation framework is effective. It may also investigate the 
degree to which either institutional theory or neoliberal theories impact 
differentially on scheme performance, and whether either of the two forms 
of institutional theory deliver the greater public good. That is, does the 
combination work and, if so, is it critical or does one school of thought 
dominate the other in terms of driving service provider performance and 
service user outcomes? 
Overall, the complexity inherent in the provision of human services 
emphasises the importance of such studies in terms of ensuring the policy 
framework generates the desired outcomes from the point of view of 
service users who are, after all, at risk and dependent on these service 
systems as well as the overall public good.
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ALL THE BEST INTENTIONS
A review of a sub‑national attempt 




There is little doubt that, over the past two decades, governments in 
developed Western countries have increasingly relied on the not-for-
profit (NFP) and charitable sector as an infrastructure framework for the 
delivery of policy (Frumkin 2002). This is no less the case in Australia, 
where the NFP sector is articulated effectively into many activity areas 
that are also the domain of national and sub-national governments. 
In the Australian case, in the aftermath of World War II, the 
implementation of the welfare state broadly followed the example of the 
United Kingdom and saw governments take an increased responsibility 
for  human services.1 Governments met this responsibility in one of 
three ways: (1) they provided services directly (e.g. primary health 
care); (2) they funded other governments to undertake service provision 
1  The definition of human services can be fraught as differing contexts may imply different 
activities that fall into or out of the accepted definition. While the definition is not so important 
in this chapter, it includes disability services, aged care services, child protection and mental health 
services, as well as hybrid activities such as the provision of post-incarceration supports.
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(e.g.  local government service provision funded by state governments, 
state  government health provision funded by the Commonwealth 
government); and/or (3) they directly funded NFPs to provide services 
(Butcher & Gilchrist 2016). It  is  the third case, and the resulting 
government/NFP nexus, that is my focus here.
At this point, it is appropriate to indicate that there has been considerable 
discussion in academic and industry circles regarding the government/
NFP  nexus (Butcher & Gilchrist 2016; Alford & O’Flynn 2012; 
McGregor-Lowndes 2008; Mendes 2008). There is a metaphysical 
and practical aspect to this discourse. It is the outcomes achieved 
from a  practical attempt at strengthening the nexus in an Australian 
sub-national jurisdiction, however, that is of interest in this chapter 
(Wilkins & Gilchrist 2016).
In recent years, the nexus between governments and the Australian NFP 
sector2 – hereinafter termed the NFP sector or the sector – has undergone 
changes due to ‘traditional’ funding arrangements giving way to quasi 
market systems intended to result in better service delivery and better 
outcomes for service users (Alford & O’Flynn 2012). While the extent to 
which the introduction of quasi-market-style arrangements has resulted 
in the outcomes expected warrants further examination, this chapter is 
concerned with the broader development of the government/NFP nexus 
in one Australian sub-national jurisdiction – Western Australia (WA).3
In 2008, the newly elected WA Government undertook an economic 
audit of the state’s public sector. The focus of the audit was to identify 
prospective efficiencies, cost savings and better ways of conducting 
government business. The audit considered all aspects of government 
business, including the relationship between the NFPs contracted to 
2  The Australian NFP sector is composed of an estimated 600,000 organisations that can be 
incorporated under many differing types of legislation under both state/territory and federal legislative 
frameworks. Further, charities are a sub-sector of the NFP sector and comprise approximately 55,000 
organisations. Charities are the primary regulated NFP sub-sector and they are also most likely to 
be the type of organisation providing human services in Western Australia. This is because the types 
of services provided in human services attract charitable status and certain tax advantages. As the tax 
or other status of the organisations discussed in this chapter is irrelevant to the context and findings, 
I have retained the use of NFPs throughout the chapter to cover all types of entities that may be 
impacted by the Delivering Community Services in Partnership (DCSP) policy.
3  Additional changes in recent years have included the establishment of a national charities regulator 
(the Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission) in 2012, the establishment of a new statutory 
definition of charity (Charities Act 2013 (Cth)), and the development of federal regulatory requirements 
for charities including the annual lodgement of financial and operational data.
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provide government-funded services and the government agencies 
procuring those services – the WA Government/NFP nexus. This aspect 
became a major subsection of the final economic audit report.
Specific recommendations relating to the government/NFP nexus 
(Economic Audit Committee 2009) were adopted, including that 
a partnership forum should be established of senior representatives from 
the NFP and government sectors that would: (1) act as a policy and practice 
driver; (2) seek to recognise the value of the NFP sector; and (3) establish 
a number of subcommittees – including a contracting subcommittee 
– focused on practical improvements. The various recommendations 
that were developed as part of the economic audit were wrapped into 
what became the Delivering Community Services in Partnership Policy 
(or DCSP) (Government of Western Australian 2011).
The initiative was also to be evaluated on an annual basis; subsequently, 
assessment of the outcomes achieved, having been identified as a result 
of this annual evaluation, was to be reported to parliament. Since its 
inception, the author has carried out three evaluations on behalf of the 
WA Government and reported the largely quantitative aspects of these 
evaluations in previous publications (Gilchrist 2016; Knight & Gilchrist 
2015; Gilchrist 2013; Gilchrist & Knight 2013a). Now, over a decade 
after the establishment of the Partnership Forum, and after the election 
of a new government, the forum has been discontinued and a new, 
replacement, structure is being introduced.4
It is appropriate, then, for this chapter to look at the Partnership Forum 
structure and to analyse the impact it has had at a policy level, and whether 
or not it has achieved its intended outcomes. I do this by reviewing the 
most recent evaluation (together with previous evaluations where useful) 
within the context of the government/NFP nexus.
4  While not strictly relevant to this chapter, the new WA Government’s policy framework is 
entitled the Supporting Communities Program and it will focus on procurement processes but include 
the establishment of a Supporting Communities Forum to be made up of senior government and 
sector personnel but also including service user representatives (see www.wacoss.org.au/wp-content/
uploads/2017/06/Draft-Terms-of-Reference.pdf ). Amongst other things, this new arrangement is 
intended as a response to the Partnership Forum’s failings by including service users, appointing and 
prioritising participation in forum deliberations of senior public sector personnel, and appointing 
a local chair.
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This chapter is divided into four sections. In section two, I consider 
the government/NFP nexus with respect to human services, and place the 
DCSP in that context. In this section I also briefly describe the structures 
that made up the Partnership Forum. In section three, I analyse the forum’s 
achievements by considering the 2016 report to the WA parliament and, 
in section four, I provide concluding remarks.
The government/NFP nexus: The WA 
Partnership Forum
While this chapter is concerned specifically with the WA experience and 
while this sub-national government has sovereignty with regard to its 
response to human services challenges, due to the nature of the Australian 
national polity, this response is also tempered by the impact of federal 
government policy and funding as well as by practice in other Australian 
jurisdictions. It is necessary, therefore, to consider a broader, national 
framework before narrowing the view to the WA experience.
The development of funding and practice relating to human services 
has not been uniform across Australia5 or within each sub-sector of 
the sector – nor, indeed, has it been uniform worldwide (Young 2006; 
Salamon 1995). Broadly, however, the NFP sector has been involved in 
direct service delivery for over three decades, during which time there has 
been a general reduction in the level of direct government involvement. 
It has also been the case in Australia that governments have traditionally 
provided different services to varying degrees, but the trend is now toward 
a reduction in direct government services and an increase in the role of 
NFPs as service providers (Butcher & Gilchrist 2016).
Indeed, over the past five or so years, Australian governments have 
increasingly sought to transfer their services delivery activity (including in 
relation to assets and staff ) to the NFP sector (Alford & O’Flynn 2012). 
5  For clarity, Australia is a federation of six states and two territories, while the federal government 
also controls a number of territories that are external to the continent of Australia. Each state and 
territory has a set of responsibilities relating to human services delivery and these responsibilities can 
be both concomitant with those of the federal government or they can be separate and specifically 
a state/territory responsibility. Because of Australia’s vertical fiscal imbalance – where the states/
territories have many responsibilities but the federal government has the chief income sources – it can 
be difficult to disaggregate the roles of the federal government and that of the states and territories. 
For our purposes, I have restrained my discussion to the WA nexus and the DCSP.
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This objective has been pursued because: (1) savings can be made – NFPs 
are cheaper and more efficient than government in the delivery of services; 
(2) clinical and other service delivery risk can be transferred to the NFP 
sector (although, importantly, it is questionable as to whether political 
risk can be effectively transferred); (3) NFPs are more connected to the 
communities in which they operate and, therefore, better understand 
service needs and effective delivery techniques; and (4) NFPs are able to 
be defunded and policy is able to be changed without the need for changes 
to machinery of government and the industrial relations issues that arise 
from such changes (Productivity Commission 2010; Mendes 2008).
Due to the considerable costs associated with the provision of human 
services in Australia, watchdog agencies, particularly auditors-general 
(for instance, see Victorian Auditor-General 2013; Office of the Auditor 
General Western Australia 1998, 2000, 2003, 2012 and 2013; National 
Audit Office 2005), have also subject the government/NFP nexus to 
review. Concomitantly, there has been a move to change the government/
NFP nexus in recent years, particularly in terms of procurement 
arrangements. Indeed, this development has seen the replacement of 
‘traditional’ service funding arrangements – including government 
control, acquittal processes, funding in advance and often in quarterly 
tranches, and limited input from service users – toward the development 
of quasi-markets in human services. In such funding rationing structures, 
the various governments providing funding in support of service delivery 
do so in a way that is reminiscent of the operation of markets so that, 
in the ideal scenario: (1) service users are able to exercise choice and 
control; (2) procuring government agencies pay a price per iteration of 
service provision, often via the service user, and after the service has been 
provided; (3) and service providers are intended to be user responsive and 
more commercial in their outlook but recompensed to an extent that is 
reflective of the true cost of service delivery (Knight & Gilchrist 2015; 
Alford & O’Flynn 2012; Productivity Commission 2010; Mendes 2008).
The costs of service delivery in Western Australia are no less significant 
than elsewhere (Gilchrist & Knight 2017a) and the resources provided 
by the state’s Treasury support a considerable level of service delivery 
provided largely by NFPs on behalf of the state government (Government 
of Western Australia 2016). Given the significance of the sector’s work 
and its cost to the state government, it is logical for the government to 
look at alternative ways of driving efficiency and effectiveness in relation 
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to the nexus. The introduction of quasi-market-funding rationing systems 
is one such alternative. There are other aspects driving government policy, 
however, including in relation to managing the nexus itself.
Indeed, in the WA context, the economic audit resulted in a set of 
recommendations intended to modernise and rationalise the relationship 
between the state government and the NFP sector. This included 
the Partnership Forum’s establishment as a standing committee with the 
authority to receive reports and make recommendations regarding 
the government/NFP nexus, including in relation to the procurement of 
services, red tape reduction and broader human services policies.
The DCSP was the WA Government’s policy response to the 
recommendations it accepted and this policy impacted the contextual 
framework within which the government and NFPs operated, both at 
a metaphysical level and at a practical level.
The DCSP provided for a number of changes in the way that the 
government procurement process impacted the delivery of human services 
in Western Australia with the intention of changing the relationship 
between government and the sector as well as impacting the service-user 
focus of human service providers. In short, the DCSP set the scene for 
the government to hand more of its services over to the NFP sector on 
the basis that: (1) the NFP sector was best placed to provide services due 
to its closeness to the community; (2) the provision of funding should 
be made such that resources are to be provided to individuals using the 
services so that they can make provider decisions based on their needs 
and their perception of provider responsiveness to them (individualised 
funding); (3) recipients then have control over decision-making regarding 
the services they access (person-centred care); and (4) the evaluation of 
funded programs should be focused on the assessment of outcomes rather 
than the provision of outputs (Government of Western Australian 2011).
Further, the DCSP also provided for a policy framework that encouraged 
state government agencies to exit service delivery, it confirmed that the 
price offered for service procurement should be sustainable from the 
perspective of the NFP providers, and that the administrative burden 
experienced by the government procuring agencies and the NFP sector 
should be reduced. It also established a policy framework within which 
to provide additional funding – in the form of $600 million paid to the 
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sector in a number of tranches according to need – intended as a response 
to the apparent real reduction in funding experienced by the sector over 
previous years.
The DCSP also provided for the creation of the Partnership Forum, which 
was established with considerable political commitment being made by 
the then premier of Western Australia who saw this infrastructure as the 
pinnacle roundtable for shaping the government/NFP nexus. Figure 6.1 
provides an overview of the elements making up the forum and the 
context in which it operated. As can be seen, the premier saw himself 
as having a central role, while members of the forum were recruited 
from the NFP sector via cabinet appointments – they naturally included 
representatives from sector peak bodies, but there was no design from the 
sector’s perspective in terms of who should be around the table – and from 
the public sector by reference to the roles, rather than specific people, 
required to be in attendance. 
The Department of Premier and Cabinet, at the centre of government, 
acted as secretariat and directors-general and senior policy personnel 
were required to attend on behalf of government. By and large, NFP 
representatives were either peak body policy personnel or sector leaders 
with a high profile. However, on the sector side representation changed 
over time, while the sector peaks remained as part of the structure at 
all times.
The Partnership Forum created a number of subcommittees charged 
with widening the opportunity for specialist input into policy relating 
to key elements such as procurement and funding. These were especially 
important in the context of the implementation of the DCSP and its 
impact on government purchasing, funding acquittals and so on. As can 
be seen in Figure 6.1, the procurement subcommittee was supported 
by the Department of Finance as the central department with primary 
responsibility for facilitating the reform of the procurement process. 
Procurement personnel from key agencies and relevant sector personnel 
were appointed to this subcommittee.




















Figure 6.1. Partnership Forum structure
Source . David Gilchrist
Importantly, while the Partnership Forum was seen to be an important 
roundtable and facilitator of communication between the government 
and the NFP sector, it had no financial or human resources available to 
it to deploy in order to examine alternative policy frameworks, assess or 
evaluate existing practice or with which to drive its own agenda. As such, 
the Partnership Forum had limited real autonomy.
It is the impact of the Partnership Forum that is of interest in this chapter. 
In order to accept the policy framework and the concomitant funding 
increase that accompanied it, the parliament of Western Australia insisted 
that the government must annually evaluate the DCSP, its implementation 
and impact, and provide a report communicating the evaluation outcomes 
to the parliament. I have taken the results reported in the latest evaluation 
(Government of Western Australia 2016) related to the nexus and the 
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objectives of the DCSP as a proxy for the success or otherwise of the 
Partnership Forum. In short, the evaluation process examines the extent 
to which the DCSP was achieved in the context of the Partnership Forum 
infrastructure. The evaluation methodology, findings and commentary 
are provided in the following section.
Annual policy evaluation and commentary
As indicated above, the WA parliament required an annual evaluation 
of the DCSP in relation to the relative improvements achieved through 
the policy’s implementation. The evaluation took place each year for four 
years – the first three evaluations were undertaken by the author and the 
fourth evaluation – the focus of this chapter – was undertaken by the 
WA Treasury (Government of Western Australia 2016). The evaluation 
was carried out in 2016 but considered 2015–16 data due to the need 
to use lag data in this process. In this section, all references relate to this 
evaluation unless otherwise stated.
In 2015, approximately 1,500 individual contracts were established 
between approximately 400 NFPs delivering human services on behalf 
of 14 government agencies. These contracts had a value of approximately 
$1.65 billion while the median contract value was $250,000. 
In summary, if the DCSP was impactful we would expect to see outcomes 
such as the increased transfer of services from government to the NFP 
sector, increased sustainability of the NFP sector as a result of the increased 
prices that should have been applied, and a reduction in administrative 
burden. These outcomes should be found to have increased sustainability, 
improved outcomes and reduced cost for both government and the 
NFP sector. 
To undertake the evaluation, the WA Treasury implemented four key data-
gathering processes: (1) a review of the 2015–16 whole-of-government 
NFP contract database; (2) a survey of NFP organisations delivering 
human services on behalf of the WA Government via contracts established 
under the DCSP; (3) a roundtable discussion with procurement staff 
representing applicable government agencies; and (4) a review of a sample 
of 20 human services contracts developed under the DCSP.
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The inclusion in the evaluation process of government agencies procuring 
services was a critical aspect because the intent was to see an improvement 
on both sides of the nexus. This evaluation constituted an important 
confirmation of the government’s genuine intent with respect to the 
delivery of the expected advantages of the DCSP. This section is divided 
into four subsections, the first examines the impact of the DCSP on 
government agencies, the second examines the impact on NFPs, while 
the third section examines the deficiencies identified by Treasury and 
that relate to government agencies and the NFP human services sector. 
The final section considers the evaluation findings and draws conclusions 
regarding the Partnership Forum.
Importantly, all of these findings were also reported to the Partnership 
Forum and their lack of resolution is also likely to be an indication of the 
relative success of that body.
The impact of the DCSP on government agencies
In many respects, the impact of the DCSP is highlighted via an 
examination of what has not been achieved by government. This is partly 
because the key value of the DCSP from the perspective of procuring 
agencies is a  decrease in administrative burden and partly because the 
complexity of the DCSP means that new skills need to be acquired 
and new processes need to be implemented in order to achieve the 
outcomes sought. 
In terms of the deficiencies identified, the evaluation made it clear that, 
notwithstanding the DCSP was under its fourth evaluation, insufficient 
investment was made in training and systems to develop the intellectual 
capital and infrastructure required to ensure the DCSP achieved the 
desired results. The lack of government resulted in the DCSP’s limited 
impact in relation to a number of key result areas thus also limiting the 
capacity of procuring agencies to evaluate the purchases they made from 
the NFP sector – a critical element in any public sector accountability 
regime (Wilkins & Gilchrist 2016).
Specifically, Treasury identified a need to improve how service level 
outcomes – an important aspect of the DCSP given its focus on the need 
to achieve service delivery outcomes from the user’s perspective – are 
defined and measured in human services contracts. This finding is not 
necessarily an indictment of the commitment of the WA Government 
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in relation to the DCSP, however, as outcomes are notoriously difficult 
to identify, measure and report upon (Gilchrist & Knight 2017b). 
Notwithstanding, the need for investment in training and systems is 
an important consideration for government if it expects to achieve the 
DCSP’s desired outcomes; the evaluation results are strongly suggestive of 
a lack of investment in this regard.
Additionally, the evaluation identified insufficient machinery necessary 
for managing the increased number of contracts – under the person-
centred care and individualised funding paradigm, service users signed 
separate contracts resulting in an exponential increase in the numbers of 
contracts managed by procuring agencies – and for evaluating the extent 
to which the contracts achieved the intended outcomes. The contract 
management processes evinced by agencies needed improvement in order 
to undertake value-for-money evaluation. Once again, however, this 
deficiency is a result of a lack of investment. Without such investment, 
the additional cost of administering greater numbers of individualised 
contracts and assessing outcomes achieved adds cost to the process rather 
than reducing it. Thus, technology and know-how are critical to ensuring 
the containment of costs.
An extension of the identified infrastructure deficiency was that of a 
need to provide for data linkages between government agencies. NFPs 
providing human services can contract with more than one government 
agency depending on the breadth of services they offer. Therefore, Treasury 
identified a need for data sharing to assist with the analysis of a program’s 
efficiency, effectiveness and appropriateness.
A need was also found for government agencies procuring services from 
the NFP sector to support that sector in developing skills and awareness 
with respect to undertaking collaborations. It is widely held that such 
collaborations are likely to increase the integration of services and develop 
better approaches to service delivery while also enhancing efficiencies, 
thereby ensuring the right resources are allocated to the right areas at 
the right time (Butcher & Gilchrist 2016). As such, this issue identified 
that the procuring agencies have a responsibility for supporting the NFP 
sector, which obviates against the rhetoric of commercialisation and quasi-
markets that underpins much of the discussion relating to the DCSP.
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The impact of the DCSP on human services NFPs
The deficiencies identified in the previous section were found to manifest 
on the NFP side of the nexus – they invariably had limited capacity with 
respect to identifying and measuring outcomes; they did not have the 
capacity to invest in training, change management or systems; and they 
were impacted negatively by the growing administrative costs associated 
with the management of a substantially increased number of contracts 
and involved in identifying and reporting on outcomes. 
There were also, however, some NFP-specific deficiencies identified by 
Treasury in its evaluation in 2016. These included that the sustainability 
of NFP organisations’ was brought into question because 57 per cent of 
their income in 2014–15 was raised via WA contracts; Treasury described 
this as an excessive proportion. Clearly, this is also a finding specific to the 
cohort reviewed given that other research has identified that approximately 
71 per cent of the income of Western Australia’s charities is raised from 
government sources, including federal government sources (Gilchrist & 
Knight 2017a). It is accepted, however, that diversity in income sources is 
an important indicator of financial sustainability (Zhai et al. 2017).
The Treasury evaluation also found, however, that NFPs were confident in 
their capacity to meet both current and future demand for their services. 
This confidence included the issue of individualised funding. The positive 
perspective was also extended to the NFPs’ belief regarding their desire and 
ability to work with other NFPs and government in the development and 
provision of services. This positivity suggests that, where government was 
found to have a need to invest in and support the development of NFPs’ 
capacity for collaborative work, any response to this need by government 
would meet fertile ground.
Joint deficiencies identified – the challenges 
of outcomes measurement
The deficiencies identified above were particular either to the WA 
Government agencies or NFPs. As already described, however, a deficiency 
on one side of the nexus usually impacts the other. In this case, both 
sectors felt the lack of real investment needed to support change.
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Specifically, outcomes measurement always represents challenges 
because  outcomes can be difficult to identify, measure and report, 
especially  when they are related to human services (Gilchrist 2018a, 
2018b; Gilchrist & Knight 2017b). For instance, while government 
and NFPs may agree on specific outcomes, when it comes to human 
services, valid outcomes do not always neatly allow for annual reporting 
against contractual requirements, can be difficult to aggregate to allow for 
corporate governance regarding service delivery due to differences between 
individual service users, and the collection and measurement of individual 
outcomes can be difficult as well as expensive in time and infrastructure.
As such, investment is needed in upskilling agency procurement staff 
and NFP personnel, to establish outcomes measurement frameworks 
that are satisfactory to government and NFP providers, to establish the 
infrastructure required (such as IT platforms) for data gathering, and to 
develop the skills necessary for appropriate analysis of the data and 
a suitable response.
The co-design of services between government and the NFP sector was 
also identified as an important goal. Indeed, the Treasury report posited 
that the co-design of services would likely result in better targeted services 
that represent better value for money. The communications channels and 
collaboration between government procurers and the NFP sector, however, 
were identified as unsatisfactory and further work was needed in order to 
ensure the realisation of the advantages of collaborative work. Such an 
improvement would likely require investment on the part of government, 
as would the mitigation of additional concerns raised by Treasury.
For instance, a need was identified to recognise the expenses associated with 
the process of outcomes reporting. Data collection can take up time from 
a service delivery perspective, and there is administrative cost and time 
associated with identifying and implementing outcomes for individual 
service users (Gilchrist 2018a, 2018b; Gilchrist & Knight 2014). While 
the outcomes framework is accepted as an improvement with respect to 
the prospects for individualised funding and person-centred care, it is also 
true that the framework increases the administrative burden because all 
of these activities need to be conducted at an individual service-user level 
rather than a corporate level. 
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An increase in the administrative burden also requires a change in 
perspective relative to administrative and governance costs associated with 
human services delivery – it is almost universally agreed that the aspiration 
of person-centred care and individualised funding are worthy goals, yet 
the cost of administering the service design and reporting responses to 
this aspiration are not accepted. These costs are important elements in the 
success of outcomes and need to be accepted as such rather than simply 
as unnecessary red tape.
The evaluation further identified the need for additional skills 
development to support government agencies and NFPs to collaborate 
in identifying and operationalising outcomes measures. Guides and 
exemplars would add capacity on both sides of the nexus and there was 
a need for additional expertise to be applied at a sector level. Treasury 
expects that such upskilling and exemplars will improve the prospects for 
collaborative outcomes identification and measurement, thus improving 
the effectiveness of government service purchases. 
The final element raised by Treasury, which appeared likely to be an 
ongoing issue for the DCSP, was the need for administrative streamlining 
and reform. While it has already been observed that elements of the DCSP, 
such as individualised funding and person-centred care, will naturally result 
in an increase in administrative effort, a fundamental recommendation 
of the audit review that resulted in the DCSP was that administrative 
burden ought to be reduced with respect to the government/NFP nexus. 
Co-design between government purchaser and NFP supplier, shared data 
and genuine joined-up government are required if administrative costs are 
to be meaningfully reduced.
The impact of the Partnership Forum
Clearly, the deficiencies identified endured through the first three 
evaluations and continued into the period covered by the fourth, with no 
expectation that change was imminent. Fundamentally, the Partnership 
Forum was supported by the government and the NFP sector. It is clear, 
however, that there were a number of aspects of the forum that impacted 
negatively on its capacity to effect change, notwithstanding the almost 
universal support it enjoyed.
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While the Partnership Forum was intended to be the peak venue for 
guiding the government/NFP nexus in Western Australia, it was effectively 
restrained by the central agencies of government as it did not have a budget 
of its own or an independent secretariat. This restraint was not ‘negative’ 
in that the central agencies did not necessarily move to constrain the 
forum or reduce the opportunity for realising the DCSP. Rather, as his 
government aged, the premier’s attention was focused elsewhere, and the 
subsequent lack of political focus on the DCSP meant that the necessary 
resources for change were withheld.
Without a budget, the forum was neither able to develop an implementation 
plan to guide the functional introduction of the DCSP, nor examine 
alternative policy settings or undertake research or other work in its own 
right. Additionally, the lack of executive capacity meant that, while four 
annual evaluation reports consecutively described the same problems 
and prescribed the same solutions, there was no appetite or capacity to 
respond positively. 
The lack of an implementation plan combined with the absence of 
executive capacity and effectively sidelined the Partnership Forum, with 
anecdotal evidence suggesting that senior government personnel routinely 
sent subordinates to represent them at forum meetings – an indication 
of the failing relevance of the body.
Additionally, the Partnership Forum was chaired by a non-WA resident 
– who arguably lacked context as a result – and provision was not made 
for a contribution by service users or their advocates. Consequently, 
the gradual dissipation of influence meant that, when the government 
changed in April 2017, the forum was suspended. 
Following initial consideration by the new government, the Partnership 
Forum was disbanded and the Supporting Communities Forum has been 
established. Among other things, this new body will include service users’ 
advocates, be chaired by a Western Australian with an understanding 
of the human services sector and include senior government and sector 
personnel. Importantly, it appears that the body will not have any financial 
or human resources at its disposal, suggesting that the same problems that 
arose with the previous body may be replicated in this new one.
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Concluding remarks
The establishment of the DCSP in 2011 was identified as a paradigm 
shift in Western Australia’s government/NFP nexus. Expectations were 
raised that the Partnership Forum would husband the change sought, and 
implementation of annual evaluation of both sides of the nexus was an 
important signal that the government was serious about driving effective 
change to the state’s provision of human services – change that would 
benefit those relying on supports funded by government and provided 
by NFPs.
The four subsequent annual evaluations, however, including the evaluation 
undertaken by the WA Treasury in 2016 that forms the basis for this 
chapter, confirm that the government did not supply sufficient funding 
for investment and change management. The need for capital to support 
change was highlighted by the fact that the necessary infrastructure and 
skills sets remained deficient, even though the policy itself was in place for 
six years and preceding evaluations raised similar concerns. 
Additionally, the prospects for improving the effectiveness of the 
government/NFP nexus seemed strong at the commencement of 
the  DCSP. Annual evaluations, however, highlighted the need for 
improved collaboration between government procurers and the NFP 
sector to co-design services and identify and report on outcomes.
Of course, the prospects for improvement might have increased if there 
was also a fundamental reconstruction plan in place that could have been 
used to prioritise the allocation of resources, guide the development 
of service frameworks and guide reporting and other requirements for 
ongoing improvement. Such a plan was, and remains, likely to identify 
investment needs, establish a logical timeframe and allow for government 
and sector change processes.
The implementation of a policy framework of the significance of the 
DCSP required broader consideration at a whole-of-government and 
a whole-of-sector level. The change impacted two intertwined sectors that 
have worked together within the context of a policy framework that has 
been in existence for decades, making it difficult to change cultures as well 
as practices. Continued government enthusiasm at the highest levels is 
critical to ensuring the prospects for the expected outcomes associated with 
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the DCSP can be realised, even under the new Supporting Communities 
Forum. Unfortunately, it is clear that the prospects for positive change 
expected out of the DCSP have, to date, not been fully realised.
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An examination of three 
models of influence
Annwyn Godwin
Institutional structures influence the way in which organisations and 
individuals interact. While the leaders of organisations may respond 
differently, the structures themselves can encourage or stifle collaboration, 
openness and innovation, and can constrain or promote independence. 
Leaders of integrity organisations may also have some discretion about the 
approach they take to their statutory responsibilities, including whether 
to emphasise the promotion of good behaviour or the policing of bad 
behaviour; there is room, at times, for integrity agencies to collaborate to 
get the balance right.
During my 10 years as a statutory office holder in the Merit Protection 
Commissioner role, I witnessed an evolution in the understanding of 
governance – public accountability and performance – for non-core 
agencies. This chapter outlines some of the major influential factors that 
I observed in Australia generally, and for statutory integrity agencies 
in particular.
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In examining governance changes, this chapter draws on my experience 
in the Office of the Merit Protection Commissioner (MPC) to illustrate 
the influence of three models promulgated since the early 2000s. The first 
model was presented in the Uhrig Report – after its leader, John Uhrig 
– which was commissioned by the Australian Government to review the 
corporate governance of Commonwealth authorities. The second model 
was outlined by Jocelyne Bourgon, a former head of the Canadian civil 
service, in her keynote address to the Institute of Public Administration 
Australia (IPAA) national conference in Sydney in June 2008. The third 
model was presented in a paper by Maryantonett Flumian, another former 
senior Canadian public servant and president of the Public Governance 
Exchange (PGEx), at the Public Sector Governance Conference hosted by 
the Australian Institute of Company Directors in October 2009.
My own experience, drawing on these models, is that public sector 
governance arrangements, including for integrity organisations, 
continue to evolve. While such agencies require a considerable degree of 
independence and autonomy, it is not easy to categorise them or apply 
a common or fixed approach to their accountability or management 
arrangements for optimising performance.
The Uhrig Report
Uhrig completed his Review of Corporate Governance of Statutory Authorities 
and Office Holders in 2003. It was influential at the time in attempting to 
develop a broad template of governance principles for statutory agencies 
that drew upon best-practice models in the public and private sectors. 
The report’s context was the financial management reforms enacted 
in the 1990s. At the time there was limited consideration of the 
implications of the significant machinery of government (MoG) changes 
that occurred in 1987 and the expansion of statutory authorities under 
new public management (NPM) reforms. The 1987 changes included 
the establishment of mega-departments and ‘portfolios’ that grouped 
agencies (including statutory authorities) under ‘portfolio ministers’ and 
gave the ‘portfolio department’ implicit responsibility for coordinating 
portfolio budgets and policy advice. The administrative, reporting and 
accountability arrangements to parliament changed as a result of the 
creation of the roles of assistant ministers and parliamentary secretaries to 
support portfolio ministers. As John Nethercote noted in 1999:
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there has continued to be considerable organisational change 
within portfolios, especially through hiving off, corporatisation 
and privatisation, for instance, by creation of Centrelink, based 
on the regional networks of the departments of Social Security and 
Employment, Education and Training, or establishment of bodies 
such as the Civil Aviation Safety Authority and the Australian 
Maritime Safety Authority within the Transport Department. 
(Nethercote 1999)
The establishment of a wide range of statutory organisations over this 
period was not just a political response to the issues of the day, but 
also a response to broader developments in public sector management. 
These developments included NPM’s focus on results including through 
wider principal–agent arrangements, the new role of regulation that 
emerged with commercialisation, privatisation and competition policy, 
and increasing interest in ‘integrity’ and the oversight of public sector 
governance values, especially following NPM’s devolution of authority. 
The statutory bodies, encompassing regulatory, service delivery and 
government oversight functions, used a range of governance structures. 
Most were subject to the Commonwealth Authorities and Companies 
Act  1997 for the purposes of formal financial management and 
accountability and some were subject to the Public Service Act 1999.
The key recommendations of the Uhrig Report may be summarised as:
1. a firmer and more consistent approach to accountability with two 
main governance templates, one being via an executive board the 
other via a single accountable CEO, where any board would be 
advisory only
2. notwithstanding statutory independence, some recalibration of the 
line of accountability through the minister to the parliament by 
having a ministerial statement of expectation of how the authority is 
to exercise its responsibilities and a corresponding statement of intent 
by the authority
3. a firmer role for the ‘portfolio’ secretary of the relevant department 
in advising on appointments and coordinating the agencies within 
the portfolio.
I regarded the Uhrig review as having led, at least for a short while, 
to an alignment at the highest level between management rhetoric 
and management practice, in terms of a stronger focus on governance 
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arrangements and management accountability. I held a senior 
departmental management position in 2003 and the mantra of ‘let the 
managers manage’ felt real, including the expectation of being held to 
account. This meant senior managers needed sound evidence to support 
decision-making and could be expected to demonstrate this if called to 
explain. It may of course be coincidental that this period was also when 
a wide range of accountability reforms came to fruition including, for 
example, the charter of budget honesty (1998), the integrated accrual 
accounting framework (1999–2000) and the consolidated Commonwealth 
Procurement Guidelines (2004). 
One impact of these developments was increasing standards of public 
accountability for officials rather than ministers only. Dr Derek 
Drinkwater drew upon his experiences at the Australian Public Service 
Commission (APSC) and in the department of the Senate when 
researching his paper on parliamentary scrutiny of the Australian Public 
Service (APS). He  reported that since 1996 ‘more and more, senior 
public servants at the table, rather than ministers, were being required to 
answer questions and explain decisions, and to do so at an unprecedented 
degree’ (Drinkwater 2015: 61). This trend was arguably underway for 
much longer, particularly since the strengthening role of parliamentary 
committees and their focus on questioning officials. The shift was to 
some extent inevitable, of course, for statutory officers with statutory 
independence from ministerial direction who must be held accountable 
directly for the exercise of those responsibilities.
In many respects, Uhrig brought to a head a growing disconnect between 
public sector managers’ accountability and the traditional Westminster 
ministerial accountability to parliament. Uhrig, however, applied private 
sector practice to the issue in his terminology and focus on CEOs and 
boards and, arguably, he did not appreciate sufficiently the public sector 
environment. But he exposed a potential accountability vacuum and 
suggested a particular way of addressing it. This involved the exchange of 
statements of expectations and intent between ministers and the statutory 
authorities ‘that identified agreed outcomes and priorities without 
compromising the authorities’ statutory independence’.
Another grey area concerned responsibility for appointments to individual 
statutory officer roles. Section 19 of the Public Service Act specifically 
prohibits a minister from directing an agency head with regard to APS 
staffing decisions. From its beginnings, selection into the APS was 
consciously designed for people to compete and be assessed on their ability 
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on the basis of the merit principle. The Public Service Act includes explicitly 
a provision that employment decisions be based on merit, but this does not 
apply to the employment of agency heads. The prime minister appoints 
departmental secretaries (following a report by the secretary of the Prime 
Minister’s Department) and ministers appoint the heads of other agencies 
(in practice, the decisions are subject to cabinet endorsement); there is no 
formal statutory requirement to consider or apply merit.
Uhrig recommended that portfolio secretaries advise ministers on the 
appointment of statutory office holders in the portfolio. While this 
would not enforce a merit-based approach, it would inform ministers of 
the relative merit of those considered by the portfolio secretary, while 
leaving the final decision to ministers. While this recommendation was 
generally implemented, it is not clear that it was widely influential in 
the final decision. In early 2008, however, the APSC published Merit 
and Transparency: Merit-Based Selection of APS Agency Heads and APS 
Statutory Office Holders (APSC 2012), a policy document agreed by the 
then government. 
This document affirmed merit as a basis for selection of most APS agency 
heads and other statutory office holders working in, or in conjunction 
with, APS agencies, giving formal authority to portfolio secretaries in 
their advising role in consultation with the Public Service Commissioner. 
There were exceptions to the application of the policy, notably with 
regard to the APS Commissioner, the Commissioner of Taxation, the 
Auditor-General, the CEO of the (then) Australian Customs Service and 
the Australian Statistician. These positions, of a similar status to portfolio 
secretaries, had an expectation of appointment on merit (in the case of the 
auditor-general, consultation with the relevant parliamentary committee 
is required). 
In the context of governance and Uhrig, this policy document was another 
recognition of the changing nature of the relationships and accountabilities 
between ministers and portfolio secretaries. For the first time the roles 
of a secretary, the APS Commissioner and the minister in a statutory 
appointment process were explicitly identified. Importantly, portfolio 
secretaries have responsibility for the processes of appointments within 
their portfolios and for advising the minister of the recommendations from 
those processes. While there is an expectation that the minister will accept 
those recommendations, there are important exception clauses where the 
minister (and the government) can override the recommendations. 
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These developments, influenced by Uhrig, did not settle other 
grey areas that have emerged over the years in the relationship 
between ministers and senior officials. The other key trend has been the 
growth in numbers and influence of ministerial staff outside the public 
service. After  attempts by the APSC to clarify the respective roles of 
public  servants and ministerial staff (APSC 2003, 2005), in 2008 the 
then government introduced a formal (but not statutory) code of conduct 
for ministerial staff that includes the provision the APSC had previously 
articulated that such staff do not have the power to direct APS staff or 
make decisions: such power lies exclusively with ministers and public 
servants. That code (slightly amended) still applies, though its title has 
changed to Statement of Standards for Ministerial Staff.1
Uhrig and the Office of the Merit 
Protection Commissioner
Uhrig’s terms of reference ‘required an examination of structures for good 
governance, including relationships between statutory authorities and the 
responsible Minister, the Parliament and the public, including business’ 
(Uhrig 2003: 1). Importantly, Uhrig’s report attempted to place some 
boundaries and insert a consistent nomenclature around the plethora of 
authorities and structures that had flourished. Once departments of state 
and executive agencies were accounted for, the term ‘statutory authority’ 
was a convenient way to cover the remaining structures created by law. 
While not a way of classifying different statutory authorities, the report 
defined the following selection of terms (more than one term may apply 
to the same organisation):
• Department of state 
A department created by the Administrative Arrangements 
Order made by the Governor-General.
• Executive agency 
An agency established under section 65 of the Public Service 
Act 1999.
1  Statement of Ministerial Standards available at www.smos.gov.au/statement-standards-
ministerial-staff.
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• Statutory authority
A public sector entity created by a specific law of the 
Commonwealth. For the purposes of this report the term 
includes a statutory agency having statutory office holders.
• Statutory agency
A body or group of positions declared by an Act to be a statutory 
agency for the purposes of the Public Service Act 1999.
• Regulatory authorities
Those entities that administer legislation on behalf of 
government to regulate the behaviour of individuals and/or 
organisations.
• Commission
A statutory authority with a full-time executive management 
structure that is directly accountable to a Minister. 
(Uhrig 2003: 121–24)
Likewise, Uhrig defined office holders as:
those persons appointed to statutory positions in the governance 
structure of a statutory authority. Depending on an authority’s 
particular structure, these positions would include the CEO  or 
managing director, commissioners and members of a board 
of directors.
The role of a statutory office holder is principally to implement legislation. 
Given how difficult it usually is to remove an officer from office once 
appointed, it is a position of considerable trust and stewardship. 
For example, the office of the Merit Protection Commissioner is one of 
only two individual offices specifically named in the Public Service Act 
(the Public Service Commissioner being the other). My appointment was 
made via a national and open merit-selection process. As required under 
sections 61 and 62 of the Australian Constitution, my name was  put 
forward to the executive council for appointment by the governor-general.
The independence of the role is enshrined in the legislation and the 
normal five-year term safeguards against political or other interference 
as it is longer than the usual term (around three years) of an Australian 
federal government.
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Section 54 of the Public Service Act states:
Removal from Office
1. The Governor-General may remove the Merit Protection 
Commissioner from the office if each House of the Parliament, 
in the same session of the Parliament, presents an address to 
the Governor-General praying for the removal of the Merit 
Protection Commissioner on the grounds of misbehaviour or 
physical or mental incapacity.
2. The Governor-General must remove the Merit Protection 
Commissioner from the office if the Merit Protection 
Commissioner does any of the following:
a. becomes bankrupt;
b. applies to take the benefit of any law for the relief of 
bankrupt or insolvent debtors;
c. compounds with his or her creditors; 
d. assigns his or her remuneration for the benefit of his or her 
creditors.
The terms of the appointment are designed to reinforce the Merit 
Protection Commissioner as free of influence and able to uphold public 
sector governance values whilst fulfilling the statutory requirements. 
Consistent with the APSC’s Merit and Transparency policy, the final 
decision-maker regarding the appointment is at arm’s length from 
the independent recommendations put forward as a result of the 
selection process.
Post-Uhrig work on governance
Australian governance structures have evolved considerably since the 
Uhrig Report. Among the criticisms of the report and its private sector 
focus was its failure to clarify whether and when statutory authorities 
should be under the Public Service Act and which financial management 
and accountability legislation should apply (the Financial Management 
and Accountability Act 1997 or the Commonwealth Authorities and 
Companies Act 1997 ). The Department of Finance issued some 
guidance on these matters in 2005, and a more substantial internal 
review in 2012 (the  Commonwealth Financial Accountability Review 
(CFAR)) recommended action that led to the replacement of both 
financial management laws with the Public Governance, Performance 
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and Accountability Act 2013 (PGPA). The PGPA Act and its definition 
of Commonwealth entities for financial purposes had flow-on effects for 
the governance structures of entities and, in particular, Finance’s issuing 
of guidance about the establishment of new entities.
While Finance’s definitional terminology in its policy guidance on 
governance structures has some similarities to Uhrig’s, it has been 
simplified and sharpened; for example, ‘A statutory authority is a generic 
term for an Australian Government body established through legislation 
for a public purpose. This can include a body headed by, or comprising, 
an office holder, a commission or a governing board’.2
Finance guidance now includes measures relating to the circumstances in 
which alternative organisational structures may be required. Through an 
assessment tool, it has identified seven considerations when establishing 
an alternative governance structure. These are summarised as, does the 
activity:
1. require enabling legislation which cannot be altered without 
parliamentary authorisation
2. involve exercising coercive (enforcement) or regulatory powers 
usually for a specific field or industry and may include regulatory fees, 
imposing penalties, conducting investigations and/or compelling 
production of evidence
3. have core policy (and/or non-commercial) government functions, as this 
may be better served within an existing non-corporate Commonwealth 
entity
4. have a commercial focus
5. need to hold money outside the Commonwealth
6. necessitate a governing board or multi-member accountable authority
7. require a level of independence, based on an assessment of risk.
Finance goes on to acknowledge that ‘It is enabling legislation that provides 
the level of independence of Commonwealth entities, not the type of 
entity … Ultimately it is the level of risk in undertaking the activity that 
will dictate the level of independence for the body’.3
2  Available at www.finance.gov.au/about-us/glossary/governance/term-statutory-authority.
3  Finance advice on governance structures is available at www.finance.gov.au/government/managing-
commonwealth-resources/structure-australian-government-public-sector/commonwealth-governance-
structures-policy-governance-policy.
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Some public servants and commentators considered the Uhrig Report too 
private sector–oriented and too narrow in its understanding of the range of 
government functions and possible structures. The two main templates for 
accountability – via a board or a single CEO point – held little flexibility 
to assimilate non-core functions and political circumstances. While it 
exposed gaps in the existing system, the recommended solutions didn’t 
always work as expected. The seeds of Uhrig can be seen, nonetheless, 
in the more flexible but coherent PGPA Act following CFAR, and its 
principles-based approach provided a new paradigm for governance.
Jocelyne Bourgon and 
Maryantonett Flumian
The second and third models that had a major influence on me in my role 
as Merit Protection Commissioner were both from Canada. Bourgon’s 
model was enunciated in her 2008 paper ‘Future of the public service: 
a search for new balance’ and further developed in her collaborative book 
A New Synthesis for Public Administration (2011), which is based on seven 
case studies. 
Bourgon provides an evolutionary framework to make sense of 
developments in public administration, including through NPM and 
subsequent reforms. She first acknowledges the origins and contribution 
of public administration in democratic governments:
Many of our public institutions were born in the latter part of 
the 19th century and early 20th century; a period characterised 
by the industrial revolution, the emergence of bureaucracies in 
democratic societies and the influence of scientific management.
Public sector organisations were expected to perform predictable 
tasks under prescribed rules. The power structure was top down 
and hierarchical. Rigorous controls ensured performance and 
accountability for delegated authorities. (Bourgon 2008: 5)
The structures of public accountability and performance in Australia 
(and Bourgon’s Canada) are inherited from the United Kingdom. 
The Westminster parent gave its colonial children institutions based on 
the rule of law, respect for democracy, due process, transparency and 
accountability. 
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Bourgon’s model draws upon the broad base of conceptual thinking 
that challenged this ‘classic model’ of public accountability, including 
NPM’s focus on accountability for results and subsequent emphasis on 
whole-of-government and networking beyond government. Christopher 
Hood’s 1990 article ‘De-Sir Humphreyfying the Westminster model of 
bureaucracy: a new style of governance?’ was followed by another thought 
piece on the intellectual provenance of NPM (Hood 1991). Rod Rhodes 
wrote about policy networks, reflexivity and accountability in the late 
1990s (Rhodes 1997) and Stephen Osborne argued in 2006 that NPM 
was a transitory phase in public administration (PA) before it emerged 
as new public governance (NPG). Bourgon constructively links these 
emerging ideas of the late 1990s and early 2000s in her framework; she 
doesn’t categorise traditional PA, NPM and NPG but rather ‘synthesises’ 
(her term) them in a modern and more integrated approach. She offers 
jurisdictions at different stages of development or facing different 
challenges the flexibility to move between different paradigms and to 
balance approaches to suit their circumstances. Figure 7.1 illustrates 
Bourgon’s ‘synthesis’ concept.
Figure 7.1. Categorising public sector reforms
Source . Bourgon 2008
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She notes that ‘A combination of vertical accountability for the exercise 
of delegated authority and of network management improves the capacity 
of the public sector to achieve system-wides results’ (Bourgon 2008). 
Bourgon’s model offers a whole-of-government approach to governance 
– acknowledging all the competing parts – rather than identifying any 
single approach that may be optimal to a specific function of government; 
at the same time, she recognises the continuing value of the traditional 
emphasis on compliance and NPM’s emphasis on performance.
Like the UK and Canadian models, Australia’s public sector institutions 
were established before the availability of the internet and before artificial 
intelligence. Our structures, expectations and accountability mechanisms 
were based on old paradigms of bureaucracy. In the early 2000s, at the 
time when Bourgon presented her synthesis, the emerging governance 
questions were:
1. Are the current hierarchical and lineal structures flexible enough to 
address evolving community and parliamentary expectations?
2. If not, how can we structurally encourage tailored and immediate 
responses to complex and interconnected issues?
This was a time when the APS trialled a variety of new practices in an 
attempt to dismantle siloed responses to ‘wicked problems’4 including, 
for example, how to encourage meaningful cross-agency collaboration 
when one agency supplied the resources and another was accountable 
for the outcomes. Bourgon’s view of the evolving nature of management 
provided new ways of thinking about the needs of the public sector and 
the range of potential responses. Her ideas exposed the inherent tension 
within modern management of traditional accountability structures for 
non-hierarchical, non-traditional relationships. 
While these ideas did not have a particular impact on me as the Merit 
Protection Commissioner, they did influence me and many other senior 
Australian public servants about the way we worked across and beyond 
government.
In 2009, Maryantonett Flumian’s outlined ‘The new reality of “distributed 
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1. governments have been transforming to accommodate the realities 
of a faster paced, networked and globalised world
2. redistribution of the functions of government from traditional 
command-and-control core bureaucracies to public models 
of governance distributed across a variety of factors based on 
performance
3. a significant shift in the organisational design of public institutions 
and a significant increase in the number, size and significance of 
organisations along a much longer governance continuum.
She summarised the impact, both positive and negative, of these on 
governance, as shown in Table 7.1.
Table 7.1. The impact of ‘distributed governance’
Governance impacts
Intended Unintended
Devolution Less direct relationship with citizens
increase in distributed governance Role confusion / mandate diffusion
Deregulation Decreased accountability capacity
re‑centralisation Who’s got the ball
Redefined relationships indirect accountability
Clarified mandates / performance targets increased importance of departmental silos
Effectiveness? Effectiveness?
Source . Flumian 2009
Flumian’s work was a natural and logical extension of Bourgon’s, but with 
more specific relevance to the Merit Protection Commissioner’s role and 
accountability. The evolving nature of the operating environment led 
to shifts in formal roles and accountability methods. Agencies realised 
that the traditional arrangements established for highly centralised and 
hierarchical models didn’t reflect the use of alternative organisational 
models and degrees of independence. This led to a rethinking of how 
different agencies interact along a governance continuum; in particular, 
the need for a conceptual model to capture and map organisational 
independence and institutional control across the public spectrum, 
from the centre to the most autonomous models. Even within and along 
the continuum, however, roles and relationships may vary and overlap. 
Flumian’s model is summarised in Figures 7.2, 7.3 and 7.4.
DeSiGninG GovernAnCe STruCTureS For PerForMAnCe AnD ACCounTABiLiTY
156
Figure 7.2. Traditional hierarchical and contemporary accountability 
relationships
Source . Flumian 2009
Figure 7.3. Institutional control – operational autonomy continuum
Source . Flumian 2009
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Figure 7.4. Mapping organisations’ functions and relationships 
to the continuum
Source . Flumian 2009
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This model brought together the thinking behind the Uhrig Report 
and subsequent Finance guidance about the establishment of different 
structures, and Bourgon’s ideas about structures evolving to meet new 
requirements. Flumian’s framework combined these elements, offering 
a way to map and integrate different structures in interconnected systems. 
While Flumian’s model made intuitive sense, it didn’t neatly map to the 
wide range of Australian public sector organisational forms (see Table 7.2). 
While Flumian’s operational service and enterprise categories may be 
a matter of interpretation (corresponding broadly to service delivery 
agencies and government business enterprises), there was greater difficulty 
with mapping Australian structures to her regulatory, adjudicative and 
supervisory categories. In particular, Australia’s ‘integrity bodies’ cover 
a wide range of organisational forms and functions that potentially overlap 
several of Flumian’s categories (Table 7.3 identifies the multiple roles of 
a selection of integrity bodies).
Table 7.2. Mapping the Flumian model to Australian practice
Flumian model Australian translation
Ministry: traditional generalist department Departments (central and line)
Advisory: publicly provides advice 
to government
Special research and policy‑advising 
authorities (statutory bodies)
Regulatory: establishes and/or enforces 
rules of conduct in a particular sector of 
activity against obligations set out in existing 
statutes and/or regulations
regulatory bodies, integrity bodies, 
independent commissions and 
tribunals
Adjudicative: renders impartial quasi‑judicial 
decisions to resolve disputes
Operational service: delivers programs and 
services to the public in a primarily non‑
commercial manner within a well-defined 
policy framework determined outside the 
organisation itself
executive agencies and service delivery 
authorities (also, often departments)
Operational enterprise: sells programs 
and services to the public in a primarily 
commercial manner
Government business enterprises 
and other commercial units 
Supervisory: impartially oversees activities 
on behalf of another entity with authority over 
those activities and reports on its findings
integrity bodies, independent 
commissions
Relationship trust: invests or otherwise 
administers funds on behalf of the public, 
other groups and entities .
non‑government organisation (nGo) 
bodies linked with government
Source . Flumian 2009 and author’s assessment
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Under Flumian’s model, integrity agencies, including the Merit Protection 
Commissioner, lie towards the independence end of the spectrum, 
though there remain uncertainties about the degree of independence and 
operational autonomy of different integrity agencies.
Australian integrity agencies and the 
Integrity Agencies Group
The collective idea of ‘integrity organisations’ is not institutionalised at the 
federal level, though the term has been used by some state governments 
(e.g. Western Australia). Senator John Faulkner as Special Minister for 
State, used the term in a ministerial speech in 2008 when he said:
One of our first steps was to bring under a single minister integrity 
agencies across the Commonwealth such as the ANAO [Australian 
National Audit Office], the Inspector-General of Intelligence and 
Security, the ombudsmen [sic], the Public Service Commissioner, 
the Archives and the like. (Faulkner 2008)
With this as the context, the then Public Service Commissioner, Lynelle 
Briggs established the Integrity Agencies Group (IAG). The original 
membership included the relevant statutory office holders that focus on 
integrity-related matters from within the portfolio of Prime Minister and 
Cabinet. The goal was to support a ‘joined-up’ approach to whole-of-
APS integrity-related issues within the portfolio. As agencies moved in 
and out of the portfolio, so too did the membership. For example, the 
Australian Electoral Commissioner, while upholding the integrity of the 
electoral process and thereby the legitimacy of government, is no longer 
an IAG member; however, when the Office of the Australian Information 
Commissioner was created, the three commissioners – Privacy, Freedom 
of Information and Australian Information – became members.
With subsequent machinery of government, policy and legislative changes 
and a new APS Commissioner, the IAG evolved to reflect a clearer 
understanding of the integrity framework, though there is no longer 
a  minister with explicit responsibility for integrity organisations. IAG 
membership and its role have varied over time and are no longer based 
on the portfolio of Prime Minister and Cabinet. The nature of the group 
changed significantly around 2012 with the extension of jurisdictional 
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coverage of the Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity 
(ACLEI) to include specific agencies that employ staff under the Public 
Service Act. ACLEI joined the IAG around this time.
Under APS Commissioner Stephen Sedgwick, the IAG responded to two 
cases of integrity organisation inquiries: the Home Insulation Program 
inquiry by the Australian National Audit Office and specific activity 
that ACLEI identified involving Australian Customs Service employees 
at Sydney international airport. The IAG recognised the intrinsic links 
between culture, leadership and behaviour and how a tolerance of low-
level indiscretions and general misconduct can, and does, influence an 
organisation’s (and the APS’s) overall integrity risk profile.
The overlapping roles of IAG members were recognised as part of 
an education-to-enforcement continuum for integrity in the APS. 
As Sedgwick stated before the ACLEI Committee in 2014:
One of the things we have learned out of the experience that ACLEI 
has had … has been the availability of forensic skills to investigate 
quite complex issues and that has been valuable to resolving those 
matters. An environment in which you have a modulated series of 
responses, for example, makes sense in terms of the relationship 
between the risk that is being borne and the costs that are involved. 
We have a number of agencies that operate in this space … We 
[the APSC] promote the values and the employment principles, 
the ethical framework and the code of conduct … We work at 
one end of the spectrum, if you like; ACLEI works at the other 
– ACLEI or the AFP [Australian Federal Police], depending on 
the nature of the issues. (Parliamentary Joint Committee on the 
Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity 2014)
The education–enforcement continuum is just that, a risk-based sliding 
scale. It guides organisations to identify the appropriate response to 
a  situation at both inter- and intra-agency levels. For example, at an 
internal level, when the Merit Protection Commissioner reviews agency 
decisions on code of conduct breaches and makes a recommendation, 
there is the potential for:
• an education intervention – to help a public servant learn from the 
outcome and hopefully ensure he or she is unlikely to repeat the mistake 
or 
• an enforcement intervention – to punish wrongdoing as an example 
to others, with the downside risk of creating a vexatious employee 
with attitude! 
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In my experience as Merit Protection Commissioner, the two extremes – 
complete education or complete enforcement – are not where most effort 
is spent. Rather, an approach resting between the two is used. Depending 
on the intervention, this approach tries to engage the person concerned 
as a positive partner, not as a negative influencer. The intent is to have as 
many individuals and teams working with, not against, the system. This 
reduces workload, creates a peer cohort of support and allows the Merit 
Protection Commissioner to focus on areas of high and serious risk that 
require enforcement. Again, the approach is to target the intervention and 
the sanction. 
In the APS environment, the overlapping and complementary roles of 
specialist integrity agencies have been promoted as a basis for a strong and 
appropriate response to upholding integrity in our specific environment. 
The interagency continuum framework enabled targeted and escalating 
interventions as appropriate. The IAG played a significant role in providing 
a level of assurance that a multi-pronged approach to the APS integrity 
framework is indeed integrated. Under this umbrella, information and 
insight has been shared and the experience, knowledge and contribution 
of all members to the integrity framework has been recognised and valued. 
The IAG has no formal role or status and its contribution is based on the 
assumed goodwill and understanding of the principal members.
Considering the roles of Australian integrity agencies along the education–
enforcement continuum (educative, regulatory, adjudicative, enforcement) 
provides insight into why it is difficult to map their multipurpose roles 
strictly against the Flumian model (see Table 7.3).
For example, the APSC’s role in encouraging the embedding of the 
APS Values as a means of supporting a positive workplace culture is at 
the education end of the spectrum, and ACLEI, with its forensic fraud 
investigations, is an example of the enforcement end. The Merit Protection 
Commissioner and most other integrity agencies are bridges somewhere 
in between. All are focused on learning and preventing the recurrence 
of inappropriate behaviour.
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Mapped against the Flumian model, the Australian integrity agencies are 
statutory agencies under the Public Service Act and tend to clump around 
the ‘regulatory’ and ‘adjudicative’ sections of the curve, though some may 
be categorised under Flumian’s model as ‘supervisory’. Even ACLEI seems 
to fall into the regulatory and adjudicative sections of the spectrum as 
it must employ staff under the Public Service Act and cannot prosecute 
under its own legislation. As it must work in tandem with a relevant law 
enforcement agency to lay charges of criminal activity, it is unclear to me 
how operationally autonomous it is when mapped to Flumian’s model.
The Flumian regulation and adjudicative categories tend to have a particular 
governance style; for example, focusing on policy autonomy, the leader’s 
term of appointment, their specific statute and legal personality, as well as 
having a governing board. This may reflect Flumian’s Canadian heritage 
and public service experience. The dimensions of her categorisation are 
also linear in nature and assume a level of structural discipline that may 
work well in theory but not necessarily in practice. 
Independence is a relative term – independence from whom or to do what? 
There may be value in developing a public administration continuum that 
maps degrees of autonomy and control. For example, dimensions could 
identify how much control or autonomy an organisation has in practice to 
make budget and financial decisions, appoint staff and manage personnel, 
conduct research and release communications. 
From my experience as the Merit Protection Commissioner, an 
independent complaint/investigation-type agency also faces certain 
underlying strategic issues, including:
• providing credible assurance on the integrity and fairness of decision-
making while simultaneously exposing endemic issues to be addressed
• building relationships and networks to influence policy change while 
retaining impartiality and independence.
To these I would add the administrative issue of improving cost-
effectiveness and reducing red tape while ensuring the legality of due 
process. 
There is no right or wrong approach to balancing these issues; achieving 
the balance is a result of leadership, vision and judgement depending 
on the evidence available at the time. My experience as a commissioner 
revealed to me that balancing the above is difficult in a media savvy, 
DeSiGninG GovernAnCe STruCTureS For PerForMAnCe AnD ACCounTABiLiTY
164
fast-paced environment where the prized quality of a timely response can 
come at the expense of proper investigation. It can also be difficult to 
maintain a media or other profile without being perceived as ‘crying wolf ’ 
over every incident; picking the cases not to promulgate is more difficult 
than it may seem.
Conclusion
Having had the luxury and privilege of two terms in the statutory role 
as Merit Protection Commissioner, it is easy to observe through Uhrig, 
Bourgon and Flumian that requirements and expectations are continuing 
to evolve. In Australia, the role of integrity agencies is not easy to 
categorise and new dimensions may assist in reflecting the complexity 
and sophistication of our environment.
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THE ROLES OF 
COMMUNITY-BASED NON-
PROFITS IN THE CONTEXT 
OF COLLABORATIVE 
GOVERNANCE IN HONG 
KONG AND TAIWAN
José Chiu‑C Chen and Helen K Liu
Introduction
Essential social programs, such as elderly care and assistance for low-income 
earners, have been introduced through community-based initiatives 
in Taiwan and Hong Kong. For example, over the past two decades, 
reforms to Taiwan’s long-term care policy (Nadash & Shih 2013) and the 
Community Care Stations project (Wang 2013; Wang 2016), and to Hong 
Kong’s Lump Sum Grant Initiative (Lee 2005), have increased the role of 
community-based organisations (CBOs) in the provision of social services 
at the local community level (Lee & Liu 2012; Liu 2019). These policies 
aim to provide personalised services and ease of access for the elderly or 
disabled (Hunter & Ritchie 2007) by working with organisations that 
have strong connections with the community. This chapter stems from 
a need to explore how well these policies work and to investigate further 
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the role of CBOs in local communities and their impact on accountability 
and performance when used to deliver publicly funded services, especially 
in the context of moves towards collaborative governance. 
Marwell (2009: 32) described CBOs as ‘a particular kind of neighbourhood 
organisation: uniquely oriented to the external economic and political 
world, yet closely tied to specific geographic places and the local residents 
who are their constituents’. Chaskin and Greenberg (2015) have since 
provided a framework to examine the roles of CBOs in the context of 
governance, identifying three key roles: resource provision and allocation, 
representation, and deliberation. First, through contracting with local 
government agencies or foundations, CBOs may implement public 
policies by delivering essential services to local residents (Smith & Lipsky 
1993; Grønbjerg & Salamon 2002). Second, by sitting on the boards 
of local committees or conducting advocacy activities, CBOs play the 
role of representing local residents (Marwell 2007; Mosley 2011); they 
may also negotiate decisions that are relevant to their communities’ 
interests (Ostrander 2013). Third, by engaging local residents, CBOs 
provide a space for deliberation among them and influence the agenda for 
community affairs (Chaskin 2001; Chaskin & Greenberg 2015). 
As we move from the new public management (NPM) reforms towards 
more collaborative governance, existing studies on CBOs can help us 
understand community governance by reviewing how CBOs fulfil these 
three roles (Marwell 2007; Mosley 2011; Chaskin & Greenberg 2015). 
This conceptual framework not only helps us to understand how CBOs 
operate and contribute to public policy, but also draws attention to the 
importance of the external relationships CBOs must build to contribute 
more broadly to governance issues in local communities. We ask research 
questions similar to those raised by Chaskin and Greenberg (2015), 
but in the context of Hong Kong and Taiwan. To what extent do the 
CBOs perform and balance the roles of service delivery, advocacy, public 
engagement and political exchange? How do their external relationships 
affect their roles in the governance of the local community? 
Following the methods used in Galaskiewicz’s (1979) and Liu and Chen’s 
(2015) studies, we selected 96 CBOs for in-depth, face-to-face interviews 
with directors or top managers in four urban poor communities in Taiwan 
and Hong Kong. The interview questions covered basic information 
about the organisation and its functions, its advocacy and public policy 
participation activities, and the CBO’s external relationships with 
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governments, funders and other non-profits. More specifically, our study 
examines the varied roles of these CBOs and explores factors that might 
influence their roles in Taiwan and Hong Kong, particularly in terms of 
their resources and external relationships. 
The development of collaborative 
governance in Hong Kong and Taiwan
New public management reforms
Western and Asian countries have adopted NPM reforms with different 
focuses, depending on the political institutional arrangements, culture 
and socioeconomic conditions of the given country (Pollitt & Bouckaert 
2000). Previous studies have emphasised some common characteristics of 
the NPM reforms, including public–private partnerships, the introduction 
of competition and performance evaluations (Osborne & Gaebler 1993; 
Hood 1995). Given the differences in political institutional arrangements 
and socioeconomic conditions between Hong Kong and Taiwan, the 
focus of NPM reforms has taken slightly different turns in both countries, 
including in terms of the emphasis on local community actors. 
In Hong Kong and Taiwan from the 1990s, governments began to 
contract out to external service agencies, especially to community-based 
non-profits delivering various social services to local communities. 
The literature shows that non-profits can provide free or low-cost services 
to their beneficiaries, and they can act as service providers, advocates, 
value guardians and social capital creators for the community (Kramer 
1981; Salamon 1997). The act of contracting out social services from 
the government to non-profits shifts the mode of service provision from 
uniform and standard systems to systems with greater flexibility and variety 
(Ferlie, Ashburner, Fitzgerald & Pettigrew 1996). In these more flexible 
systems, differently sized agencies can be selected to address the varying 
demands for the types of public services required (Gruening 2001: 7). 
From the government’s perspective, contracting out has the additional 
advantage of attracting professionals who are not otherwise available to 
participate in service delivery (Christensen & Lægreid 2001: 83).
DeSiGninG GovernAnCe STruCTureS For PerForMAnCe AnD ACCounTABiLiTY
170
The selection of not-for-profit partners is a challenge in managing 
partnerships. To ensure the quality, efficiency and accountability of 
services, the government introduced competitive bidding to select potential 
community partners. In Hong Kong during the 1990s, the Social Welfare 
Department introduced the Lump Sum Grant Initiative, a short-term 
competitive grant, to replace the long-term Standard Unit Cost Model 
grant (Lee 2005; Lee & Liu 2012). Non-profit organisations that receive 
funding to provide various social services (such as social security; family 
and child welfare; clinical psychology; rehabilitation; and aged, youth 
and community services) must prove that they meet established program 
goals before they can receive additional grants. In Taiwan, a competitive 
bidding process was created to select community partners to carry out 
social, youth, elderly, health and other community services on behalf of 
local governments (Wu 2011). 
Contracting non-profits are required to demonstrate their performance in 
meeting set targets and goals (Ferlie et al. 1996). The performance approach 
results in a list of measurable outcomes to evaluate social services and 
a high degree of professionalism in the workforce (Meyer & Zucker 1989). 
For instance, in Hong Kong, a series of public management reforms in 
the 1990s – including a service performance monitoring system, service 
quality standards, and funding and service agreements – were created as 
guidelines to measure and monitor non-profits that received government 
funding (Painter 2005; Lee & Liu 2012; Wang 2013). In Taiwan, non-
profit organisations were also required to be accountable and provide 
evidence-based outcomes to demonstrate their performance before being 
able to secure government contracts (Wu 2011).
Moving toward collaborative governance
Collaborative governance is an approach in which the government 
openly and inclusively involves various stakeholders in dynamic processes 
of communication and adjustment to work toward a common goal 
(Ansell 2003; Emerson, Nabatchi & Balogh 2012). Jing and Hu (2017) 
argue that contractual relationships between the government and non-
profits under NPM evolve naturally into collaborative governance among 
stakeholders in the provision of social services. While the NPM reforms 
in both Hong Kong and Taiwan involved competition and performance 
evaluation, different policies and systems emerged over time to 
collaboratively build the capacities of the community-based non-profits 
to carry out social services on behalf of governments. 
171
8 . THe roLeS oF CoMMuniTY‑BASeD non‑ProFiTS
In Hong Kong, under the influence of NPM, the Social Welfare 
Department prompted local community centres to deliver integrated 
services through so-called one-stop service centres. These centres provide 
specialised integrated services, including to children, youth and the 
elderly; in-home care; mental wellness; and family services. These centres 
are designed to integrate multiple local government agencies and non-
profits into one unit and allow clients to access specialised services at 
a single location. This change has also created a top-down system and 
entails a greater dependence of the community-based non-profits on local 
government welfare agencies.
In Taiwan, as a continuous initiative since 1997, the government has 
introduced a series of reforms to establish long-term care management 
centres in certain districts leading to the Promotion of Community Care 
Development Act (Wu 2011). The previous long-term care reforms 
established a foundation for the development of a 10-year Phase 1 and 
Phase 2 long-term care program with the aim of building community 
capacity through contracting directly with community-based non-
profits to deliver essential social services (Wu 2011). Community care 
in Taiwan has its roots in the development of long-term care reforms 
with resources flowing to community actors who play essential roles in 
providing direct social services to residents. The focus of community 
care and home care is a bottom-up system requiring city governments 
to build and strengthen the capacity of CBOs. This system is similar to 
community care systems in other countries, such as that operating under 
the United Kingdom’s National Health Service and Community Care Act 
1990 (Ackroyd, Kirkpatrick & Walker 2007).
While the structures of community networks might be different, the 
governments in Hong Kong and Taiwan both face governance challenges, 
because managing collaborative systems requires the administration to 
go beyond traditional boundaries (Kettl 2006). Resolving citizens’ needs 
requires the collaboration or cooperation of multiple agencies, sometimes 
from different sectors. This means that the government, the private sector 
and the CBOs must be adaptive and able to manage complex relationships 
in the institutional environments where they operate (Agranoff & 
McGuire  1998). Previous studies have focused on how governments 
address emerging collaborative initiatives and integrated services 
(Agranoff & McGuire 1998; Liu & Chen 2015). Here, we focus on the 
roles of CBOs in implementing collaborative initiatives and integrated 
services in Hong Kong and Taiwan.
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The roles of CBOs in implementing 
collaborative governance
Studies on CBOs illustrate how they fulfil various roles in carrying 
out social services and engaging the public in a complex institutional 
environment (Osborne 2006; Marwell 2007; Mosley 2011; Chaskin & 
Greenberg 2015). Chaskin and Greenberg (2015) provide a framework 
for illustrating the roles of CBOs in the context of governance. First, after 
contracting with the local government agencies or foundations, CBOs 
carry out policies and deliver essential services for local residents (Smith & 
Lipsky 1993; Grønbjerg & Salamon 2002). 
Second, by sitting on the boards of local policy committees or conducting 
advocacy activities, CBOs represent local residents (Marwell 2007; Mosley 
2011) and negotiate decisions that are relevant to their communities’ 
interests (Ostrander 2013). For instance, CBOs often have an agenda 
with regard to local affairs and wish to resolve their issues of concern 
through a particular political channel (Crenson 1983). Sometimes, the 
government  intentionally builds relationships with reputable CBOs, 
seeking to engage a particular target group of residents and build 
a participatory system through those CBOs (Berry, Portney & Thomson 
1993). Kuan, Lee and Hsieh (2006) also found that CBOs in Taiwan 
act in accordance with residents’ interests to address local issues, such 
as development, unemployment and social inclusion. Following some 
CBOs’ successful influence over local policies, the government reached 
out to the CBOs for regular consultation.
Third, by engaging local residents, CBOs provide a space for 
deliberation among them and for setting agendas for community affairs 
(Chaskin 2001; Chaskin & Greenberg 2015). While the nature and scope 
of the deliberation varies across communities and types of CBOs, often 
a wide range of community actors are engaged to participate (Chaskin & 
Greenberg 2015). The physical presence of the CBOs’ offices in the local 
community can allow residents to get together through local activities and 
discuss various issues (Marwell 2004). Kuan et al. (2006) also found that 
the governing boards of CBOs are composed of local volunteers, enabling 
deliberation on community issues to take place within the CBO setting. 
Chaskin and Greenberg’s conceptual framework enhances not only the 
understanding of the different roles of CBOs, but also addresses how their 
construction of different external relationships might influence governance 
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issues in local communities. Marwell’s (2004, 2007) community studies 
further elaborate the roles of CBOs in the context of governance. Building 
on other studies (Chaskin 2001; Chaskin & Greenberg, 2015), Marwell’s 
(2004) work argues that CBOs generate greater contract revenue by 
adding electoral politics to their traditional roles of providing services and 
building communities. 
This model produces a new kind of CBO: the political machine 
(Marwell  2004, 2009; Liu 2019). By reciprocally distributing services 
to residents and binding residents to the organisation, political machine 
CBOs create reliable voting constituencies for local elected officials. These 
officials trade these constituencies at higher levels of the governmental 
system and steer government human service contracts to favoured CBOs. 
This suggests that some CBOs might intentionally form relationships 
with local elected officials to obtain funding and resources, especially 
those CBOs that have closer and more direct relationships with 
community residents. 
Network roles under collaborative governance
In addition to understanding the functional roles of CBOs, Ansell (2003) 
argues that it is necessary to measure how organisations are embedded 
within a broader collaborative governance structure. Granovetter (1985) 
explains how embeddedness in social relations allows exchange among 
actors within the system, with less dependence on organisational hierarchy. 
Network embeddedness also enhances the capacity of organisations to 
make exchanges through relational and informal mechanisms, such as 
trust, reciprocity and norms (Powell 1990; Gulati & Gargiulo 1999; 
Uzzi 1996; Ansell 2003). The social embeddedness of organisations is 
associated with the construction of social capital through a horizontal 
network among organisations that engage the public actively in public 
affairs (Putnam 1993). 
The social embeddedness of an organisation refers to its embedding 
within a set of social relationships or networks (Ansell 2003). The more central 
an organisation is within a set of social relationships in a network, the more 
it is embedded in the network (Gulati & Gargiulo 1999). Network theory 
uses centrality as a measure of organisations’ embeddedness. Centrality can 
be measured in several ways (Freeman 1979). Degree centrality refers to the 
number of ties an organisation sends to others (outdegree) or receives from 
others (indegree). This captures the importance of the organisation. More 
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specifically, a high outdegree indicates that an organisation is networking 
actively with other organisations while a high indegree indicates that an 
organisation is prestigious or powerful, with others seeking partnership with 
it. Previous research suggests the following distinct roles, divided according 
to the degree of centrality: ‘prestigious organisation’, ‘boundary spanner’ 
and ‘peripheral organisation’.
While previous studies have laid a strong theoretical foundation for 
understanding the roles of CBOs in the context of collaborative governance, 
as yet we know little about the roles of CBOs in Hong Kong and Taiwan, 
which face similar transitions from NPM’s competitive model to new 
governance’s emphasis on collaboration. This study applies case study 
and social network analysis to examine how CBOs in Hong Kong and 
Taiwan perform and balance the roles of service delivery, advocacy, public 
engagement and political exchange, as well as the influence of external 
relationships on their roles. 
Methods and data
According to Yin (2004), a unique and relevant case might not be 
representative in a given research site, but it could serve a purpose by 
advancing theory through the understanding of a specific phenomenon. 
Consistent with this view, this study focuses on four communities in 
the poorest districts of the cities, namely Kwun Tong and Shek Kip Mei 
(Hong Kong), Taipei and Old Train Station (Taiwan). For data collection, 
following methods in Galaskiewicz’s (1979) and Liu and Chen’s (2015) 
studies, we selected 96 directors or top managers of CBOs in the four 
urban poor communities for in-depth, face-to-face interviews. The 
subjects of the interview questions included organisational functions and 
basic organisational information, advocacy and public policy participation 
activities, and the external relationships of the CBOs with governments, 
funders and other non-profits.
Our primary focus was to examine partnership selection among CBOs, 
following Provan and Milward’s (1991, 1995) procedures. To assist our 
examination of relationships, we created a table listing all the CBOs 
within each of the relevant communities and asked the respondents to 
select the organisations with which they had working relationships, and 
to identify the direction of the relationship. To illustrate the relationships, 
four sociomatrices with multiple relationships were developed. We did 
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not assume symmetrical relationships for the sociomatrix representing 
partnership selection because the directional ties allowed us to examine 
the power dynamics (White, Boorman & Breiger 1976; Ansell 2003). 
To illustrate the structure of this network, we adopted a network analysis 
technique to visualise the four networks and their associated characteristics 
(Wasserman & Faust 1994). 
Results
The characteristics of social service provisions 
in Hong Kong and Taiwan
Professionalism and competition
There is increasing demand on CBOs to deliver social services in Hong 
Kong and Taiwan, both to respond directly to the actual needs of 
society and to meet the demands for services that are being passed on by 
government. Our findings on the roles of the CBOs in service provision 
are consistent with existing findings on non-profits in general (Lee & 
Liu 2012; Xian, Kuan & Lu 2009). For instance, in a study of large non-
profit databases and their missions, Xian et al. (2009) found social service 
organisations that received government funding serve mainly in the 
social welfare and education sectors and with increased professionalism 
in service delivery. Our survey found a trend also for those CBOs that 
focus  on  social provision to be more professional. For  instance, in 
Hong  Kong, most CBOs receiving government funding have joined 
the Hong Kong Council of Social Service, which sets the standard for the 
provision of social services in Hong Kong (Lee 2005).
Furthermore, our study found that most of the CBOs in Hong Kong 
and Taiwan have small- and medium-size funding amounts, as they 
are frontline centres and receive only limited support from their local 
headquarters. More than half of these organisations self-reported from our 
open-ended questions about financial difficulties and lack of managerial 
experience, small-scale, limited mobilisation ability, inadequate ability to 
sustain operations, confined quarters, lack of communication skills for 
coordinating with other organisations, insufficient scale of participation 
or intervention, and deficient understanding of their social and economic 
environment. The larger CBOs have greater capacity to secure funding, 
despite the competitive environment.
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Political influence and social embeddedness
A previous study shows that most of the CBOs studied in Hong Kong 
do not carry out advocacy activities or have political involvement (Centre 
for Civil Society and Governance 2010), whereas the CBOs in the two 
cities in Taiwan have greater political activity and engage residents in 
signing petitions and joining organised protests (Lin, Chuang, Liu & 
Hwang 2012). Consistent with our findings, but with some variations 
(see  ‘Discussion’ below for details), many small local or regional 
organisations have appeared in recent years, forming an indispensable 
grassroots force in different regions. Given their size, CBOs in Taiwan 
must mobilise networks to gain support from the community for 
petitioning or advocacy activities. Thus, this type of CBO tends to form 
external relationships with actors of diverse backgrounds.
Network roles of non-profits
Next, by analysing social networks in four communities (two in Hong 
Kong and two in Taiwan), we examined degree centrality as a measure of 
organisations’ embeddedness (Ansell 2003). As explained above, degree 
centrality refers to the number of ties an organisation sends to others 
(outdegree) or receives from others (indegree). We classify the roles that 
CBOs play based on their number of outdegree and indegree ties with 
other CBOs as partners in local communities. These roles can be described 
as prestigious, boundary spanning and peripheral CBOs (Table  8.1). 
We then examine the network roles and the average organisational 
characteristics of these network types across the four communities 
(summarised in Table 8.2).
Table 8.1. Four social service networks in Hong Kong and Taiwan 
and their network roles as measured by degree centrality
Roles Sau Mau Ping, 
Hong Kong
Sham Shui Po, 
Hong Kong
Beitou, Taipei Central 
Taicheung
Prestigious 27 .6% 19% 32% 20%
Boundary 41 .4% 33 .3% 28% 40%
Peripheral 31% 47 .6% 40% 40%
Source . Surveys conducted by authors
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Prestigious CBOs
Prestigious CBOs have stronger ties with government and sufficient 
resources but are less flexible
In social network analysis, prestige can be measured by the indegree 
number. In other words, the higher its indegree number, the more 
prestigious the given CBO is. Our data shows that about 25 per cent 
of CBOs are prestigious within their community networks (Table 8.1). 
In Hong Kong and Taiwan, we find that service delivery is the primary 
function of prestigious CBOs and they tend to collaborate with other 
CBOs that are also primarily service providers, and they are not 
particularly involved in political activities, such as petitions, advocacy or 
citizen engagement (Table 8.2). 
One explanation for this could be that CBOs receiving significant 
government funding must follow service quality guidelines and remain 
non-partisan. Thus, they organise events and exchange resources within 
their existing networks but are reluctant to share their resources with 
actors outside this system. They enjoy not only reliable funding from the 
government, but also a high level of prestige, as evidenced by the many 
ties that they enjoy. There are, however, few reciprocal ties from this type 
of CBO to others. As a result, the integrative system designed originally 
by the government to build networks in the community has become a 
more inclusively networked social service system.
Boundary spanners
Boundary spanners connect with everyone but have less resources 
and political motivations
The term ‘boundary spanner’ refers to those who have connections with 
different types of actors within communities. For instance, a boundary 
spanner would not only have a higher degree of outdegree relationships 
but also connect with different types of organisations according to the 
nature of their service. In our data, we found about 36.5 per cent of CBOs 
are boundary spanners. The data also shows that boundary spanners 
are, moreover, mostly politically affiliated (either with a local district 
councillor/representative or they are founded by politicians) and tend to 
have more ties with CBOs of diverse backgrounds. For instance, in Hong 
Kong, district councillors and politically affiliated CBOs serve a bridging 
role in poor urban communities because they actively build relationships 
with different community members.
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As in Marwell’s (2004) study, the current study identified an exchange 
relationship among local politicians, politically affiliated CBOs and other 
informal neighbourhood associations. Politically affiliated groups build 
working relationships but are also keen to gain resources and access to local 
residents to expand their political interests. This was especially observed in 
Hong Kong (Liu 2019) and is similar to the case in Taiwan, where local 
elected representatives work with specific CBOs to deliver meal services 
and perform elderly visits in exchange for gaining potential political 
support from community residents, as reported by the local representative 
office in Beitou, Taipei. Political interference, however, was reflected more 
clearly in our open-ended survey in Hong Kong, where the interviewees 
noted that politics represented a major obstacle to building mutual trust 
and understanding in their community (see ‘Discussion’ below).
Peripheral CBOs
Peripheral CBOs have fewer connections with actors in their communities
Our analysis showed that 38.5 per cent of the CBOs are peripheral, 
based on their network connections. These CBOs are either smaller or 
informal, have fewer connections with other CBOs and do not occupy an 
important position within their own community networks; they also are 
less involved in advocacy (Table 8.2). Such informal CBOs are, however, 
often gathering points for local residents and provide access to a specific 
group with a particular ethnicity or special need, such as the deaf, single 
mothers or private community foundations. Such CBOs tend to have 
fewer resources (see Table 8.2) and are reached by the politically affiliated 
CBOs rather than the social welfare CBOs. 
In sum, the preliminary results show that CBOs serve the roles of social 
service provision and allocation, representation and deliberation, yet 
differences between Taiwan and Hong Kong exist. For instance, the CBOs 
in Hong Kong reported that they play a minimal role in advocacy and 
policy participation, while those in Taiwan reported a relatively higher 
degree of advocacy and policy participation. This study explores the extent 
to which CBOs are involved in the policymaking process or in advocacy 
activities and how this varies depending on their resources, community 
influence and external relationships with government. In doing so, the 
study shines some light on the implications for community governance in 
Hong Kong and Taiwan. 
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A few limitations should be noted before the findings are discussed. 
First, the empirical cases selected for this study are based on theoretical 
relevance. The target communities do not represent typical communities. 
Instead, our research team chose low-income communities at each site. 
This narrows the application of our findings, but it allows us to examine 
the roles of CBOs in serving the poor.
Discussion
Differences between Hong Kong and Taiwan
Top‑down versus bottom‑up approach
Due to social and political differences, the governance structures of 
the community networks in Hong Kong and Taiwan were created 
differently. One major difference is Hong Kong’s more top-down rather 
than bottom-up structure. As noted, in the early 2000s, the Hong Kong 
Government established service integration centres to provide one-
stop services for children, youth and the elderly; in-home care; mental 
wellness; and  family services. These centres integrate local government 
agencies and non-profits into one unit and allow clients and service 
users to access different specialised services at one location. For instance, 
multiple agencies that we interviewed in Hong Kong were co-located in 
the same office building and provided services to the same low-income 
families. The government in Hong Kong allows rent deduction for non-
profits that choose to be located on public housing estates so their clients 
can readily access services. Because of policy incentives and geographic 
convenience, both of the communities studied in Hong Kong presented a 
top-down structure of social service provision. 
In Taiwan, NPM reforms in welfare policy took a different turn and 
put more emphasis on community care and community-building. 
For instance, before the 2000s, a 10-year Phase 1 and Phase 2 long-term 
care program was intended to build community capacity by contracting 
directly with community-based non-profits to deliver essential social 
services (Wu 2011). Instead of establishing hub centres, Taiwanese 
policies, like those on long-term care and community care, focused on 
capacity-building and service-training programs for the local CBOs. 
Furthermore, through a series of decentralised funding processes and 
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resource decisions for local city and district governments, the amendment 
of some service contracts to make them more manageable in terms of 
scope and boundaries allowed CBOs to bid for government contracts.
Engagement versus advocacy
To increase its role in government coordination, the Hong Kong 
Government actively engages local CBOs. Table 8.3 shows the differences 
in engagement channels utilised by CBOs in Hong Kong and Taiwan. 
Surprisingly, CBOs in Hong Kong reported a higher percentage of 
government engagement through sitting on central or local government 
boards/committees and participation in public consultation or government 
panels. For instance, we found a higher percentage (37 per cent) of CBOs 
in Hong Kong have a representative on local coordinating committees 
than in Taiwan (13 per cent). 
Table 8.3. Differences in the engagement channels utilised by CBOs 
in Hong Kong and Taiwan
Hong Kong Taiwan Total
Engagement channels N % N % N % P
Government board/committee 11 21 .57 9 20 .45 20 20 .83 0 .000
Government panel/consultation 17 33 .33 12 27 .27 29 30 .21 0 .000
regional committee 19 37 .25 6 13 .64 25 26 .04 0 .000
Public consultation 15 29 .41 10 22 .73 25 26 .04 0 .000
Source . Surveys conducted by authors
There are two possible reasons for this disparity. First, the development 
of social service provision differs historically between Hong Kong and 
Taiwan. In Hong Kong, beginning in the British colonial period, the 
government adopted a cooperative strategy and invited large and influential 
non-profit organisations to sit on government committees (Lee 2005). 
Hong Kong district councils were designed to cooperate with influential 
non-profits and they continue to play an essential coordinating role in 
local communities (Leung 2010). These committees are an important 
communication channel between the government and the non-profit 
sector. Taiwan’s political transformation from an authoritarian state to 
a democratic system resulted in non-profits emerged more gradually. 
Second, and perhaps related to the different histories, CBOs in the two 
jurisdictions have different approaches to, and use different means of, 
engagement and advocacy (see Table 8.4). In Taiwan, CBOs are more 
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involved in advocacy (only 23 per cent report that they did not conduct 
advocacy activities, compared to 59 per cent in Hong Kong), and they 
use a wider range of channels. The CBOs in Hong Kong advocate mainly 
through their member networks (29 per cent), with limited use of other 
means such as the internet (16 per cent) and street petitions (14 per cent). 
CBOs in Taiwan relied less on their member networks (16 per cent) and 
much more on the internet (52 per cent), TV ads (20 per cent), public 
media (18 per cent) and mailed advertisements (18 per cent). Both made 
some use of street petitions.
Table 8.4. Differences between CBOs in Hong Kong and Taiwan in their 
adoption of advocacy methods
Hong Kong Taiwan Total
Advocacy methods N % N % N % P
Member network 15 29 .41 7 15 .91 22 22 .92 0 .000
Email/phone text 3 5 .88 7 15 .91 10 10 .42 0 .000
Social media 8 15 .69 23 52 .27 31 32 .29 0 .000
Direct mail 1 1 .96 8 18 .18 9 9 .38 0 .000
Street ads 7 13 .73 5 11 .36 12 12 .50 0 .000
Tv ads 2 3 .92 9 20 .45 11 11 .46 0 .000
Public media 1 1 .96 8 18 .18 9 9 .38 0 .000
others 10 19 .61 11 25 .00 21 21 .88 0 .000
Source . Surveys conducted by authors
The implementation challenges of collaborative 
governance
The development of effective collaborative governance systems in local 
communities poses a challenge to policymakers as well as to the CBOs 
that implement them. Previous studies have focused more on finding 
the right combination for collaboration to be effective. As discussed 
previously, governments have transformed and redesigned social service 
provisions to be more collaborative and effective, creating one-stop 
services in the United States, community care in Taiwan, the No Wrong 
Door policy in the United Kingdom, and integrative service in Hong 
Kong. This study finds that frontline CBOs struggle to balance their roles 
of service provision, engagement, advocacy and creating relationships 
with others to gain additional resources and information to survive in 
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the competitive environment. By understanding the role played by CBOs 
in implementing collaborative governance in the local community, our 
findings reveal a number of challenges. 
Resource‑distribution asymmetry
Under the NPM reforms, governments adopted a competitive bidding 
process to allocate resources and funding. Our interviews show, however, 
that resources and funding are allocated mainly to larger and more 
established non-profits. These CBOs have extended networks and affiliated 
non-profits that provide similar services or share the same religious or 
political backgrounds. These clusters of medical and elderly service 
organisations make the competition for contracts more difficult for newly 
established non-profits, because it is difficult for them to access clients 
and build the capacity to bid for contract work. For instance, interviewees 
from organisations that were established in Hong Kong after 2000 
reported difficulty in obtaining service contracts from the government 
because their client base was smaller than that of larger organisations. 
To be competitive, these new service organisations had to emphasise their 
innovativeness and personalised services for the elderly.
Lack of coordination with diverse non-profits
When policy requires them to extend their working boundaries to be 
more accessible to clients, CBOs are likely to seek less costly relationships 
or form networks with similar organisations rather than the most effective 
or efficient ones. Such less costly relationships with similar organisations 
are usually confined within the existing boundaries of missions, 
capacities, resources, responsibilities, accountability and networks, as 
Kettl (2006) found. Not surprisingly, even well-intended policies cannot 
be accomplished without taking into account the costs of building 
relationships with organisations with different networks.
Political involvement creates distrust among CBOs
A surprising finding from our open-ended questions was the negative 
aspect of political engagement. The negative effects of the political 
involvement of CBOs are particularly significant in Hong Kong. Some 
interviewees reported that politics is a major obstacle to building mutual 
trust and understanding in their community. The following observation 
was reported from an interview in Hong Kong with a librarian at a local 
public library: ‘An organisation’s political partners reduce opportunities 
for cooperation.’
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This perception hinders the development of networking relationships 
between governments and politically affiliated non-profits. The organiser 
of a neighbourhood community association voiced the following 
complaint: ‘Political polarisation divides society and, consequently, 
affects mutual trust between organisations and the trust between citizens 
and organisations as well.’ This view was confirmed by a local service 
centre serving the deaf, which stated that: ‘Political affiliation divides the 
community.’ Political interference was mentioned less by the interviewees 
from the two cities in Taiwan. 
Implications for the greater China region
It can be inferred from the cases of Hong Kong and Taiwan that CBOs in 
the greater China region differ from those of the West due to the historical 
and political development of the region. The transition from NPM to 
collaborative governance in China is changing the role of contracting 
non-profits in social service provision: how can non-profits be both 
competitive contractors and collaborators that create consensus (Jing & 
Hu 2017)? While the literature shows that both roles can be taken on at 
the same time, performance measurement of non-profits as contractors 
that provide social services in China does not account for collaboration 
and, thus, creates barriers to it, as found in Shanghai (Jing & Hu 2017), 
Hong Kong (Lee & Liu 2012; Liu & Chen 2015) and Taiwan (Liu, Kuo & 
Lin 2018). More importantly, non-profits’ disproportionate dependence 
on government in greater China also deprives them of autonomy and 
constrains network building, thus reducing their governing capacity 
(Jing & Hu 2017). 
Our empirical findings on Hong Kong and Taiwan have implications for 
the transition from NPM to collaborative governance in China. Unlike 
the findings of the literature on the hollow state (Milward & Provan 
2003), in our study, CBOs in Hong Kong and Taiwan reported that they 
seek leadership from local government. From our open-ended questions, 
a discussion of leadership surfaced, and the local CBOs expressed the view 
that it is essential to have leadership that can coordinate different non-
profits in the community to avoid unnecessary competition and promote 
information sharing. 
The interviews indicated that the relationship between governments 
and non-profits should be improved so as to increase coordination. 
Only about one-quarter of CBOs studied here have participated in 
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government-led forums and consultation meetings, and only one-third 
have been consulted by government. In particular, a higher percentage 
(37 per cent) of CBOs in Hong Kong reported having representatives 
on local coordinating committees, than in Taiwan (13 per cent). Due to 
historical development, the Hong Kong Government cooperates more 
actively with local CBOs while, over the last few decades, the Taiwan 
Government has gradually allowed the CBOs to express their perspectives 
on issues through a variety of channels to accurately represent the views 
and demands of local residents. 
Internationally, governments play leadership roles by adopting strategies 
to improve coordination and collaboration among service providers 
in order to assure the level of service especially in competitive policy 
environments, such as community development block grants (Agranoff & 
McGuire 1998), information and communication technology platforms 
(Urban Institute 2012), and insurance schemes, such as the Australian 
National Disability Insurance Scheme (Green, Malbon, Carey, Dickinson 
& Reeders 2018).
On the other hand, CBOs in Hong Kong were much less involved in 
public advocacy and more often relied on formal links with government. 
Perhaps both models have merits for the greater China region when 
constructing social service provision arrangements for local communities 
and establishing effective communication channels between governments, 
CBOs and local residents. 
Our findings for CBOs in Hong Kong and Taiwan have implications 
for understanding governance capacity and service quality in local 
communities.  The People’s Republic of China’s recent Five-Year 
Development Plan listed ‘Winning the battle against poverty’ as an 
essential policy target for the near future. In particular, the government 
will focus on working with cross-sector actors to improve the self-
sufficiency of low-income families and assure their upward mobility. 
The  collaborative governance models adopted and the experiences 
accumulated in both Hong Kong and Taiwan have important implications 
for this commitment. 
To improve governance capacity and to facilitate collaboration and 
exchange among different CBOs, the government needs to provide 
legitimacy to bureaucrats and CBOs to build their connections with 
actors in the communities and remove barriers to forming connections 
with groups from different backgrounds. For instance, block grants in 
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the United States (Reingold & Liu 2009) and Hong Kong’s Community 
Investment & Inclusion Fund have demonstrated that governments can 
create cross-sector collaboration by providing separate funds (in addition 
to funding to services) for facilitating collaboration-related activities 
(Leung 2010); this might help promote community participation through 
community network building. 
Similarly, increasing the participation of local CBOs and neighbourhood 
associations in the policymaking process and ensuring fair participation 
through self-regulation are essential. Huther and Shah (2005: 40) argue, 
‘the quality of governance is thus determined by the impact of this exercise 
of power on the quality of life enjoyed by its citizens’. Our social network 
analyses reveal that the way in which institutions of governance exercise 
their power in local communities can influence the quality of service 
provisions. For instance in Hong Kong, unlike in the United States, the 
existing laws that govern the non-profit sector do not specify the type of 
political activities in which a non-profit can engage.1 
Our open-ended survey also suggests that CBOs with a strong individual 
political motive diminish social capital, because they work for a political 
agenda rather than the needs of the community. Thus, more specific 
and fairer regulation of those CBOs can reduce the negative impacts 
of political machines and clientelism and ensure that the provision of 
social services by community actors is based on public need rather than 
individual politicians’ political interests. More importantly, diversifying 
different channels for local CBOs to express their concerns and needs may 
also reduce the influence of the larger and more influential CBOs and, 
thus, reduce resource-distribution asymmetry.
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ASSESSING THE VERTICAL 
MANAGEMENT REFORM OF 
CHINA’S ENVIRONMENTAL 
SYSTEM
Progress, conditions and prospects
Fanrong Meng, Zitao Chen and  
Pichamon Yeophantong
Introduction
Despite China’s rapid economic development over the past 30 years, the 
country’s current patterns of economic growth are not environmentally 
sustainable. From the severe smog that blanketed Beijing in early 2017 
to the serious industrial pollution of major waterways such as the Yangzi 
and Yellow rivers, China is experiencing an environmental crisis in the 
making. In response, the Chinese Government has recognised the need 
for exigent environmental reforms. In a bid to mitigate and reduce 
environmental degradation, the central government has put in place 
a range of policy initiatives, having also enacted a series of national plans, 
policies and laws since the late 1990s (Sims 1999). These policies largely 
focus on enhancing administrative capabilities to improve environmental 
protection and legislation, with a clear emphasis on coordinating 
a ‘win–win’ balance between economic development and environmental 
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protection (Zhang, Wen & Peng 2007). To this end, the structure and 
institutional authority of the country’s chief environmental agency 
was considerably strengthened through the transformation of the State 
Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA) into a fully-fledged Ministry 
of Environmental Protection (MEP), which was renamed as the Ministry 
of Ecology and Environment (MEE) in 2018.
China’s system of environmental management and the implementation of 
environment-related policies, however, still suffer from sizable challenges 
and inefficiencies, as problems of noncompliance and the inconsistent 
enforcement of laws and regulations persist. This, in part, stems from 
issues relating to the nature of national legislation, local protectionism, as 
well as local bureaucratic and enforcement procedures. Some scholars have 
concluded that environment laws in China are of a low legislative quality, 
have too many general instructions and that they are basic and difficult to 
enforce (Wang 2009). Additionally, the lack of attention to environmental 
indicators in the ‘cadre evaluation’ system has led to limited capacity in 
local Environmental Protection Bureaus (EPBs) because of insufficient 
funding and personnel for monitoring and enforcement (Wang 2013; Jin, 
Andersson & Zhang 2016). The lack of coherence among environmental 
regulations, conflicting interests at different levels of administration, and 
insufficient technical capacity and resources further complicate the ability 
of state environmental protection authorities to carry out their duties 
(Van 2006).
It is within this context that demands have arisen for stronger steps to 
be taken to tackle endemic problems of weak enforcement. During the 
Fifth Plenary Session of the 18th Communist Party of China’s (CPC) 
Central Committee in October 2015, the CPC pledged to update the 
current system of governance among the different levels of environmental 
protection authorities, and to adopt a new vertical management system 
that has since come into effect under the auspices of the country’s 13th Five-
Year Plan (2016–20). ‘Vertical management’ refers to a system in which 
an agency implements policies within a hierarchical, internal process, 
and negotiates its roles and duties in relation to other environmental 
protection authorities. Here, agencies and departments situated on the 
lower rungs of the chain of command are required to report directly to 
those on the upper rungs, as opposed to local governments at the same 
level (Li 2016).
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Figure 9.1. Vertical management pilot provinces in environmental 
protection system
Source . Fanrong Meng and Zitao Chen
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Following the development of this system, 12 provinces across the 
country have since applied to be vertical management pilot regions. These 
provinces are Hebei, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Fujian, Shandong, Henan, Hubei, 
Guangdong, Chongqing, Guizhou, Shaanxi, and Qinghai (Figure 9.1). 
This chapter interrogates the key drivers behind these provinces’ 
application to become vertical management pilot provinces and explores 
the key elements of China’s vertical management reform alongside a review 
of the evolution of the country’s system of environmental management. 
We then consider whether this reform can potentially fix problems related 
to administrative inefficiency within the bureaucratic system and improve 
policy efficiency. As explained later, by applying a qualitative comparative 
analysis (QCA) method, the chapter compares official field data and 
documents from 31 provinces across China to reveal the significance of 
internal and external determinants in informing provincial decisions to 
apply for the vertical management pilot.
The evolution of China’s environmental 
management system
Prior to transforming into the MEE, MEP had been the sole national body 
responsible for environmental management. First established in 1974 as 
a unit under the State Council, with a staff of 20 people, a reorganisation 
in 1998 led to the creation of SEPA, which came directly under the 
State Council. In March 2008, as a significant step towards improving 
environmental management, SEPA was elevated to the ministerial level. 
The MEP’s functions included preparing and implementing national 
policies, legislation and regulations related to water and air quality, solid 
waste management, nature protection and nuclear/radiation safety. 
The MEP was also in charge of formulating environmental quality 
criteria and pollutant discharge/emission standards at the national level, 
organising environmental quality monitoring, and collaborating with 
local environmental authorities to initiate enforcement activities. It 
coordinates plans for addressing trans-boundary environmental problems 
and organising scientific research and development.1 Apart from the MEP, 
a range of environment-related issues was further managed separately 
by other ministries and agencies of the State Council. For example, the 
1  See www.mee.gov.cn/zjhb/zyzz/
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National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) has played a 
key role as the agency responsible for developing and implementing Five-
Year Plans. In  this capacity, the NDRC integrates environmental issues 
into China’s overall planning system, and into sector-specific policies such 
as those on energy. 
Even so, the primary responsibility for implementing environmental 
policy remains at the sub-national – that is, provincial and local – level. 
There are around 2,000 EPBs with approximately 60,000 employees at 
the provincial, prefecture/municipal, district/counties and township 
administrative levels. Other administrative units of local governments 
that are engaged in environmental policy implementation include the 
Environmental Protection Committees of the local People’s Congress, 
the Environmental Protection Commissions of local governments, mayor 
offices, planning commissions, finance bureaus and a range of industrial 
bureaus. These all play important roles in endorsing local environmental 
regulations, coordinating EPBs’ work with other government organs, 
taking key decisions on large investment projects involving industrial 
development and environmental protection, integrating these projects 
into local economic and social development plans, as well as managing 
pollution-discharge fee systems, among other functions.
Historically, the Chinese system of governance was characterised by 
the division between the vertical line, which means that the agencies of 
bureaucracy are directly controlled by their functional administrative 
superiors (Tiao), and the horizontal line (kuai), in which the agencies are 
also administered by the local government rather than the higher levels 
with certain functionalities. In this system, a municipal-level EPB reports 
to its ‘vertical’ superiors (i.e. the provincial EPB and MEP) while also 
being subject to the leadership of its ‘horizontal’ boss (i.e. the mayor of the 
municipality). Currently, different departments within local governments 
shoulder the responsibility of carrying out environmental protection, and 
sub-units within the environmental agencies are responsible for reporting 
individually to the government. It is the local government offices that 
appoint the heads of these agencies and provide financial support. China’s 
environmental reform program has been carried out under this ‘parallel 
management system’ for the past 35 years and it is clear that the system 
is responsible for some of the main structural obstacles to effective 
environmental policy implementation at the local level.
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The first is the interference of local protectionism and weak environmental 
compliance assurance. The central government has increasingly delegated 
responsibilities to local governments for addressing local problems, and 
they are expected to draw upon and allocate local funds for this purpose. 
This encourages governments to defend local industries in order to secure 
revenues, even at the cost of environmental enforcement – basically, 
engaging in a  form of local protectionism. This becomes particularly 
problematic when the goals of environmental protection conflict with the 
targets of economic development (Ma & Ortolano 2000). While EPBs 
had received guidance from the MEP, they remained institutionally and 
financially subordinate to provincial and local governments. Thus, the 
actions of EPBs were directed more by sub-national governments than by 
the MEP, as local governments tended to favour economic development 
over environmental considerations, with EPBs also ranking low in the 
government hierarchy. Pressures to demonstrate economic growth are 
powerful and compelling (Wang & Lin 2010). Even with the introduction 
of a wider range of environmental targets in socioeconomic planning, 
and despite innovations in the evaluation system for government officials, 
there was an ever-present risk that ‘fake data’ might be produced to 
preserve the political status quo. 
The second structural obstacle to effective environmental policy 
implementation concerns budget allocation. China’s decentralised 
administrative system means that most EPB financial resources come 
directly from the local government (Jahiel 1998; Ma & Ortolano 2000). 
As a result, EPBs are often weak with minimal funding and limited 
authority (Lo & Leung 2000: 677; Ma & Ortolano 2000: 81). Since 
the late 1990s, EPB authority has improved somewhat nationally – this 
is especially the case in richer coastal areas – but funding continues to 
represent a major constraint. Until 2003, EPBs were dependent on the 
revenue from the pollution levy to finance their operations. 
Without adequate funds, EPBs have been unable to carry out sufficient 
inspections, or to execute sanction decisions. The remainder of the EPBs’ 
resources are taken from pollution discharge fees and are thus dependent 
on continued pollution. It is in this way that a lack of funding effectively 
hampers enforcement: staff resources and materials, such as cars needed 
for inspections, are in chronic shortage. With inefficient staff who are also 
increasingly overburdened, EPBs are often unable to carry out regular 
and proactive inspections of polluting enterprises, and are forced to rely 
heavily on receiving complaints before investigating.
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Third, fragmented authority and blurred accountability further hinder 
cooperation among local government agencies. The fragmented nature 
of China’s bureaucratic system has been debated since the 1980s, and 
continues to hamper effective environmental management even now 
(Brombal et al. 2015). China’s environmental protection and conservation 
efforts are managed by different government departments. For example, 
soil and water conservation activities are guided by the Bureau of Water 
Resources, dust management on construction sites is regulated by the 
Bureau of Housing and Construction, and vehicle exhaust is monitored 
by the Bureau of Transportation. The EPB’s authority on such matters 
is limited by the need for it to seek consensus among its constituent 
members, consisting of representatives from more than 20 bureaus. 
The EPB cannot compel cooperation because it lacks a formal mechanism 
that would otherwise allow it to do so. On the other hand, local 
government leaders continue to give limited attention to environmental 
performance and there remains an underlying bias towards GDP growth 
within the evaluation and rewards system for government officials. The 
lack of clear responsibilities and indicators for assessing local government 
leaders’ environmental performance results in the systematic neglect of 
environmental protection that is seen in China today.
The fourth problem is the challenge of low implementation capabilities 
at the local level. The lack of knowledge and skills can result in certain 
national policies being misinterpreted by local governments. Partly, 
this lack of local capacity is due to the nature of the decentralisation 
process in China, where sub-national agencies are given decision-making 
authority but no accompanying financial resources. Even though a large 
number of civil servants are trained every year, training opportunities 
for environmental staff are unevenly allocated. In poorer counties and 
townships where the local government cannot even pay the salaries of 
their officials, training becomes a non-essential ‘luxury’, as opposed to 
a critical necessity.
Reviewing China’s approach to vertical 
management reform
In order to reduce the interference of local governments in the work 
of local environment departments, overcome the institutional and 
procedural barriers that hinder environmental protection, and strengthen 
integrated management by treating both the symptoms and root causes of 
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environmental problems, in September 2016 the General Offices of the 
CPC Central Committee and the State Council published and distributed 
Guidelines for the Pilot Reforms for a Vertical Management System for the 
Environmental Monitoring, Supervision, Inspection, and Enforcement by the 
Environmental Protection Branches below Provincial Level (hereafter, the 
Guidelines). As one official of the MEP observed:
The vertical administration system will adjust not only the 
administrative jurisdiction, but also the division of powers 
among the  local governments at different levels, the functional 
departments of a local government and the departments in charge 
of environmental protection. The system will also improve the basic 
mechanism of environmental governance. (Xinhua News 2016)
Following from the development of the central government’s management 
procedures, 12 provincial divisions applied for and were selected as the 
vertical management pilot regions amongst 31 provinces. They were 
urged to carry out the reforms based on their practical circumstances, and 
to accomplish the reform objectives by the end of June 2017. 
The main distinction between the two types of political relationships in 
horizontal and vertical management refers to those governed by binding 
orders, and those based on non-binding instructions (Figure  9.2). 
In horizontal management, the local party committees and governments 
at each level itemise the responsibilities of EPBs at their level, give full 
support for their initiatives, and provide supervision and inspections to 
enhance accountability in environmental protection tasks. On a vertical 
scale, the Guidelines highlight the unified supervision and management 
of  the environmental protection departments, which is intended to 
improve overall efficacy. The Guidelines emphasise the regulation and 
establishment of environmental protection departments and teams, while 
optimising environmental functions at the provincial, municipal and 
county levels. The EPBs are primarily responsible for unified supervision 
and management, as well as for localised management, whereas other 
relevant departments are expected to take up responsibilities based on 
their respective jurisdictions.
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Leadership relations / binding orders
Professional relations / non‑binding orders
Figure 9.2. Before and after vertical management
Source . Fanrong Meng, Zitao Chen and Pichamon Yeophantong
The purpose of the reforms to a vertical management system is twofold: 
to address the pressing problems found in existing vertical and horizontal 
management systems as used in local environmental management, as 
well as to change the current situation where some local governments 
either give too much weight to economic development and make light 
of environmental protection; or intervene in environmental monitoring, 
inspection and supervision, and enforcement. This, in turn, leads to hurdles 
in performing environmental protection tasks, failure to observe laws, 
sloppiness in environmental enforcement and insufficient accountability 
for law-breaching activities. The key tasks and the corresponding problems 
are listed in Table 9.1.
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Table 9.1. Key tasks in vertical management
Key tasks Problems
Strengthen the environmental protection responsibilities 
of the local party committees, governments and 
relevant departments and urge them to fulfil such 
responsibilities, conduct authoritative and effective 
environmental supervision and inspection, and step up 
accountability and other measures .
Difficulty in overseeing local 
governments and relevant 
departments .
Centralise the eco‑environmental quality monitoring 
and environmental supervision and inspection functions 
in order to wield such powers only at a provincial level, 
and manage the environmental enforcement teams at 
municipal level .
Difficulty in stopping the 
influence of local protectionism 
over environmental monitoring, 
supervision, inspection and 
enforcement .
Build capacity at provincial and municipal levels in 
making overall plans for and regulating environmental 
issues, and explore such measures as establishing 
cross‑watershed and cross‑region environmental 
protection bodies .
Difficulty in meeting the new 
requirements for addressing 
cross‑watershed and cross‑
region environmental issues 
in a comprehensive manner .
Enrich the structure and staff of environmental 
protection institutions, and enable the environmental 
protection teams to be more specialised .
Difficulty in regulating and 
enhancing team‑building 
among local environmental 
protection departments .
Source . Fanrong Meng, Zitao Chen and Pichamon Yeophantong
The integration of a vertical management system into environmental 
agencies is not  entirely new. In 2002, Shaanxi province piloted the 
‘vertical management’ of environmental bureaus at the municipal level 
and below, which led to ‘better law enforcement at the county level’ (Yue 
2016). But  the trial also met with resistance from the counties, which 
resented the fact that, with the concentration of authority, the original 
budget attached to this authority was ‘sucked upwards’. In 2006, the 
central government took a bigger step by creating 11 dispatch inspection 
centres all over China – an idea modelled on the regional offices of the US 
Environmental Protection Agency. These inspection centres, though based 
locally, report directly to, and are funded by, the political centre. But as 
‘dispatch’ centres, they do not feed into the existing power structure at the 
local level, and are sometimes seen as interfering with local governments’ 
ability to exercise their legitimate authority. Since then, the MEP has 
made little progress vis-à-vis vertical management. 
The 2008 upgrade of SEPA into a full ministry required the MEP to 
assuage fears of an even greater concentration of decision-making power. 
Accordingly, a key obstacle to pushing through the vertical management 
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reform was the concern that it may further fragment and undermine 
governance at the local level. With an increasing number of departments 
reporting to the top, there is a risk of excessive regulatory interference at 
the expense of catering to local needs.
Within the political science discipline, prior attempts at vertical 
management amount to experiments from which examples of best 
practice might be identified (Zhu 2014). The effects of a new policy 
cannot always be predicted, however, and it may be better, therefore, not 
to rely on a single approach (Ostrom 2005). Nonetheless, the experiments 
can potentially provide proof of principle, help shape any new policy and, 
thereby, provide the basis for policy diffusion.
But how is one to account for the variation in the levels of policy interest 
among different provinces? Some provinces are more hesitant, yet others 
appear to be more enthusiastic adopters when it comes to applying to be 
a vertical management pilot region. Provincial governments face many 
environmental problems but, at present, there is limited knowledge of how 
policymakers have responded to this problem. As more environmental 
problems fall under the purview of provincial governments, it is 
increasingly important to explore their capacity to develop comprehensive 
responses to those problems. This chapter explores the determinants of 
variations in the policy capability of these pilot provinces relative to other 
provinces and examines the ability of provinces to develop a multifaceted 
vertical management system.
Theoretical framework
Policy innovation and diffusion
Political scientists have long been fascinated by the puzzle of why local 
governments adopt certain policies or reforms (Dye 1966; Gray 1973; 
Savage 1978; Walker 1969). Policy diffusion refers to an understanding of 
policy innovation that emphasises the spread of novel policy approaches. 
New approaches are only innovative if and when they enter into 
widespread use and are adopted by or diffused into many jurisdictions. 
Diffusion theory is an established field of academic enquiry, which 
suggests that policymaking activity at the national level can occur either 
through internal processes, or by building on what has occurred in other 
states (Berry & Berry 1999; Gray 1994; Walker 1969).
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The reasons for innovation and the mechanisms of inter-regional 
diffusion are complicated. Previous studies generally can be grouped 
under three models: internal determinants, horizontal influence and 
vertical interventions (Nice 1994; Elkins et al. 2006; Berry & Berry 
2007; Walker et al. 2011). The internal determinants include social, 
economic, political and historical traditions; traits of leaders; and internal 
policy networks (Berry & Lowery 1987; Mintrom 1997). The major 
horizontal influential factors come from competition and pressure among 
governments (Rogers 1995; Cao 2012; Rose 2005). In contrast with these 
two models, the vertical intervention model emphasises the role of higher 
levels of government in powerful hierarchical systems, which may spread 
and accelerate policy diffusion to local governments through mandated 
measures (Newman et al. 2000; Nutley et al. 2012).
In China, vertical intervention from the superior government is more 
complicated than in democratic decentralised countries. The central 
government has strong powers and considerable influence on the 
behaviours  of local governments and on the careers of local officials. 
Xufeng Zhu (2014) revealed how different diffusion patterns of 
innovation are adopted by subordinate local governments under various 
vertical intervention mechanisms that are established by the central 
or superior governments within an authoritarian structure. The central or 
superior governments may adopt two major intervention methods to 
impose the necessary effect: intervention via administrative command 
and competition using performance evaluation.
Internal and external determinants of policy adoption
Considering the above theoretical perspective, we establish two broad 
explanations for policy adoption in this study: internal and external 
determinants. Internal determinant models suggest that the adoption of 
policy innovation depends on a state’s internal characteristics (Berry & 
Berry 1999). These characteristics, such as socioeconomic resources, 
political ideology, the severity of the problem and interest-group pressure, 
may influence state policymaking (Wright et al. 1987; Ringquist 1994; 
Williams & Matheny 1984). They are often related directly to the 
‘motivation to innovate, the strength of obstacles, and resource availability’ 
(Berry & Berry 1999). In view of this literature, we test two specific aspects 
of the internal determinants explanation of provincial pilot reform:
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• Problem severity: The emergence of a problem or crisis requires 
a  change to existing circumstances and increases the likelihood 
of  policy adoption. Moreover, the likelihood of adoption and the 
rate of diffusion increase if the innovation is perceived to be compatible 
with current circumstances and the generally accepted values and 
norms of the social system (Rogers 1995). We speculate that the more 
serious a province’s environmental problems, the more likely it will 
adopt environment management reforms.
• Resources: Policy innovation and implementation often carry high 
costs. Researchers consistently report that larger and wealthier states 
adopt new programs faster than smaller and poorer states (Gray 1994; 
Walker 1969). Necessary legitimacy and resources (legal, financial) 
can facilitate the development of long-term project visions, stimulate 
and oversee local approaches, and support the implementation of 
ambitious programs (Bell & Hindmoor 2009). Thus, the availability 
of resources may increase the motivation of decision-makers to initiate 
a search for new ideas, study their effectiveness and apply them in 
practice (Berry  & Berry 1999; Jensen 2004). The social and legal 
viability of the state is not the only established resource required for 
policy adoption. A sound ecological foundation – which in this chapter 
refers to the ecological restoration and conservation of land and water 
resources – also constitutes an essential factor in environmental policy 
adoption and innovation. 
Aside from the internal determinants, diffusion theory also considers how 
external factors can likewise have a positive influence on policy adoption. 
In other words, states are more likely to adopt policies or programs when 
other governmental units have already adopted them (Berry & Berry 
1999). The possible reasons are: (a) states learn about different policies 
from other states, (b) states compete with each other, and (c) public 
pressure may force a state to adopt a policy that neighbouring states have 
adopted (Berry & Berry 1999). Given this, we hypothesise three external 
determinants: 
• Horizontal competition: Some diffusion theorists suggest that 
there is a greater likelihood of states adopting policy innovation if 
a neighbouring state has already done so (Berry & Berry 1999; Gray 
1994; Mooney & Lee 1995; Walker 1969). Innovation adoption is 
not always predictable, as some states have a greater desire to be on 
the ‘cutting edge’ and are willing to take risks, while other states prefer 
to wait until an innovation is ‘standard practice’ before considering 
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adoption (Dusenbury & Hansen 2004). Competition occurs when 
units react to, or anticipate, the other’s policy actions in an attempt to 
attract or retain resources. As a pilot region, a province could obtain 
more political and financial resources, but also face unpredictable risks. 
Such competition would then affect the choices of other governments. 
• Vertical learning: Along with the pressure from other state 
governments, national policymaking can also be affected by upper 
level government units. Vertical or top-down pressure is often 
suggested in diffusion research, but seldom examined in an explicit 
manner (Berry & Berry 1999). The vertical influence model does not 
view learning and competition as key elements to policy diffusion, 
but rather situates the influence of national governments as a central 
factor. Therefore, it is more likely that states will adopt the policies 
heralded by the national government, rather than emulate the policies 
of other states (Berry & Berry 1999). More specifically, the vertical 
influence model posits that states are most likely to adopt policy 
innovation in response to federal mandates. In fact, adoption is even 
more likely when it is attached to federal funding and incentives 
(Berry & Berry 1999). Innovation adoption is also influenced by the 
national government’s expectation that states conform to standards 
(Brown  1981). Accordingly, supporting the central government is 
particularly important for local officials seeking to obtain favourable 
consideration of their future promotion.
• Public participation: Popular environmental movements are usually 
the result of serious public concerns over social and ecological 
impacts, and can help to compel governments to expedite the search 
for solutions to environmental problems. National environmental 
policymaking might also be subject to pressure from interest groups, 
albeit this is likely to be marginal in China in contrast with Western 
democracies (Davis & Feiock 1992; Gray & Lowery 1996; Potoski 
2001). On this view, new environment policies are likely to emerge 
under conditions marked by active public participation within the 
policymaking process.
In sum, we identify seven internal and external determinants – namely, 
problem severity, social development, legal development, ecological 
foundation, horizontal competition, vertical learning and public 
participation – as explanatory variables that may influence provincial 
decisions to apply to become vertical management pilot regions 
(i.e. the dependent variable).
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Methods, data and measurement
We use QCA in order to empirically assess the relative weight of the 
determinants of policy adoption. This method is particularly well-suited 
for a ‘small-N’ research design, which allows for the examination of multi-
causal analysis and the interaction of causal variables (Ragin 1987). A basic 
premise of QCA is that there may be multiple paths or causal combinations 
leading to the same outcome. It is a combination of independent variables 
(‘conditions’, in QCA terms) that eventually produces the phenomenon 
to be explained. Several different combinations of conditions can produce 
the same outcome and, depending on the context (i.e. ‘conjuncture’), 
a given condition may have a different impact on the outcome. 
This suggests how different causal paths – each path being relevant in 
a  distinctive way – may lead to the same outcome. Hence, by using 
QCA, one is urged not to ‘specify a single causal model that fits the data 
best’, but rather to ‘determine the number and character of the different 
causal models that exist among comparable cases’ (Ragin 1987: 167). 
Although QCA is often considered a non-standard method, it is steadily 
gaining ground in comparative research in sociology and political science 
(Rihoux & Ragin 2009).
China’s highest level of administrative division is at the provincial level. 
There are 31 such divisions spread across the country: 22 provinces, 
four municipalities and five autonomous regions. This study examines 
how these 31 divisions decided whether or not to be candidates for 
vertical management pilot regions within China’s broader environmental 
protection system. We regard attempts to apply to become a pilot region 
as a manifestation of policy adoption. By using a mix of statistical and 
qualitative approaches, we identify associations between provincial 
conditions and policy adoption behaviour. The study utilises data from 
official field statistics that present the environmental and social–legal 
conditions of China’s 31 provincial level regions. 
Table 9.2 lists the indicators that were adopted from the statistical analysis, 
and which are used to operationalise the seven conditions of internal and 
external determinants. Problem severity refers to the number of serious 
environmental events or crises within a province. A province is classified 
as having a serious environmental problem that requires urgent attention 
and mitigation if it has experienced more than 10 serious environmental 
events or crises that were criticised by the MEP or which exhibit levels of 
air pollution above pm 2.5≧50μg/m³ (the national standard). 
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The human development index (HDI) is used as an indicator of social 
development and provides a composite statistic of life expectancy, 
education and per capita income indicators. Legal development refers to 
the degree to which public concerns are considered by policymakers, and 
is measured here by the number of local People’s Congress proposals on 
environmental protection issues. Ecological foundation is measured with 
respect to whether there is an ‘ecological’ city, county or district within the 
province. Horizontal competition is measured on the basis of applications 
for pilot regions from neighbouring provinces. The indicator for vertical 
learning is measured by the number of local regulations vis-à-vis central 
government requirements on soil, water and air protection. Finally, 
public participation reflects popular participation in and influence on 
environmental policymaking, and is measured by the number of public 
petitions on environmental protection.
Table 9.2. Variable calibration and sources
Variables Calibration Values Source
PS (problem 
severity)
Serious environmental events 
≧10, PM2 .5 ≧ 50μg/m³
1, or 0 China environmental 
Annual Statistics 2016, 
PM2 .5 rank of 359 cities 
in China in 2016
SD (social 
development)
Human development index 
(HDi) ≧ 0 .70 





Local environment laws or 
regulations ≧ 20 (median)




number of ecological cities, 
counties or districts in the 
province ≧1
1, or 0 List of national ecological 




number of neighbouring 
provinces applying for vertical 
management ≧ 1
1, or 0 MeP website
vL (vertical 
learning)
number of regulations in soil, 
water and air protection in the 
light of central government 
requirement ≧ average
1, or 0 MeP website
PP (public 
participation)
number of petitions on 
environment protection ≧ 
average




Source . Fanrong Meng and Zitai Chen
209
9 . ASSeSSinG THe verTiCAL MAnAGeMenT reForM oF CHinA’S environMenTAL SYSTeM
With regard to coding, there are multiple forms of QCA; however, for this 
study, we used crisp-set QCA (csQCA) in which variables or conditions 
can take only two values. Each case is evaluated according to the presence 
(1) or absence (0) of a condition and outcome, and this information is 
arranged in a truth table (Ragin 1987). QCA is a theory-driven method and 
the selection of conditions depends on the theoretical questions at hand. 
We coded the indicators for seven conditions that have been identified in 
the literature. The coding in csQCA necessarily simplifies the complexity 
of the cases because it uses a binominal scale. Even though the coding is 
binominal, the coding process takes into account the complexities of the 
different conditions.
Analysis and results
The QCA begins with the construction of a ‘truth table’ (Table 9.3) that 
registers the possible determinants expected to affect provinces’ responses. 
For each province in our sample, these factors are recorded in accordance 
with the coding procedures explained above. The truth table is then 
minimised to generate Boolean equations. 
Minimisation consists of a set of logical rules that reduce the complexity 
of the combinations of conditions and outcomes. The objective is to 
eliminate irrelevant factors. In other words, the QCA produces the 
shortest possible description of different constellations of conditions and 
outcomes. We used (fuzzy-set) fsQCA 2.0 software to analyse the truth 
tables (with our crisp-set data) to specify the different combinations of 
conditions linked to the selected outcome, as based on the features of the 
positive cases that consistently distinguish them from the negative cases. 
We further assess the consistency for crisp sets, which is the percentage 
of cases in each row displaying the outcome. Consistency scores of 
either 1 or 0 indicate perfect consistency for a given row. A score of 0.5 
indicates perfect inconsistency. Cases with greater than 0.9 consistency 
are considered likely to be necessary conditions. 
Table 9.3 shows that horizontal competition (HC) has 0.9167 consistency 
and should be considered a necessary condition for a province to apply to 
be a pilot for vertical management of environmental regulation.
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Table 9.3. Truth table
Province VM HC VL PS SD LD PP EF
Beijing 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
Tianjin 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
Hebei 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
Shanxi 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
inner 
Mongolia 
0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0
Liaoning 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1
Jilin 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
Heilongjiang 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
Shanghai 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
Jiangsu 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Zhejiang 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Anhui 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1
Fujian 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
Jiangxi 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1
Shandong 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Henan 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Hubei 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1
Hunan 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
Guangdong 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Guangxi 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
Hainan 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
Chongqing 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0
Sichuan 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1
Guizhou 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1
Yunnan 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0
Tibet 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Shaanxi 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Gansu 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
Qinghai 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ningxia 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
Xinjiang 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1
Consistency 0.9167 0.7500 0.8333 0.8333 0.6667 0.6667 0.7500
Source . Fanrong Meng and Zitai Chen
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We use fsQCA to identify other conditions that are likely to contribute 
to a province’s decision regarding piloting vertical management. This 
software usually presents three possible solutions: (1) a ‘complex’ solution 
that relies only on the positive cases (i.e. only the provinces that applied 
to be pilots) and ignores the counterfactual cases, which generally leads 
to identifying all the conditions that commonly apply to the positive 
cases; (2) a ‘parsimonious’ solution that takes into account all the cases, 
both positive and negative, and identifies the more limited number of 
conditions that apply especially to the positive cases; and (3) ‘intermediate’ 
solutions that take into account the analyst’s additional considerations 
about the plausibility of the two other solutions, including theoretical 
considerations.
The complex solution we identify is a combination of the other 
variables (vertical learning, problem severity, social development, 
legal development,  public participation and ecological foundation). 
The  parsimonious solution focuses only on vertical learning, legal 
development and public participation. While in both cases the consistency 
measure is high (0.8333), it is difficult to fully explain the basis of either 
of the two solutions. Accordingly, while we have not explicitly considered 
additional factors to develop some ‘intermediate’ solution, we have 
examined more specific combinations of the variables and identified two 
possible pathways, both of which reveal total consistency (1.0) and, when 
combined with horizontal competition, offer highly plausible solutions: 
Table 9.4. Truth table final solutions
Raw coverage Unique coverage Consistency
~vL*~PS*~SD*LD*~PP*eF 0 .083333 0 .083333 1 .000000
~vL*PS*SD*~LD*PP*~eF 0 .083333 0 .083333 1 .000000
Solution coverage: 0 .583333
Solution consistency: 0 .875000
* indicates positive intersection with condition, *~ indicates intersection with reverse condition
Source . Fanrong Meng and Zitai Chen
Table 9.4 lists details about the two solutions. Solution consistency 
measures the degree to which membership in the solution (the set of 
solution terms) is a subset of membership in the outcome, which is 
0.875. Solution coverage measures the proportion of memberships in 
the outcome that is explained by the complete solution, which is 0.583. 
Raw coverage measures the proportion of memberships in the outcome 
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explained by each term of the solution, and unique coverage measures 
the proportion of memberships in the outcome explained solely by each 
solution term, excluding memberships that are covered by other solution 
terms (Ragin 2018). Both the raw and unique coverage are low, and we 
discuss the implications further below. 
The first path is a combination of: more horizontal competition, less 
vertical learning, good ecological foundation, less public participation, 
good legal development, poor social development and less problem 
severity. It is likely that such a combination presents a model driven 
by poor  social development, where less severe environmental problems 
and good ecological resources cause lower levels of public pressure on 
environmental issues. The typical case of such a model is Guizhou, 
a  mountainous province in south-east China with rich natural, 
cultural and environmental resources. Compared with other provinces, 
Guizhou  is  relatively poor and economically underdeveloped with 
a nominal GDP for 2015 of 1050.26 billion yuan (US$150.04 billion) 
and per capita GDP of RMB29,847 (US$4,264) (National Bureau 
of Statistics of China 2017). Demographically, it is one of China’s most 
diverse provinces, with ethnic minorities accounting for more than 
37 per cent of the population. 
In such a multi-ethnic region, pursuing social stability and integration is an 
important task for the senior local officials. China’s Constitution and laws 
guarantee equal rights to all ethnic groups and provide priority policies 
to promote ethnic minority groups’ economic and cultural development. 
Under the pressure of a target-oriented responsibility system, which covers 
comprehensive performance indicators in economic, social and ecological 
fields, a common strategy for the local government is to develop their 
strong points and not exacerbate their weaknesses. 
As Guizhou has good environmental resources and an ecological 
foundation, there is less risk politically within the party, administratively 
and with the general public in carrying out new attempts at environmental 
policymaking. There is also a greater likelihood of producing a positive 
outcome and reorganisation through environmental, as opposed to 
economic, policy innovation. Hence, the central performance evaluation 
system is possibly a key factor pushing local senior managers to design 
innovative environmental management strategies and carefully govern 
innovation processes; this may be regarded as a top-down model for 
policy adoption.
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The other path leading to a local government’s policy adoption is 
represented by a mix of more horizontal competition, less vertical 
learning, a poor ecological foundation, more public participation, poor 
legal development, good social development and greater problem severity. 
This depicts a different strategy of policy adoption that is largely driven 
by problem severity and having the resources to address it. The typical 
examples are Shanghai and Jiangsu provinces. Shanghai is the commercial 
and financial centre of China and, since 2011, its total GDP has been 
the highest of all Chinese cities, with per capita GDP of RMB 82,560 
(US$12,784) (Dongfang Daily News 2012). 
Public environmental awareness is growing fast and the city has invested 
in a number of environmental protection projects. On 23 January 2014, 
the municipal government announced that three main measures would 
be taken to manage air pollution in Shanghai, along with surrounding 
Anhui, Jiangsu and Zhejiang provinces. The measures involved delivery 
of the 2013 air cleaning program, a linkage mechanism with the three 
surrounding provinces and improvement of the emergency early 
warning system (CNSTOCK News 2014). The sharp contrast between 
poor ecological protection and rich social development leads to deeper 
public support for and pressure on environmental issues. In this model, 
good social development can provide sufficient financial resources to 
encourage policymakers to pursue greater policy innovation. This is more 
akin to a bottom-up model, given the impetus for innovation does not 
endogenously arise from the leaders themselves.
It is interesting to note that horizontal competition constitutes the single 
necessary condition for policy innovation. This suggests that pressure 
arising from same-level competitors is the chief driver for provinces to 
adopt new policy. The two multiple configurations identified are not 
mutually exclusive but together provide plausible bases for the decisions 
by most provinces. 
They do not, however, provide the full answer. Despite the high 
‘consistency’ score, the analysis reveals a low ‘coverage’ result (0.0833), 
suggesting that other factors not included in the study may be equally, 
or even more, important. It is common in social phenomena, which 
are contingent by nature, to find that additional contextual conditions 
influence policy decisions (Gerrits & Verweij 2013). This study mainly 
considers macro-level factors and does not include micro-level factors, 
such as individual styles of leadership and motivation. For example, 
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the style, tenure, education and work experience of leaders may affect 
their policy decisions and implementation. Thus, an interesting future 
research avenue is to take some micro factors, such as leaders’ attributes, as 
conditions and examine what combinations of these influence the practice 
of certain management strategies.
Discussion
Two general conclusions can be drawn from the above QCA of the 
vertical management pilot region applications of Chinese provinces. First, 
horizontal competition is a key factor that directly influences provincial 
policy adoption. Regardless of how different the internal conditions are, 
the provinces that had applied for the pilot reform possessed similar 
external conditions to neighbouring provinces that had, likewise, 
attempted the reform. Under external pressure, provincial leaders exhibit 
higher levels of motivation and tend to be more inventive in introducing 
new policies to win political arguments. Other jurisdictions tend to follow 
leading provinces that have similar preferences in terms of instruments 
and types of technology (Jordan & Huitema 2014). Massey et al. (2014), 
for instance, observed how external drivers are more prominent across 
Europe in the diffusion of adaptation policies on climate change issues. 
Biesenbender and Tosun (2014) similarly suggest that the adoption 
of climate policies in OECD countries is influenced by learning from 
international organisations, which serves as an external driver. Our study 
also supports these findings within the Chinese context. 
Second, internal factors also influence the policy adoption process. There 
are two main configurations of different conditions: severe environmental 
problems with good social development and lagging legal development in 
environmental issues, or less serious environmental issues and a stronger 
legal foundation but with poor social development. We use the HDI to 
discern the degree of social development. A region scores higher HDI 
when the lifespan, the education level and the GDP per capita is higher. 
It seems that with rapid social and economic development, environmental 
protection has often been ignored, even with respect to legislation. The 
environmental Kuznets curve serves as a reminder of how economic 
development can initially lead to environmental degradation, but also 
how, after a certain level of economic growth, a society can begin to 
improve environmental quality, resulting in lower levels of environmental 
degradation (Mills & Waite 2009). 
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From this viewpoint, China’s provinces need to adopt new methods to 
amend the current model of national development. As such, the pilot 
region applications could suggest new opportunities with regard to 
China’s environmental governance. Stadelmann and Castro (2014) 
demonstrate how higher levels of GDP are positively correlated with the 
adoption of financial instruments, which in turn stand to motivate greater 
policy adoption. Conversely, for lower and middle-income provinces, 
local government pressure can prove to be more important than in higher 
income provinces. Our results also suggest, however, that there may well be 
other factors, not addressed in this study, that affect provincial decisions to 
apply to be a pilot for vertical management of environmental regulation.
Conclusion and prospects
This chapter has demonstrated how policy adoption does not depend 
on a single condition, but can result from a combination of internal 
conditions. Moreover, these configurations differ under certain case-
specific or contextual circumstances. In other words, specific contexts 
may require, for instance, specific combinations of management and 
stakeholder involvement. Indeed, the patterns of policy adoption and 
diffusion, together with the subsequent consequences, warrant more 
attention. Biesenbender and Tosun (2014) have noted how the adoption 
of policies is dominated by learning and emulation from policy practices 
adopted by culturally and politically similar peer countries and that, after 
adoption, countries tend to modify policies again. In light of this, there 
is a need to further link policy content to practical circumstances, and to 
explore the possible (unexpected) consequences or problems associated 
with the emerging vertical management regions.
According to the Guidelines, the vertical management system holds 
the potential to transform the kuai-based set of authority relations to 
one based on centralised management, largely of personnel/budgetary 
allocations (bianzhi), cadre recruitment and allocation (nomenklatura), 
and revenue collection. Here, the channelling of capital happens in a more 
direct fashion. But, more fundamentally, local governments are ultimately 
accountable for environmental quality within their jurisdictions. 
In  other words, greater accountability, clearer articulation of tasks and 
authority, and direct financial and policy support, contributes to reducing 
transaction and management costs among bureaucracies further along the 
line of command and, as such, improves policy efficiency. Certain risks 
and challenges remain, however; for instance, the fragmentation brought 
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about by a vertical management system could undermine local governance. 
This challenge could very well become one of the most urgent problems 
in need of mitigation.
Under the vertical management system, local EPBs below provincial 
level have witnessed a dramatic increase in administrative subordinates 
within their area of direct responsibility, particularly through their ability 
to control personnel and budgetary flows. Local governments can no 
longer directly control personnel, budgetary and related arrangements. 
This potentially represents a significant loss of local government leverage 
over EPBs. Moreover, local EPBs are not created and managed by, or 
responsible to, the corresponding local People’s Congresses. Thus, they do 
not need to be approved by or even report to the local People’s Congress 
about their work. 
National and local laws stipulate, however, that local People’s Congresses 
have supervision authority over the administrative departments within 
a specific locality. At the very least, centrally managed units can act as 
‘blind spots’ for the local People’s Congresses. As centrally managed EPBs 
become more autonomous, their relations with other local administrative 
departments become less important, and a sense of alienation may be 
unavoidable. Effective implementation of environmental policies, 
however, requires coordination between local departments under the 
local EPBs’ direction. In this way, a weakened relationship among 
government departments could give rise to obstacles to cooperation and 
policy enforcement. 
Only through innovations to institutional, legislative and development 
models can China overcome these problems and achieve sustainability 
into the future. The case of vertical management serves as a prime example 
of the politics of power decentralisation and recentralisation, while also 
reflecting the complex principal–agent relationship between China’s 
central and local governments. Based on China’s previous experiences 
in enacting total control policies, the implementation and enforcement 
of environmental regulation has been shown to be better guaranteed by 
cadre evaluation and centralised data management systems (Jin et  al. 
2016). As  a consequence, future effective implementation of vertical 
management depends on three considerations: a ‘top design’ strategy that 
integrates environmental protection reform, a robust evaluation system 
and a well-designed regional development model. 
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Positive examples taken from pilot areas should be encouraged and 
diffused. By the same token, efforts should be made to improve the ‘nuts 
and bolts’ of the country’s evaluation and accountability systems. Indeed, 
the vertical management system could empower local party committees 
and governments to shoulder greater responsibility for environmental 
protection through the implementation of the ‘one position with dual 
responsibilities’ and lifelong accountability systems, which means 
that officials who fail to meet requirements and thereby contribute to 
environmental damage will be identified and not be appointed to other 
important positions or promoted; they may also be held responsible for 
damages even after they have left office. 
As an important local organ of state power, local People’s Congresses 
should also play stronger roles in supervising and ensuring the execution 
of national laws and regulations to avoid the ‘blind spot’ of environmental 
policy implementation. Among the 12 pilot regions, Chongqing 
and Hebei province have taken the lead in publishing documents on 
the vertical management framework for environmental monitoring, 
inspection and enforcement. They have also teased out regulations for 
environmental protection obligations, measures for environmental 
inspection and detailed rules on the accountability of leading party and 
government officials for ecological damage caused. 
Second, centralising the data management system can be an important 
entry point for refining the function and responsibility of environmental 
protection organisations at different levels – from cities and districts to 
counties and townships. The accuracy of environment-related information 
serves as the basis for monitoring, risk assessment, policy evaluation 
and further adjustment. This power should be centralised to upper 
level government agencies to guarantee scientific validity and fairness. 
Some specific functions of the state environmental apparatus, such as 
environmental monitoring and internal inspection, should be further 
appropriated to city EPBs, with these functions mainly serving as a means 
for higher level departments to hold their subordinates accountable. 
District- and county-level EPBs would retain the key functions, such 
as the inspection of industrial facilities, that allow them to enforce 
environmental regulations at the local level, but these functions would be 
derived from national data standards and collections.
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Third, a comprehensive environmental governance network, combined 
with a more powerful incentive structure for public participation, should 
also be established. Greater policy and financial support can help to 
encourage government units, industry, non-government organisations 
and volunteers to contribute more to environmental protection. 
Following from this, publicly accessible information platforms should be 
created to provide information in order to promote public participation 
in policy enforcement. Governance should, therefore, be pushed to be 
more standardised, normalised and legalised (Jin et al. 2016).
In this regard, future research should consider how institutional reform 
relates to other types of policy innovation and contextual factors in 
forming the configurations necessary for effective environmental 
management performance. Answering the question of whether historical 
institutionalism or rational choice is more correct will also require 
additional analysis and theoretical elaboration in this research area. 
Potentially, extending this topic of inquiry towards a longitudinal study 
could offer more insights and possible solutions.
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An exploratory case study on 
informal accountability and policy 
implementation in mainland China
Bo Yan and Jiannan Wu
Introduction
Over the past three decades, mainland China’s pursuit of ‘top-down’ 
strategies when directing local governments to introduce new policies 
has encountered significant ‘wicked’ problems that have inhibited 
improvements in government performance. To address these problems, 
the  18th Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee 
announced an unprecedented comprehensive reform to transform 
governmental functions and invigorate the market, and emphasised 
the importance of strengthening the implementation responsibilities 
of city-level governments.
The difficulties of implementing policy are in part due to deficiencies 
in mainland China’s accountability system, leading some to call for the 
establishment and enforcement of formal accountability (e.g. through 
administrative punishment or sanctions) to encourage local cadres to 
achieve the central government’s policy objectives. In particular, some 
proponents advocate the benefits and necessity of formal accountability 
tools, which may result in the stigmatising of local cadres, with the failure 
DeSiGninG GovernAnCe STruCTureS For PerForMAnCe AnD ACCounTABiLiTY
226
to implement policy ascribed to their misconduct. The adoption of these 
tools could deter irresponsible behaviour and make cadres comply with 
CPC policy implementation.
Formal accountability is not a panacea, however, and in practice is often 
accompanied by specific dilemmas. The approach usually refers to ex post 
facto processes in governance rather than ex ante inputs (Bovens 2007), 
so the accountability mechanism usually means punishment or sanctions 
for those held accountable for their conduct and performance (Behn 2001). 
Punishing the bad and rewarding the good in public sector cadres may 
appear reasonable, but it is difficult to foster unsolicited compliance or 
inspire proactive behaviour ex ante. Further, the accountability paradox 
suggests that strengthening accountability may hinder performance 
improvement or even encourage failure (Chan & Gao 2009).
In fact, the formal accountability mechanism involves the CPC’s 
centralised structure overlaying the state (the executive), the legislature 
and the judiciary, and operating through mainland China’s five levels of 
decentralised government (Podger & Yan 2013). There is no strong evidence 
that this can prevent idle policy implementation, such as ‘implementing 
the essence of a previous meeting by convening the next meeting’. 
The prevailing sluggishness of policy implementation in mainland China 
suggests that some public sector leaders pursue substantive action slowly, 
cautiously waiting for each other to make further progress on specific 
policy implementation. 
In practice, mainland China’s governments do not solely rely on the 
formal accountability system to implement policy. China’s complex 
accountability system differs from the Western system in that it consists 
of formal and informal mechanisms. Much of the reform agenda involves 
addressing wicked public problems characterised by complexity and 
uncertainty, and depends on cross-agency collaboration. 
Government leaders find it difficult to use the formal accountability 
system to coordinate and constrain sectors administered by peer leaders. 
This unsettled situation requires the blurring of formal accountability 
lines and  taking a holistic approach across organisational boundaries 
(Christensen & Lægreid 2016). It also generates more space for informal 
accountability to affect informal behaviour, including networking through 
cross-agency meetings. 
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Government leaders often work to solve wicked problems by establishing 
numerous small leading teams with many meetings at various levels. 
The question arises, therefore, do small leading-team meetings matter for 
policy implementation in mainland China? If so, why do they matter and 
what are the underlying social dynamics behind them? Little is currently 
known about how policy implementation is facilitated by cross-agency 
meetings, or how these shape informal accountability at mainland China’s 
local government level.
To address this gap, this study explores how regular cross-agency meetings 
of a local government can contribute to policy implementation under 
pilot reform in mainland China, from the perspective of informal 
accountability. We use an exploratory case study to identify the key 
elements and ethnographic methods to collect data, which provide the 
empirical evidence for developing a theoretical framework. This case 
offers empirical evidence from mainland China, through which we can 
compare local government policy implementation with the experiences of 
other countries. The research must also extend from a macro-level analysis 
of accountability structure to a micro-level analysis of the subjective 
experiences of the actors involved in a specific accountability relationship 
(Yang & Dubnick 2016). The findings will further the understanding of 
mainland China’s administrative accountability system and its effects, and 
reveal the mechanism of mainland China’s local policy implementation 
from a new perspective.
The article consists of four parts. First, we introduce the research 
background and clarify the research questions. The research design 
of the case study follows, along with a concise description of the case 
itself. We  then take an ethnographic approach to analyse the effects of 
small leading-team meetings, and construct a preliminary framework 
to illustrate the informal accountability involved under the context of 
policy reform. Finally, the conclusion includes a summary of the academic 
contribution and presents implications for practitioners.
Research design
We use a single–case study strategy to investigate the effects of informal 
accountability associated with small leading-team meetings on the 
implementation of complex policy reforms at the local governmental level 
in mainland China. This strategy is particularly relevant when ‘the number 
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of variables of interest far outstrips the number of data points’, and where 
the research questions mainly focus on ‘how’ and ‘why’. The method is 
typically more explanatory than others, and can deal with operational 
links that must be traced over time (Yin 2003).
Despite the obvious weakness of any exploratory case study, it is still an 
effective method of bringing rich qualitative evidence to mainstream 
deductive research. The case need not be representative of a specific 
population (Eisenhardt & Graebner 2007), although it should aim to 
illustrate a broader experience. It provides a snapshot, enabling us to 
illuminate meaningful characteristics of complex phenomena in a real-life 
setting without trying to control the context. For example, Yasuda (2015) 
used a case of failed food safety policy implementation to illustrate China’s 
broad ‘politics of scale’, including central–local conflicts and trade-offs in 
its scale-management framework (Yasuda 2015).
For our selected case, J City’s county-level government (J Gov’t) in 
eastern mainland China, we analysed the small leading-team meetings 
in which pilot reform was discussed. J City is a satellite of Q City, which 
is a provincial-level municipality in terms of its social and economic 
development planning, and thus has considerable fiscal autonomy, 
significantly higher official staffing authority than other municipalities, 
and strong fiscal conditions. Mainland China’s county system has existed 
for two millennia and its boundaries have remained largely intact and, 
as the saying goes, ‘good governance of the whole country depends on 
the counties being well governed’. Of the four levels of sub-national 
government, county-level governments are endowed with wide-ranging 
responsibilities, including comprehensive functions for implementing 
higher level government policies and for initiating and administering 
their own policies (Wu et al. 2017).
Following the guidance of the Q City government, J Gov’t launched 
a comprehensive pilot reform program in August 2013 that covered 
economic, administrative and social affairs. As academic experts invited 
to help J Gov’t implement the reform proposal, we regularly conducted 
field investigations and collected data for the period April 2013 to January 
2014. Ethnographic methods, including participatory observations, 
in-depth interviews and document reviews, were also used to elicit 
findings on the realities of J Gov’t’s practice. We also used textual and 
social network analysis to explore the complex set of relationships and to 
achieve a degree of data triangulation.
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Case description
Context
The pilot reforms of the J Gov’t are commonly regarded as reflecting 
a  particularly active response to the national innovation-driven 
development strategy of the central government. According to the State 
Premier Keqiang Li, ‘Deeper reform is the way forward’, which reveals the 
ambition and willingness of mainland China’s government to promote 
structural reform and to expedite the transition to a sustainable growth 
model, increasingly driven by innovation and consumption rather than 
state-led investment. A combination of policy tools is expected to be 
assembled to help drive regional development, and to strike a better 
balance between the state and the market by offering a more enabling 
business environment and a leaner but effective government.
A key challenge to this ambition is how local government can make 
progress on this grand reform strategy. The model of ‘planning and 
experimentation under hierarchy’ (Heilmann & Melton 2013) suggests 
that it is common practice for higher level government in mainland 
China to provide local governments with both policy safeguards and 
policy discretion to ‘go ahead of the rest and try new things out’. J Gov’t 
was urged to launch comprehensive reform in the name of transforming 
government functions, mainly by focusing on streamlining administration 
and delegating power, strengthening regulation and ensuring better 
provision of public goods and services.
The reform covers 10 policy domains, 41 policy categories and 74 policy 
tasks in total,1 so all of the township-level governments and almost all of 
the principal bureaus in J Gov’t were involved in this policy experiment. 
The leadership team consists of the mayor, one first deputy mayor 
(FDM), and five deputy mayors (DMs). The FDM and DMs are peers 
and each has different duties in assisting the mayor in directing and 
steering subordinates. They are each in charge of managing a number 
1  The 10 policy domains are: removing administrative approval, removing administrative charge, 
removing certification, centralising administrative approval, centralising law enforcement, centralising 
trading, centralising payment, streamlining business registration, normalising management of 
NGOs, and trade and investment facilitation. Corresponding policy tools reconcile the demands 
from National Structural Reform on ‘Streamlining administration and delegating power, strengthening 
regulation, facilitating public goods provision’.
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of the principal bureaus, and coordinating the vertical administrative 
institutions (VAIs). A VAI is a type of bureau directly managed by and 
accountable to the respective central or provincial government bureaus 
rather than city-level government.
For example, J Gov’t has no power to appoint or remove the leadership 
of the Bureau of Quality and Technology Supervision (BQTS) as it is 
a provincial VAI, whereas most of the other bureaus (e.g. the Administrative 
Service Center (ASC) and the Bureau of Human Resources and Social 
Security) are jurisdictional administrative institutions and their personnel 
and fiscal or other vital resources are dependent on J Gov’t. Thus, the 
complex formal accountability structure makes it difficult for the FDM or 
DMs to coordinate each other’s subordinate sectors (whether or not they 
are VAI) as they each have different ‘turf ’ to maintain.
The local cadres, however, recognised the considerable complexity, 
uncertainty and risk associated with the reform and informally expressed 
unwillingness and a lack of ability to promote the reform locally. 
The leaders of J Gov’t were squeezed from above and below in that they 
not only had to conduct the pilot reform in response to the direction 
from Q City, but also had to address the serious concerns and lobbying 
of their subordinates. They feared that, at the beginning of the process, 
‘the more active the reform is, the more passive the individual is’. Many of 
the bureau leaders are middle-level cadres responsible for implementing 
aspects of the reform and reporting progress to the J Gov’t, and they were 
concerned that their leaders were ignoring their bureaus’ tight budgets 
and heavy ongoing duties, along with other obstacles to implementation. 
Even frontline workers who were grassroots cadres in bureaus and 
township-level governments were fearful that the reform was too 
burdensome for them, and some complained that ‘we are incapable 
of getting things done in this timeframe’. They also believed that they 
would be trapped if they made and implemented new policies faster than 
superior agencies (‘The more aggressive the junior staff member is, the 
more embarrassing it will be if their changes are not first endorsed by 
the  higher-up’ ---下动上不动越动越被动). Thus, many local cadres 
were reluctant to implement the reform at the beginning and responded 
slowly to the directive.
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Conduct of reform
To promote and manage the implementation of the pilot policy reform, 
J Gov’t established a small leading team and set up a series of regular 
meetings. The team’s regular weekly or bi-weekly meetings were led by 
the FDM, with chief leaders from 13 selected bureaus constituting the 
core ongoing membership. Representatives of other relevant bureaus 
were invited to these meetings as necessary. In some cases, the CPC party 
secretary of J City, the mayor, the other DMs, and even deputy leaders of 
Q City in charge of corresponding projects, were also invited to attend. 
The FDM was always the de facto moderator of the meetings, delegated by 
the CPC’s standing committee in J City to coordinate almost all bureaus 
involved in the pilot reform.
The meetings were organised to follow a series of steps for each 
explicit reform topic. First, the moderator revealed the problems and 
opportunities associated with policy implementation. Next, the bureau 
in charge of solving a specific problem was required to report on progress, 
provide relevant information and describe analytical investigations. The 
moderator facilitated subsequent dialogue among the meeting members 
who would then make or adjust decisions jointly, or agree to a means of 
conflict resolution for the topic addressed. 
Meetings of this sort generate a policy-mandated network where 
an administrative superordinate actor can impose coordination and 
collaboration on other actors (Saz-Carranza et al. 2016). In this instance 
the FDM, as the meeting moderator, is the superordinate actor who sets 
the rules of the game, and has the unique authority to ask each actor to 
be responsible for their own performance. Moreover, they are obliged 
to follow up on previous decisions and commitments. Unlike meetings 
in private organisations, which usually serve as a venue for accomplishing 
work-related goals (Odermatt et al. 2017), this kind of meeting provides 
the means for displaying each actor’s performance to others and involves 
image-building and other political behaviours. It requires a focus on the 
systematic progress of policy implementation, while also emphasising 
a  shared approach to performance improvement through interaction 
within the network.
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Consequences
The meetings have resulted in an obvious structural change from 
hierarchical management to flattening and networking. J Gov’t’s previous 
formal hierarchical leadership structure has been transformed into 
a network associated with many mutual relationships. Although the small 
leading team is a temporary organisation and the network is ad hoc and 
additional to the formal structure, this change is meaningful. It engenders 
a blurring of lines of accountability, however, and some interactions in 
practice are different from the pre-reform formal line of accountability. 
For example, bureaus such as the ASC and BQTS have clearly become 
core actors within the policy-mandated network rather than of equal 
importance to other peripheral bureaus, as they were before the reform. 
They are now required to be directly accountable to the FDM regardless 
of their original domain or duties.
Consequently, almost all of the tasks required for policy implementation 
were completed by means of this network. The concerns of the local 
cadres before the reform were unfounded, and Q City government and 
higher level agencies admired the pilot reform of J Gov’t. The party 
secretary of J Gov’t was promoted to be one of the main leaders of the 
Q Gov’t soon after the success of the J Gov’t pilot reform. He is regarded 
as representative of how successful policy entrepreneurship can promote 
the transformation of governmental functions. 
Discussion
According to this case analysis, the regular meetings of the small leading 
team have played a vital role in promoting policy implementation under 
the reform launched by J Gov’t. The effects of this kind of management 
action, particularly in the Chinese context, have not been fully explained. 
The informal accountability resulting from the meetings has influenced 
local actors’ behaviour through a combination of mechanisms that 
support the accomplishment of the policy reform’s targets and objectives. 
In the following sections, we elaborate on this informal accountability 
and the  corresponding effects on policy implementation, and draw on 
additional insights to further understand the informal accountability 
dynamics.
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As we observed, the bureaus involved in the small leading-team meetings 
were held accountable to the FDM, who was authorised to coordinate 
them regardless of the formal hierarchical structure that applied before 
the pilot reform. There was little formal agreement, however, on how 
each of the actors was to implement the policies or be held accountable. 
The objectives and the responsibilities of each actor were largely implicit 
and were subject to constant change and refinement, and the dialogue and 
agreement among the meeting members was mainly dependent on the 
moderator’s improvisation and discretion. In addition, the rewards and 
sanctions for success or failure were ambiguous and neither ex ante or ex 
post formal monetary incentives or punishments have been applied so 
far. The interactions across meetings do not only rely on formalised rules, 
but also on being reproduced via informal guanxi such as patron–client 
relations and interpersonal relationships. 
Informal accountability can be distinguished from formal accountability in 
several aspects such as facilitative behaviour, norms, and informal rewards 
and sanctions. First, the meetings exhibited explicit facilitative behaviour 
through relationship building, frequent and ongoing communication, 
information sharing, and recognising and acknowledging responsibility 
for mistakes. This gave public officials a nudge to achieve compliance by 
frequent scrutiny in the meetings. Second, norms refer to the shared values 
or the informal code of conduct among network actors, by which they can 
distinguish between appropriate and inappropriate behaviour in specific 
settings (Romzek et al. 2012), such as weekly meetings. An obvious 
norm derives from the fact that the local cadres involved in pilot reform 
were concerned about the legitimacy of their conduct. Finally, informal 
rewards and sanctions were key components of informal accountability 
in this study, along with the meetings. Instead of additional bonuses, 
career promotions or punishments, informal rewards and sanctions 
were revealed and concealed through the subtle and intricate gestures of 
meeting members. 
As described, uncertainty and risk aversion made local officials reluctant 
to pursue policy implementation before the pilot reform. In essence, 
these officials exhibit two types of behavioural characteristics. First, 
they worried about the additional workload associated with the reform. 
In China’s centralised institutional system, it is difficult to avoid this lack 
of sustainable incentives and to achieve the corresponding commitment. 
Through the series of meetings, however, these rational actors decided 
to collaborate and proceed with the policy implementation. As noted, 
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evidence shows that informal accountability, incorporated in the small 
leading team meetings and supported by interpersonal ties, has contributed 
to the success of J Gov’t pilot reform during the policy implementation 
process. This innovative approach ensured the success of their endeavour.
Compared with the subsequent comprehensive reform across mainland 
China that took place one year later, the pilot reform enacted by J Gov’t 
displayed proactive and exploratory initiatives, which demonstrate 
the feasibility of and the possible barriers to conducting reform. This 
exploratory case study provides a unique insight into the institutional logic 
behind the actions of Chinese local government in response to the ongoing 
reform directed from the top down. Our analysis shows that informal 
accountability, consisting of informal facilitative behaviour, norms, and 
sanctions and rewards, can contribute significantly to reinforce motivation 
and build capacity in local actors. Regular cross-sectoral meetings play 
a key role through informal accountability and encourage local cadres to 
meet their reform responsibilities in the local political arena.
Conclusion
This study extends previous research on policy implementation by 
focusing on a distinct organisational phenomenon: the meetings of 
a small leading team to promote pilot reform. We derive preliminary 
findings from an exploratory case study in mainland China. First, this 
reveals that local government leadership can successfully utilise informal 
accountability generated by regular meetings authorised to promote the 
policy implementation. This type of meeting cultivates a networking and 
holistic approach among multiple bureaus, involving interaction and 
joint decision-making, where the broad reform goals have been specified 
and implemented by local government mandate.
The case of J Gov’t’s pilot reform provides a specific example of 
comprehensive administrative reform in mainland China today. 
As a pioneer of this round of reform, J Gov’t provides a positive example 
for other local governments to implement reform. J Gov’t was prudent 
and smart to comply with directions from superior agencies while making 
the policy implementation feasible in practice. The example offers two 
lessons when finding a solution to difficult-to-implement problems. First, 
it is essential to select leaders with qualities of perseverance and political 
wisdom, who can reinforce the motivations of subordinates and build 
235
10 . MeeTinGS MATTer
up organisational capacity to complete tasks adroitly. Second, effective 
meetings provide a political arena for designing, implementing and 
evaluating several policy issues before scaling-up the local experiment. 
These lessons contribute to the understanding of how to promote ongoing 
comprehensive reform.
Inevitably, this study has significant limitations. While the case study 
approach is an effective strategy for developing a theory, this method 
does not allow the theory to be tested for more general application. This 
exploratory study, however, demonstrates a local government behavioural 
pattern when responding to the advocacy and requirements of the 
3rd  Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee. Alternative 
patterns for promoting policy implementation under the reform may 
be applicable, and thus further comparative and quantitative studies 
are required.
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REGIME OF PUBLIC 
GOVERNANCE IN TAIWAN
From enhancing implementation 
to improving bureaucratic 
responsiveness1
Bennis Wai Yip So
Introduction
This chapter provides an overview of the developmental stages that have 
led to the application of performance-related management to government 
and examines performance movements in Taiwan through a critical 
review of the evolution of its performance regime as an institution of 
public governance, moving from the authoritarian era to the democratic 
one. This experience is compared to that of Anglophone countries. Taking 
advantage of and expanding on the insight from the performance regime 
framework offered by Colin Talbot (2008, 2010), this chapter explores the 
institutional context of performance movements in Taiwan and thereby 
identifies how various performance interventions were developed to steer 
public sector performance.
1  This study is sponsored by the Ministry of Science and Technology of Taiwan (NSC 102-2410- 
H004-163-MY2).
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Taiwan’s performance movements have their roots in the Kuomintang’s 
rule of mainland China and paralleled those of Anglophone countries; 
however, Taiwan’s path, agenda and institutions were unique, despite 
being influenced by the concurrent Anglophone development trend. 
The author argues that Taiwan experienced three waves of performance 
development, where the emphasis was initially on enhancing the capacity 
to implement development programs before gradually moving to building 
up bureaucratic responsiveness to the citizenry in public service delivery. 
The institutional context and its implications for the performance regime 
should be viewed in light of its developmentalism and paternalism. 
Democratisation then multiplied accountability holders and reshaped 
and complicated the original institutional context.
Although Western performance management models, including new 
public management (NPM), have diffused into Taiwan, this represents 
an instrumental learning intended to help the country realise its own 
purpose rather than simply a convergence with the Western path. Three 
specific shifting techniques of performance interventions, which combine 
local and  foreign wisdom, have been identified: tracked monitoring, 
achievement/performance evaluation, and for-the-people service/quality 
management. These interventions were adopted to varying degrees 
in response to the aforementioned shifting emphasis on bureaucratic 
responsiveness.
These points are illustrated in this chapter through a historical review 
of the development of the Research, Development and Evaluation 
Commission (RDEC) – a ministry-level agency in charge of performance-
related management – and a snapshot of the performance evaluation 
of social welfare programs. In the following sections, a modified 
version of Talbot’s performance regime will be first presented as an 
analytical framework and,  subsequently, the institutional context and 
the performance interventions adopted in Taiwan will be examined to 
facilitate a comparison with the experience of Anglophone countries. 
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A modified version of the performance 
regime framework
Studies of public sector performance are weakened if the focus is 
exclusively on the measurement and reporting of the performance 
of public organisations without considering the complicated public 
governance domain in which they operate. Talbot (2008, 2010) suggests 
that the unit of analysis should be expanded beyond the organisational 
level to encompass factors outside and around an organisation that may 
influence its performance. A performance regime, as an umbrella concept, 
has been raised to realise such a macro perspective. 
Talbot’s ‘performance regime’, as a framework, is composed of two 
elements: institutional context and performance interventions. 
Institutional context refers to the ‘institutional environment’ of individual 
public organisations, but Talbot uses the term in reference to institutional 
actors that steer the performance of these organisations. In the United 
Kingdom, apart from state institutions such as central and line ministries, 
the legislature and judicial bodies, these actors also consist of professional 
associations and user organisations (Talbot 2010: 92–96). This forms a web 
of principal–agent relations with accountability arrangements between 
the actors and the public organisations, wherein the organisations must, 
to varying degrees and in varying ways, respond to these actors. 
‘Performance interventions’ refers to any means and action taken by 
institutional actors to influence performance, including performance 
contracts, targets and standards. Further, taking the UK Government’s 
approach as an example, its model of interventions contains not 
only top-down performance management but also market-incentive 
mechanisms, the participation of users, and the capability and capacity 
building of public organisations. These four functions are officially 
claimed to spur ‘better public services for all’ (Talbot 2010: 102).
This chapter follows this framework to examine the case in Taiwan, 
but the author utilises the ‘institutional environment’ definition of 
‘institutional context’, which not only focuses on institutional actors 
and the complexity of accountability arrangements but also takes into 
account the state–society relationship, as well as the ideas and purposes 
behind performance steering. This definition is especially relevant to 
countries with non-democratic and non-Western settings. For instance, 
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when the aim of performance steering for the United Kingdom is claimed 
to promote ‘better public services for all’, this is not necessarily the case 
for other countries, even when they have adopted the same instrument. 
Moreover, the performance movements of Anglophone countries should 
not be considered as a wholly static process (van Dooren et al. 2015).
Institutional context: A comparison with 
Anglophone countries
Performance movements in Anglophone countries
According to a historical review by van Dooren et al. (2015),2 Anglophone 
countries have witnessed eight performance movements since the 
20th  century. These movements can be clustered into three periods: 
1)  three between 1900 and the 1940s; 2) two in the 1950s to  1970s; 
3) three in the 1980s to 2010s. They can also be grouped into two 
orientations: policy and management. 
The emergence of the social survey movement (policy), scientific 
management and the science of administration (management), and cost 
accounting (management) in the early 20th century are identified as the 
earliest attempts at informing, understanding and standardising public 
performance. The rise of performance budgeting (management) in the 
postwar era further indicated the state’s intention to build a mechanism 
of financial accountability. 
The parallel effort of collecting social data for evaluating the development 
impact on society generated the social indicators movement (policy) 
in the 1960s. Fiscal hardship in the 1980s generated the well-known 
NPM movement (management) that subsequently spurred the evidence-
based policy movement (policy) in the 1990s, which prescribes that 
facts and figures on outcomes rather than ideologies or opinions 
should inform policymaking. The latest movement was revisionism 
(management). It witnessed the revision of the financial and performance 
framework in the 2010s that further emphasised the use of performance 
information and tried to integrate it into accountability, budgeting and 
management processes.
2  An earlier version of the review can be found in van Dooren (2008).
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Despite Anglophone countries experiencing more than 100 years of 
development, van Dooren et al. (2015) argue that the basic ideas of 
performance management are stable. This point is exemplified by the case 
of the New York Bureau of Municipal Research (NYBMR), which was 
already engaged in performance measurement in the early 20th century, 
with many features consistent with the contemporary version 
(see Williams 2003). What has changed is the technological advancement 
that helped materialise ideas and improve measurement, as well as the 
increase in institutionalisation and professionalisation of performance 
information usage. 
Another aspect of stability noted by van Dooren et al. (2015) is that the 
policy and management orientations coexisted rather than rotated during 
each period. The process of the movements, however, reflected a pendulum 
swing between the strategies of depoliticisation and politicisation. The first 
wave of the movements was to separate politics from administration 
(e.g. scientific management), while the movements concerning budgetary 
reforms demonstrated the intention of political executives to exercise 
control over administration. The promotion of an evidence-based policy 
movement appears to depoliticise policymaking (van Dooren 2008). 
The  increasing significance of enhanced fiscal accountability as a core 
aim of the performance movements in Anglophone countries should also 
be noted.
Background of Taiwan’s performance movements
Taiwan has its own storyline of performance movements, albeit under the 
shadow of Anglophone countries. This story can be traced back to the 
Kuomintang’s rule in mainland China during the Second Sino-Japanese 
War (1937–45), when the idea of performance management was initiated 
and experimented with. We can see its continuance in Taiwan, where all 
government agencies dedicate a unit (or at least a staff member for street-
level agencies) to address tasks concerning performance management. 
Since the establishment of the RDEC under the Executive Yuan 
(the highest authority of the state’s executive branch) in 1969 (reshuffled 
into the National Development Council (NDC) in 2014), this function 
has been known as ‘research and evaluation’ (R&E). Local governments 
duplicate this setting and all special municipalities have an RDEC for 
R&E tasks. Without an RDEC, a county-level government assigns R&E 
tasks to a staff agency, usually a planning bureau.
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The establishment of R&E agencies/units and functions in Taiwan’s 
governments arose from an administrative reform to enforce the idea of 
the administrative trinity system (ATS), coined by Chiang Kai-shek, the 
then supreme leader of Kuomintang and China, in 1940. This can be 
considered the first modern reform in China to focus on the topic of 
‘administration’. Why ‘administration’? Because Chiang was discontented 
with the poor enforcement of national policies at the time. In his seminal 
address to present the ATS concept, titled ‘Principles of administration: 
an outline of the administrative trinity system’, on 1 December 1940, 
Chiang defined the principles of administration as implementing political 
orders (Chiang 1954: 1).
He further noted that the most serious defect in China’s politics at the 
time was a shortage of talent to conscientiously enforce these orders 
(Chiang 1954: 2). In another address to a cadre training class on 
6 December 1940, Chiang attributed poor performance to ‘the absence 
of a well-established supervision system and the failure to develop precise 
and practical evaluation methods’. In addition, the problem also lay in 
the ‘disconnection between implementation and planning’. Overall, his 
diagnosis was that planning, implementation and evaluation (supervision) 
were not well linked. The ATS aimed to effectively connect these three 
parts (RDEC 1989a: 5). In this regard, the ATS was policy-oriented, 
especially concerning the enforcement of policy or implementability that 
was supposed to be enhanced by using evaluation or monitoring tools. 
The evaluation in turn provided feedback for planning purposes.
Chiang’s initiative can be considered a Chinese version of Woodrow 
Wilson’s Study of Administration (1887). This Chinese version did not, 
however, call for developing a field of administration that ‘[lay] outside 
the proper sphere of politics’ (Wilson 1887: 210), which later evolved 
into the notion of a politics–administration dichotomy. What Chiang 
contributed, rather, was his identification of distinct functions between 
politics and administration and his calling for the development of the 
talent of administration.
This initiative was not followed by the establishment of a politically neutral 
civil service. Interestingly, the then prevailing scientific management 
movement also appealed to Chiang, but it was promoted not only to 
enhance administrative efficiency but also to serve in building the nation 
and to establish an ‘omnipotent government’ (RDEC 1989a: 10, 35, 90). 
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In this sense, for Chiang, an administration equipped with scientific 
management was only an extension of politics for the state-led purpose 
of development.
During the period from 1941 to 1947, two institutions were established 
to realise the concept of the ATS. One was the Central Planning Bureau 
(CPB) and the other was the Party–Government Work Evaluation 
Commission (PWEC). The CPB took charge of the state’s general policy 
planning and examination of political and economic development plans 
of party–government agencies; the PWEC took charge of the evaluation 
of the performance of party–government agencies. The new institutions 
had a limited impact during the wartime era. 
Despite the failure of the reform, prototypes for many R&E practices 
advocated by Chiang in his ATS address were already sprouting and were 
later transplanted into Taiwan. The Rules of Evaluation of Party–Government 
Works, promulgated in June 1941, stipulated how an evaluation exercise 
for government agencies should be conducted. The evaluation involved 
reviewing written work reports and an annual site visit. The rules already 
required work reports to present statistical data that would help project the 
work’s progress. An agency’s evaluation report was expected to compare its 
performance with that of the previous year.
Cross-agency performance comparison was expected to be conducted 
for subsequent sanctions and rewards (PWEC 1941). To further 
realise the ATS, in 1943, all party–government agencies were required 
to establish a Planning and Evaluation Committee for performance 
management. Moreover, to enhance work efficiency and skill, agencies 
were encouraged to organise various job competitions (Li 1953: 202–04). 
The aforementioned practices appear surprisingly similar to the concept 
of a ‘competitive government’, which was advocated in one of the major 
NPM works, Reinventing Government (Osborne & Gaebler 1992).
During the war, the ATS had already embraced the principles of 
contemporary performance management, such as in the case of the 
NYBMR. Its lack of impact was due to the absence of techniques and 
practical skills to fulfil the given principles. However, learning and transfer 
of knowledge was not undertaken until the Kuomintang’s rule in Taiwan.
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The R&E system in Taiwan
The CPB and the PWEC were abolished after the enforcement of the 
constitution of the Republic of China in 1947. The fall of the Kuomintang’s 
rule on the mainland in 1949 further suspended the development of the 
ATS. The émigré regime in Taiwan relaunched the evaluation exercise in 
the name of ‘achievement evaluation’ as early as 1951, but administrative 
reforms were not salient in the first years of its rule on the island. Indeed, 
an across-the-board administrative re-engineering was not launched until 
the end of 1966, when Chiang ordered the Executive Yuan to carry out 
a thorough administrative overhaul. He further suggested that each party–
government organ should establish a research unit to study methods of 
improving their management operations and of utilising monitoring 
and evaluation for improvement (RDEC 1989a: 179–80). Chiang’s idea 
was later crystallised into the founding of the RDEC in March 1969 
and subsequently into other R&E agencies or units in central and local 
government agencies.
The founding of this staff agency marked a new attempt to realise the ATS. 
The RDEC, to a large extent, combined the functions of the CPB and the 
PWEC. From the perspective of its institutional context, in addition to 
the basic principal–agent relationship between levels in the administrative 
hierarchy, from June 1969 the RDEC, together with the Council for 
Economic Planning and Development (CEPD) and the National 
Science Council (NSC) (both being ministry-level agencies under the 
Executive Yuan), formed a systemic monitoring mechanism to respectively 
oversee performance in three functional areas: administration, economic 
development, and science and technology development. The RDEC played 
the role of coordinator among the three oversight institutions. Moreover, 
the RDEC was the government’s think tank, conducting research on 
administrative reforms and taking charge of various reforms concerning the 
overall performance improvement of government agencies.
The RDEC, as well as other R&E units affiliated with various agencies, 
formed nodes for coordination with external accountability holders, 
including the Legislative Yuan (the national legislature) and the Control 
Yuan (the state supervision organ). The R&E agencies/units at various 
levels of government were assigned to help follow up on the concerns and 
issues raised by state organs and to issue timely responses (see Figure 11.1). 
In this regard, tracked monitoring became the first important instrument 
for exercising top-down implementation control. (Further details are 
provided in the next section.)
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1.  Reshuffled into National Development Council
     in 2014.
2.  Renamed Ministry of Sciene and Technology.
3.  Merged into National Development Council
     in 2014.





Figure 11.1. Performance regime of Taiwan
Source . Bennis Wai Yip So
With Wei Yung, a US-trained professor of political science, assuming the 
role of minister of the RDEC in 1976, the function of the RDEC further 
expanded, especially in terms of capacity building of the government. This 
included strengthening comprehensive and long-term policy planning and 
introducing computer and office automation technology to government 
offices. Foreign impact became increasingly manifest during his 12-year 
ministership. US public administration and policy science and its state-
of-the-art policy research techniques (e.g. the use of opinion polls) were 
transferred to Taiwan. This second wave of performance movements 
remained policy-oriented (Wei 2004); for instance, policy implementation 
remained a focus point for the RDEC’s research up to the early 1990s 
(RDEC 1994). Furthermore, under the authoritarian setting, the learning 
was instrumental in strengthening the state’s capacity and the rationale of 
policymaking, even though the for-the-people service had been instigated 
at this stage. (Further details are provided in the next section.) 
The RDEC was a powerful arm of the Executive Yuan before 
democratisation, directly monitoring and shaping the performance of 
government agencies nationwide. The Executive Yuan also assigned the 
RDEC ad hoc tasks to settle various public policy issues and bureaucratic 
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conflicts, exemplified by its effort to help integrate scattered health 
insurance systems, which had been developed or overseen by various 
government departments, into a uniform system in the early 1990s 
(RDEC 1996). However, the RDEC has never extended into the financial 
domain to become a super ministry. Hence, its authority is somewhat 
different from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in the 
United States.
In general, the role of the RDEC can be compared to a ‘technostructure’ 
of the ‘machine bureaucracy’ under the structural configurations of Henry 
Mintzberg (1979). The technostructure is located between the ‘strategic 
apex’ at the top and the ‘operating core’ at the bottom, but it is not part 
of ‘middle line’ management and lies outside the basic flow of operating 
work. The technostructure serves as an analytical unit to standardise 
the work of other units and to apply analytical techniques that help 
organisations adapt to their environment.
During the democratisation process of the 1990s, in the third wave of 
performance movements, the RDEC’s power gradually declined in 
parallel with ebbing authoritarianism. Workload pressures on the RDEC 
also entailed the concentration of its functions on key missions. The rise 
of local autonomy made local governments more accountable to the local 
people than to the central government. The RDEC thus repositioned 
itself as a facilitator of administrative reforms. Government agencies were 
required to monitor their performance with pre-existing management 
tools, except for those issues and policies spotlighted by the central 
government.
The RDEC/NDC only provided incentives to improve performance 
(such as offering government service awards) and started promoting the 
use of performance information for indicator setting. A former minister 
of the RDEC told the author that the RDEC/NDC is now engaged 
in ‘coordination rather than control, service rather than tracking’. 
The machine  bureaucracy has been transformed into a  ‘divisionalised 
form’ of structure whereby the central government only designs the 
overall performance control system and local governments have  their 
own technostructure to steer the performance of their agencies 
(Mintzberg 1979: 390).
247
11 . THe PerForMAnCe reGiMe oF PuBLiC GovernAnCe in TAiWAn
Furthermore, the concept of NPM diffused into Taiwan and the 
performance movement appeared more management-oriented. 
The  notion of direct responsiveness to the public was introduced. The 
RDEC promoted a customer-oriented total quality management 
approach that required frontline agencies to develop diverse, tailor-made 
services for their communities. After the Democratic Progressive Party’s 
(DPP) assumption of power in 2000, the government further revamped 
the outmoded year-end achievement evaluation into a performance 
evaluation by imitating the Government Performance and Results Act 
1993 of the United States, associating the ex post facto evaluation with 
performance indicators set under an ex ante strategic plan. Performance 
evaluations outside the domain of the RDEC now also adopt a similar 
model. Despite the imitation, this wave of performance movements was 
less driven by fiscal restraint in Taiwan than was the case in the United 
States, even though performance-based budgeting was adopted (Lee & 
Wang 2009).3 This can be partially explained by the fact that the RDEC/
NDC has never taken charge of or overseen a budget and finances, unlike 
the OMB. After two ruling-party turnovers in 2008 and 2016 and the 
restructuring of the Executive Yuan in the early 2010s, the basic structure 
of the performance regime has, to date, remained intact. 
Shifting techniques of performance 
interventions
The emergence of the performance regime can be reviewed by considering 
the transformation of performance interventions. The following does not 
describe all the tools adopted but examines a selection of those major 
tools that illustrate the shifting focuses of accountability relationships and 
the impact of foreign developments. 
Tracked monitoring
As noted earlier, tracked monitoring was the first instrument used for 
performance management. It contains self-developed procedures to 
ensure the implementation of policy programs or orders and can be 
compared to a form of ‘process evaluation’ (Weiss 1998). Any policy 
3  The evaluation of budgetary performance in Taiwan mainly measures the spending ratio; it does 
not have any practices for cutback management or savings.
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program, public issue, official resolution (including the ruling party’s 
during the authoritarian era) and assignment by higher up authorities, 
can be identified as a target for tracked monitoring. Priorities are set for 
various targets. Higher level R&E agencies track key targets, while the 
agency-in-charge self-monitors the non-key targets and regularly reports 
on progress. The attainment of these targets under tracked monitoring 
are counted in the year-end achievement/performance evaluation. Since 
2001, targets have been classified into three levels in accordance with their 
significance: Executive Yuan, ministry and sub-ministry. Those classified 
into the Executive Yuan level are tracked by the RDEC. The R&E units 
affiliated with the respective ministries or the agencies-in-charge track 
the remainder. 
Tracked monitoring is not simply a control function and was originally 
considered a method to facilitate the implementation of development 
projects. In its earliest practice, the RDEC transplanted some US enterprise 
management techniques, such as management by objective and program 
evaluation and review techniques, into the executive agencies during the 
process of tracked monitoring (Wei 1986: 2–3). This contributed to the 
Ten Major Construction Projects in the 1970s (RDEC 1980: 73–88). 
In  addition, once a program or project encountered a bottleneck, the 
RDEC would be directly engaged in problem-solving and sending 
officers to the site to help settle problems. It was especially effective for 
resolving issues involving inter-agency coordination and excessive red 
tape. Chiang’s ATS address promoted such site visits for monitoring work 
progress (Chiang 1954: 40). 
The procedures of tracked monitoring remain in use even now; however, 
its positive effects and impacts have been challenged and questioned 
in the democratisation era due to a growing formalism that does not 
adequately report actual performance (Tsao 1999). Recently, frontline 
officials reportedly condemned the procedures as time-wasting paperwork 
(Yu Kai 2016).
From achievement to performance evaluation
If tracked monitoring is a process evaluation, then the achievement/
performance evaluation is an outcome evaluation. It is a year-end 
organisation-based evaluation that assesses the overall performance of 
government agencies. Its origin can be traced back to the evaluation 
exercise promoted during the Kuomintang’s rule on the mainland. 
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The version in Taiwan, originally called ‘achievement evaluation’, was 
launched in 1951 and managed by the secretariat of the Executive Yuan. 
The RDEC took over the exercise from its launch and conducted it in 
collaboration with the CEPD; the NSC; the Directorate-General of 
Budget, Accounting and Statistics (DGBAS) (the state organ for fiscal 
control); and the Directorate-General of Personnel Administration 
(DGPA) (the state personnel agency). 
The performance scrutiny originally involved a written report and a site 
visit, but the site visit was only carried out once because of the time and 
resources that it consumed. From 1971, the evaluation exercise mainly 
focused on the targets of tracked monitoring (RDEC 1999a: 101–02), 
and a site investigation was conducted if necessary. In this early period, the 
assessment was descriptive and subjective. Agencies received comments 
on their performance but were not privy to their rating grade (Ho 1993). 
In the 1990s decentralisation promoted self-monitoring of performance 
and the evaluation exercise only focused on the targets prioritised by the 
Executive Yuan. Personnel and fiscal performances were separately and 
respectively assessed by the DGBAS and the DGPA (RDEC 1999a). 
During this stage, an incentive system was introduced in which the 
evaluation result would incur a reward or penalty imposed on the officials-
in-charge (Ho 1993). 
Since the accession to power of the DPP in 2000, the evaluation has been 
renamed a ‘performance evaluation’ and it is linked with key performance 
indicators set by agencies, with common targets shared by all agencies, 
such as achieving at least the cost cutting of a service, service-standard 
promotion or customer satisfaction (Chang 2004). The evaluation is more 
quantitative and result-oriented and involves independent scholars and 
experts, and the evaluation report and result is disclosed to the public. 
This laid down a foundation of ‘accountability for performance’; however, 
the performance information has not attracted much attention from the 
Legislative Yuan. Legislators do not take it into account in their budget 
review because the budget allocation remains a consequence of political 
bargaining rather than rational analysis (Chang 2013).
Despite the poor use of performance information arising from the RDEC’s 
evaluation exercise, the practices of evaluation have diffused into other 
domains and have had a substantial effect. For instance, the performance 
evaluation of social welfare programs since 2001 has been conducted with 
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a similar model and helps project a complicated institutional context 
under democratisation. This annual exercise to assess the performance of 
social welfare programs run by local governments involves a written report 
and a site visit. In light of the burden involved, however, since 2005, the 
site visit has only been carried out in alternate years.
Various central government agencies manage this evaluation, including 
the Ministry of Health and Welfare, DGBAS and the National Treasury 
Administration. For the site visit, evaluation teams are sent to each local 
government for one day to scrutinise their self-evaluation reports and, 
if necessary, to question the officer in charge. The evaluation teams are 
composed of officials from the central government agencies in charge of 
the relevant policy, as well as scholars and delegates from social welfare 
organisations. They examine the self-evaluation report and rate every 
item in accordance with given performance rating criteria. At the end of 
the process, the performance grades of all local governments are publicly 
released. Those local governments whose aggregate scores are less than 80 
(full score: 100) suffer a cut in their general grant allocated by the central 
government.
The setting of performance indicators is not solely determined by 
the central government agencies. Review committees are formed for 
formulating the indicators for different dimensions of social welfare. 
All  committees are composed of delegates from central government 
agencies, social welfare organisations and local governments, and scholars. 
They make adjustments to indicator settings for each exercise based on 
majority rule. The formulation of performance indicators resembles 
a participatory process, with all players able to shape the mechanism used. 
This results in a complicated stakeholder evaluation model that multiplies 
those to whom local governments are held accountable. Although local 
implementers can participate in the formulation of indicators, they are 
held accountable not only to the central government (vertically) but also 
to other stakeholders (horizontally).
From for-the-people service to quality 
management
If the ex post facto performance evaluation continues, to a large extent, 
responding to higher up authorities, a complementary approach to 
introducing the ‘for-the-people service’ was supposed to enhance 
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responsiveness to the general public. The idea of for-the-people service 
was put forward by the then newly appointed premier Chiang Ching-kuo 
(son and successor of Chiang Kai-shek) in 1972, and it was enacted by 
the RDEC during the ministership of Wei Yung. A special taskforce under 
the RDEC was formed to hasten the service improvement of frontline 
agencies, especially in terms of streamlining administrative procedures 
(RDEC 1999b: 23–26). Note that there was no causality between the 
idea of for-the-people service and democracy. What Chiang wanted to 
promote was an ideal attitude of public servants towards the public that, 
he thought, should be ‘like parents treating their own children with 
a  benevolent heart’ (Ministry of Civil Service 1986: 56). In this vein, 
we should consider it a sort of ‘Chinese-style paternalism’.
Wei realised Chiang’s new order by accounting for public opinion 
(collected from an opinion poll) through an instrument of ‘system 
analysis’, but he defined for-the-people service as ‘government making 
use of its resources, manpower and policies to maximise the welfare 
for [the] majority of the people … [through] enhancing administrative 
efficiency, streamlining legal and administrative procedures’ (Wei 1987: 
56). This seems an elite-driven ‘welfare economics approach’ to judging 
what the people’s wellbeing should be.
The idea of total quality management diffused into Taiwan in the mid-
1990s, transforming for-the-people service into a ‘program for enhancing 
total service quality’ in 1996. The notion of customer orientation was thus 
introduced. Subsequently, the Service Quality Award of the Executive 
Yuan (1998–2007), Government Service Quality Award (2008–16), and 
Government Service Award (2017– ) were organised by the RDEC/NDC 
to encourage government agencies to actively improve their services. This 
practice is, to a certain extent, similar to the Beacon Scheme for local 
governments in the United Kingdom (Radnor 2009), which aims to 
disseminate best practices by encouraging applications for the award. 
Different from for-the-people service, quality management now requires 
the participation of frontline officials in devising innovative services and 
directly responding to the public, whereas for-the-people services were 
devised by external experts, with recommendations subsequently 
forwarded to the agencies for adoption (RDEC 1989b: 23).
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Discussion and conclusion
At first glance, the performance movements of Anglophone countries and 
Taiwan are similar, especially in recent NPM-styled reforms and Taiwan’s 
performance interventions have not gone beyond the UK Government’s 
approach. This is not, however, simply a diffusion of the Anglophone 
experience into Taiwan, albeit with explicit instrumental learning and 
sharing of similar rhetoric. Both have worked in tandem with each other, 
and Taiwan has its own path, agenda and institutions. 
First, the root of the movements was locally generated, and some 
fundamental notions behind the performance regime and means of 
performance interventions stem from the Kuomintang’s rule in Mainland 
China, such as the policy-oriented ATS and the practice of performance 
evaluation exercises. Interestingly, certain basic ideas resemble the 
contemporary performance movement. This coincidence may reflect 
some universal principles of performance interventions. 
Despite this coincidence, Taiwan’s performance movements have 
proceeded in a unique context, in terms of a transition from an 
authoritarian regime to a democracy. This demonstrates the different 
demands of performance management that led to an alternative path 
to that of Anglophone countries, which sheds light on the performance 
regime of other transitional states, especially Communist China. 
Taiwan has experienced three waves of performance movements since the 
founding of the RDEC. These movements gradually shifted from a policy 
to a management orientation. Implementation was the first concern and 
it underscored the state’s intention to build up the function of vertical 
accountability through process controls during the authoritarian era. 
Incessant renovations of ex post facto evaluation during the first two 
waves of movements, albeit less significant, realised the same function 
as outcome evaluation, but its transformation into an NPM-styled 
performance evaluation after 2000 has turned it into a function of public 
accountability. The rise of for-the-people service during the second wave 
of movements marked the first attempt at building public accountability 
during the late authoritarian era. The third wave’s encouragement of 
innovation in frontline service through quality management further 
hastened direct bureaucratic responsiveness to the public. 
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In terms of the agenda, however, the movements were less fiscally 
driven and did not serve any purpose of depoliticisation, unlike in 
the Anglosphere counterparts and some Western European countries 
where professionalisation, in terms of developing neutral competence 
and professional autonomy, was a critical element (Kearney & Sinha 
1988; Farazmand 1997; Peters & Pierre 2004). Taiwan’s movements 
only expanded the bureaucrats’ political responsiveness, with the ruling 
party responding directly to the public. It seems that the performance 
movements during the transition from authoritarianism to democracy 
have not passed through a process of depoliticisation. 
Furthermore, Taiwan started its performance movement with the purpose 
of establishing an ‘omnipotent government’, which is a catch-up form 
of developmentalism engaged in by a developing country, but also a sort 
of state paternalism. This legacy is apparent today, even though Taiwan’s 
democratic governments have never resurrected this symbol or slogan. 
State interventionism sponsored by developmentalism and paternalism 
has been sustained and further upheld under the enhanced legitimacy of 
democracy, especially as Taiwan has experienced an economic recession 
since the beginning of the 21st century.4 
Lastly, Taiwan established a unique performance regime, in terms of the 
R&E system that sprang from the authoritarian regime and continued to 
evolve during democratisation. The RDEC/NDC and other R&E units 
have been playing the role of performance coordinators between executive 
agencies, decision-making bodies and other oversight institutions. Their 
powerful role in monitoring and directing performance in the authoritarian 
era, however, has faded. Now, the R&E system offers instruments and 
incentives to agencies to improve performance. 
The system remains the key engine that triggers administrative 
reforms, even though it is less connected with the fiscal aspect. To be 
sure, democratisation has complicated the institutional context of the 
performance regime, especially with the increased engagement of various 
stakeholders in performance management. This phenomenon is still 
evolving. Further research is warranted for inquiring into its consequences. 
4  Taiwan is considered to be one of East Asia’s ‘developmental states’ in which a high degree of state 
interventionism spurred its economic takeoff during the authoritarian era (Wade 1990; Vartiainen 
1999). Despite the growth of neoliberalism since democratisation, the state attempted to maintain 
the statist approach to development, despite its lack of success (Chu 2002; Wong 2006). When the 
thesis of illiberal democracy is applied to East Asia, some scholars argue that democratisation would 
not lead to the decline of state interventionism (Bell et al. 1995).
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CONCLUSION
Lessons and continuing challenges 
for greater China and Australia
Andrew Podger
The different social and economic contexts that prevail in one nation 
compared to another, and their different histories and institutional 
arrangements, limit the transfer of experience across nations including the 
applicability of governance structures. According to Rudolf Klein, to ‘learn 
from’ you must first ‘learn about’ (Klein 2009). Moreover, international 
pressure for ‘policy learning’ and ‘policy transfer’ can have deleterious 
effects. The differences between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) 
and Australia make this advice particularly apposite.
Notwithstanding its much longer history and the richness of its past 
experience in government administration, China is in the midst of an 
extraordinary transition in which it is actively considering lessons from 
elsewhere that it might adapt to its institutional framework. The transition 
is not just from a developing country to a more advanced economy but also 
from a political command economy to a more market-oriented approach 
in which government plays a different role and is subject to new forms of 
social accountability for performance (Ma 2009). The emerging concepts 
of accountability and performance have yet to be fully institutionalised, 
and are most unlikely even in the longer term to reflect a democratic 
system of government such as Australia’s (Podger & Chan forthcoming). 
Of course, even in Australia, the concepts of accountability and 
performance  continue to evolve. This is evidenced by new public 
management’s (NPM) shift to management for results (or ‘outputs 
and outcomes’) as distinct from a focus on conformance with rules 
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and processes (or ‘inputs’), and by new public governance’s (NPG) 
encouragement of ‘outwards’ accountability direct to clients and 
citizens in conjunction with standard ‘upwards’ accountability through 
the democratic parliamentary process. Sadly, Australia is now shifting 
to a narrower focus on implementation of politically determined policies 
and priorities and away from consideration of the overall impact of both 
policy and management.
Despite the remarkable developments in China over the last 40 years, 
its outstanding reform agenda remains substantial and it is important 
to recognise that the country is still in transition. Unlike many Western 
nations in which systemic ‘checks and balances’ act as forms of institutional 
controls, China’s system of government is based primarily on hierarchic 
control, but within a highly devolved regional and local context. 
At the highest political level is the legislature (the People’s Congress), the 
executive (the State Council) and the judiciary, and their relationship 
with the Communist Party of China (CPC); also the respective roles 
and responsibilities of China’s five levels of government. For the most 
part, these constitutional structures are not the focus of this book, though 
undoubtedly they must shape other institutional structures.
The continuing reform agenda that is relevant to the focus of this 
book concerns the institutional framework within the executive arm of 
government. This includes the structure of ‘core’ ministries and their 
coordination arrangements; the structures for ‘non-core’ organisations 
including public service delivery agencies (and arrangements for non-
government organisations (NGOs) engaged to assist in service delivery), 
regulatory agencies, various ‘integrity’ agencies that oversee other 
parts of government, and state-owned enterprises; and frameworks for 
horizontal management.
This description of the elements of the continuing reform agenda reflects 
the cascading classification of government functions commonly used in 
Australia and other democracies, and may not be relevant to China’s more 
organic institutional framework today or into the future.
For example, central to the discussion in several of the chapters in this 
book that focus on circumstances in Australia is consideration of the 
appropriate level of administrative independence from politics for 
performing different functions. That is not the Chinese approach, where 
the fusion of politics and administration is seen as ‘a positive step to 
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stable, adaptable, highly competent, rule-based and legitimacy-enhancing 
administration’ (Chan 2016). Yet this idea of a degree of independence, or 
relative autonomy, may have more relevance than is formally recognised 
in China at present, as it may still be appropriate to vary the balance 
between conformity and flexibility, and between political control and 
professional independence, with different functions. Moreover, the forces 
that led to some separation of politics from administration in Western 
democracies in the 19th century (and the forces that led to concepts such 
as the separation of powers in the 18th and 19th centuries, and the more 
recent neoliberal measures expanding market forces including within 
government) are affecting China today. These include the importance of 
professional expertise, the need to contain corruption and to promote 
efficiency, administrative and budgetary reform agendas, the need to apply 
regulation fairly and consistently, the importance of serving all citizens 
equitably and justly and, at the international level, the need to apply agreed 
standards on free trade and other aspects of international interaction.
Modern Chinese ideas such as ‘social accountability’ rely upon increased 
transparency and professionalism, which in turn require standards of 
integrity that are not just set politically, but often by bureaucratic edicts, 
reflecting society norms set more widely – including by professions and 
internationally. As discussed in Value for Money (Podger et al. 2018), 
which was compiled from the 2015 workshop of the Greater China 
Australia Dialogue on Public Administration, China has been pursuing an 
ambitious agenda of financial management and budgetary reform drawing 
heavily on the experience of Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) countries, including Australia. Increasingly 
implicit in these reforms are similar (if evolving) concepts of performance 
and accountability explored in this book on institutional structures.
Despite the apparent slowing down of reforms over the last few years 
under President Xi Jinping, which are referred to in Chapter 1, further 
administrative and organisational reform is very likely to be required to 
maintain China’s economic growth and to meet the growing expectations 
of its people. Institutional reform will be a key part of this agenda. 
My view is that this will need to include:
• further strengthening of the policy and coordination capacity of 
the core ministries, building on the modernising measures already 
undertaken via umbrella agencies and coordinating bodies
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• reviewing the governance of non-core agencies including:
 – public service institutions such as schools, hospitals and universities 
to strengthen their professional competence and performance in 
terms of outputs and impact, and to clarify good practice in the 
outsourcing of service delivery to non-government organisations
 – greater alignment between levels of government, especially over the 
central government’s mandates and the capacities of provincial and 
lower level governments to meet central expectations
 – regulatory bodies to strengthen their competence and consistency 
and reliability, so as to improve their effectiveness
 – ‘integrity’ agencies, clarifying what functions should be categorised 
as such, ensuring their capacity to ‘speak truth to power’ and 
reviewing their relationship with the legislature as well as the 
executive
 – the development of more transparent reporting of performance 
to citizens and the community by jurisdictions and public sector 
organisations on matters of targets, milestones, service delivery 
standards and satisfaction levels
 – state-owned enterprises, building on the major reforms already 
implemented, and addressing outstanding issues arising from WTO 
obligations and wider international concerns about competitive 
neutrality (recognising that there is no single approach even across 
the OECD to ownership of public enterprises)
• clarifying good practice in horizontal as well as vertical management, 
including by drawing on the lessons from studies such as those in 
chapters 8 and 9.
Much of this reform to improve accountability, capability and performance 
could be advanced notwithstanding the firmer CPC control evident 
under Xi; aspects, however, would require allowing more flexibility and 
autonomy subject to open performance scrutiny. As Chapter 1 concludes, 
the appropriate degree of autonomy should vary with the function 
of the organisation.
The chapters that focus on Australia demonstrate that institutional reform 
is an ongoing challenge including for countries with mature systems of 
civil service administration within well-established political systems. For 
example, there is clearly room to improve Australia’s utilisation of NGOs 
in the delivery of services and to achieve the aim of citizen-centred services. 
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Those chapters also identify the risks from slowing or backsliding reform. 
Australia has got the balance between political control and autonomy 
wrong in some fields in recent years, thereby undermining civil service 
capability and performance (this is a reversal of the concerns over excessive 
independence expressed widely in the 1970s and 1980s) (Podger 2019). 
Australia could also learn from China without compromising its firm 
attachment to democratic principles and to the separation of politics 
from administration. Lessons may be drawn in particular from China’s 
management of reform – its systematic use of experimentation before 
finalising national policies and promoting implementation across 
the country. These experiments may be initiated locally or be pilots 
established by the national government in cooperation with selected 
local governments. China’s unitary system also ensures close vertical links 
within ministries that could be worth closer examination in Australia 
without compromising Australia’s federal approach. China’s arrangements 
support more shared learning between tiers of government, and provides 
opportunities for the national government to articulate minimum 
standards to be achieved (such as in health care, poverty alleviation, 
air pollution and crime prevention) and to promote particular national 
priorities (such as infrastructure investment). One downside to Australia’s 
approach to the separation of politics from administration is the risk of 
politics being immersed in immediate issues and becoming stridently 
populist. The resulting chopping and changing of policy in an atmosphere 
of hyper-partisanship and diminished appreciation of expertise and the 
importance of longer term strategic reform, are increasingly apparent 
in Western democracies (Wanna 2016). While China’s structural 
arrangements have avoided this in a way that will remain inapplicable in 
Australia, aspects of Chinese practice are worth reflecting upon.
China’s challenge is not only to continue with its multilayered reform 
agenda to clarify institutional roles and responsibilities and governance 
arrangements, but also to address new pressures resembling those 
emerging in many developed countries, such as Australia, to provide more 
responsive citizen-centred services, to ensure high-quality and effective 
regulation and to sustain capability and productivity.
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